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Reconciling Law and Morality in Human Rights Discourse: Beyond the 
Habermasian Account of Human Rights  
By  
Willy Moka-Mubelo, S.J.  
Dissertation Advisor: David M. Rasmussen  
 
In this dissertation I argue for an approach that conceives human rights as both 
moral and legal rights. The merit of such an approach is its capacity to understand human 
rights more in terms of the kind of world free and reasonable beings would like to live in 
rather than simply in terms of what each individual is legally entitled to. While I 
acknowledge that every human being has the moral entitlement to be granted living 
conditions that are conducive to a dignified life, I maintain, at the same time, that the 
moral and legal aspects of human rights are complementary and should be given equal 
weight. The legal aspect compensates for the limitations of moral human rights the 
observance of which depends on the conscience of the individual, and the moral aspect 
tempers the mechanical and inhumane application of the law.  
Unlike the traditional or orthodox approach, which conceives human rights as 
rights that individuals have by virtue of their humanity, and the political or practical 
approach, which understands human rights as legal rights that are meant to limit the 
sovereignty of the state, the moral-legal approach reconciles law and morality in human 
rights discourse and underlines the importance of a legal framework that compensates for 
the deficiencies in the implementation of moral human rights. It not only challenges the 
exclusively negative approach to fundamental liberties but also emphasizes the necessity 
of an enforcement mechanism that helps those who are not morally motivated to refrain 
from violating the rights of others. Without the legal mechanism of enforcement, the 
	   ii	  
understanding of human rights would be reduced to simply framing moral claims against 
injustices.    
Many traditional human rights theorists failed to reconcile the moral and legal 
aspects of human rights. That is why Jürgen Habermas, whose approach to human rights 
provides the guiding intuition of this dissertation, has been criticized for approaching 
human rights from a legal point of view, especially in Between Facts and Norms. Most of 
Habermas’s critics overlooked his goal in the project of reconstructing law. Habermas 
addresses the question of the legitimacy of modern law by finding good arguments for a 
law to be recognized as right and just. For him, modern law has two sources of 
legitimacy: human rights and popular sovereignty. He affirms their mutual presupposition 
in a system of rights within a constitutional democracy.  
In order to grasp Habermas’s moral considerations in his account of human rights, 
one has to go beyond Between Facts and Norms. That is why the relationship Habermas 
establishes between law and morality should constitute the starting point in understanding 
the moral dimension of human rights in his account of human rights. That relationship is 
clarified in the discussion on the interdependence between human rights and human 
dignity. Human dignity provides the ground from which human rights are interpreted and 
justified. It is the standpoint from which individuals can claim rights from one another on 
the basis of mutual respect. Because of human dignity, members of a political community 
can live as free and equal citizens.  
In order to achieve such a goal, there must be structures that facilitate social 
integration. Thus, the existence of a strong civil society that can stimulate discussion in 
the public sphere and promote a vigilant citizenry and respect for human rights becomes 
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very important. The protection of human rights becomes a common and shared 
responsibility. Such a responsibility goes beyond the boundaries of nation-states and 
requires the establishment of a cosmopolitan human rights regime based on the 
conviction that all human beings are members of a community of fate and that they share 
common values which transcend the limits of their individual states. In a cosmopolitan 
human rights regime, people are protected as persons and not as citizens of a particular 
state. The realization of such a regime requires solidarity and the politics of compassion.  
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Introduction	  
 
The title of this dissertation, Reconciling Law and Morality in Human Rights 
Discourse: Beyond the Habermasian Account of Human Rights, points to three questions. 
First, why a dissertation on human rights, a seemingly over-explored topic? Isn’t this a 
way of raising objections that will be difficult to refute? Second, why approach human 
rights from a Habermasian perspective? And third, why reconcile law and morality in 
human rights discourse?  
1.	  Why	  a	  Dissertation	  on	  Human	  Rights?	  	  
Despite the impressive number of books and articles published on human rights, 
and the dissertations and theses written on the subject, the concept of human rights 
remains a challenging concept, and some of its aspects have yet to be further explored. 
As James Griffin notes in the introduction to his book, On Human Rights, there is a 
common “belief that we do not yet have a clear enough idea of what human rights are.”1 
In a similar vein, Michael Rosen observes that “Human rights are obviously deeply 
puzzling— almost everyone nowadays professes commitment to them, yet few people 
would claim that they had a good, principled account of what they are and why we have 
them.”2 Following this same line of thought, Charles Beitz writes, “the problem is that, 
although the idea and the language of human rights have become increasingly prominent 
in public discourse, it has not become any more clear what kinds of objects human rights 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 1.  
2 Michael Rosen, Dignity: Its History and Meaning (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), 54.  
2 Michael Rosen, Dignity: Its History and Meaning (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), 54.  
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are supposed to be, why we should believe that people have them, or what follows from 
this belief for political practice.”3  
Though human rights may mean different things to different people, there is no 
doubt that the concept of human rights is one of the most important and challenging 
concepts of our time. It has become the lingua franca of our pluralist world. Or, as Jack 
Donnelly describes it, “human rights have become a hegemonic political discourse or 
what Mervyn Frost calls ‘settled norms’ of contemporary international society; that is, 
principles that are widely accepted as authoritative within the society of states. Both 
nationally and internationally, full political legitimacy is increasingly judged by and 
expressed in terms of human rights.”4 Thus, human rights are henceforth the standard 
from which we consider and evaluate relations among individuals within a nation and 
relations among nations. Or – to use David Ingram’s formulation – “human rights 
designate goals or standards against which we judge shortfalls in basic goods that any 
fully civilized society ought to provide its citizens.”5 Therefore, human rights are 
“essential and fundamental standards of the legitimacy of a social and political order.”6  
Despite the widely accepted authority of human rights and the common 
acknowledgment of the necessity and importance of promoting the language and practice 
of human rights, there are different interpretations of human rights with regard to their 
applicability, which is often context-sensitive. That is, the understanding of human rights 
is often influenced by the socio-political, geographical, and/or cultural context of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Charles Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), xii.  
4 Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 3rd ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2013), 55.  
5 David Ingram, Habermas: Introduction and Analysis (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), 176.  
6 Rainer Forst, Justification and Critique: Towards a Critical Theory of Politics (Malden: Polity Press, 
2014), 69.  
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theorist or activist of human rights. In a non-Western context, human rights discourse 
might be perceived as an imperialist strategy, which aims at imposing Western culture 
and values upon non-Western countries. Makau Mutua, for example, argues that “the 
human rights corpus should be treated as an experimental paradigm, a work in progress, 
and not a final inflexible truth,”7 because it is exclusively based on Western values. He 
calls for the multi-culturalization of the human rights corpus. That is, the participation of 
all societies and cultural milieus in the reframing of human rights discourse. Only this 
multi-culturalization will allow the human rights corpus to claim genuine universality.8  
Mutua continues arguing – through the savage-victim-savior metaphor9 – that 
human rights discourse portrays the state in non-Western countries, especially in Africa, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Makau Mutua, Human Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2002), ix.  
8 Ibid., xi.  
9 Mutua uses this metaphor (savage-victim-savior) to question the Western discourse on human rights. He 
argues that “the main authors of the human rights discourse, including the United Nations, Western states, 
international nongovernmental organizations, and senior Western academics, constructed this three-
dimensional prism” (p. 10) in order to impose Western culture and values on non-Western countries. The 
first dimension of the prism is the savage, which is the state. The real savage, argues Mutua, is not the state 
but a cultural deviation from human rights… The state itself is a neutral, passive instrumentality that 
conveys savagery by implementing the project of the savage culture (p. 11). Thus, he continues, when 
human rights norms target a deviant state, they are really attacking the normative cultural fabric of variant 
expressed by that state. The culture, and not the state, is the actual savage. From this perspective, human 
rights violations represent a clash between the culture of human rights and the savage culture (p. 23). The 
second dimension of the prism is the victim. The victim is a human being whose “dignity and worth” have 
been violated by the savage. In human rights literature, writes Mutua, the victim is usually presented as a 
helpless innocent who has been abused directly by the state, its agents, or pursuant to an offensive cultural 
or political practice… A basic characteristic of the victim is powerlessness, an inability for self-defense 
against the state or the culture in question (p. 28). For Mutua, “the metaphor of the victim is the giant 
engine that drives the human rights movements. Without the victim there is no savage or savior, and the 
entire human rights enterprise collapses” (p. 27). The third dimension of the prism is the savior, or the 
redeemer, the good angel who protects, vindicates, civilizes, restrains, and safeguards. The savior promises 
freedom from the tyrannies of the state, tradition, and culture. In the human rights story, he contends, the 
savior is the human rights corpus itself, with the United Nations, Western governments, INGOs, and 
Western charities as the actual rescuers, redeemers of a benighted world (p.11). According to Mutua, in the 
human rights narrative, savages and victims are generally nonwhite and non-Western, while the saviors are 
white (p.14). For him, the metaphor of the savior is constructed through two intertwining characteristics: 
Eurocentric universalism and Christianity’s missionary zeal (p. 31).  
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as savage because it conveys savagery by implementing the project of the savage culture. 
For him, “genuine universality is not possible if the core content of the human rights 
corpus is exclusively decided, leaving non-European cultures with only the possibility of 
making minor contributions at the margins and only in its form.”10 From this, he affirms 
that “human rights, and the relentless campaign to universalize them, present a historical 
continuum in an unbroken chain of Western conceptual and cultural dominance over the 
past several centuries. At the heart of this continuum is a seemingly incurable virus: the 
impulse to universalize Eurocentric norms and values by repudiating, demonizing, and 
“othering” that which is different and non-European.”11 He then concludes that “human 
rights are part of the cultural package of the West, complete with an idiom of expression, 
a system of government, and certain basic assumptions about the individual and his 
relationship to society.”12  
Without dismissing the truth of Mutua’s claims altogether, one must, however, 
note that he ignores the tendency of states in societies burdened by unfavorable 
conditions13 to make irrational use of the enormous power that they wield. In deliberately 
underemphasizing this aspect, Mutua justifies abuses committed by tyrannical regimes on 
their own people. If states in some of the non-Western countries are portrayed as 
“savage,” it is not because they embody local cultures, but rather because they fail to 
respect, protect, and promote the minimal conditions of a dignified life for their citizens. 
It is the primary responsibility of the state to assure the security of its people and their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Makau Mutua, Human Rights, 7.  
11 Ibid., 15.  
12 Ibid., 34.  
13 Here I use “burdened societies” in its Rawlsian sense. That is, societies whose historical, social, 
[political], and economic circumstances make their achieving a well-ordered regime, whether liberal or 
decent, difficult if not impossible. See John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1999), 90.  
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well being, and to guarantee the duties on which rights are based. These are, “duties to 
avoid depriving, duties to protect from depriving, and duties to aid the deprived.”14  
For people living in a context of deprivation, human rights are conceived and 
understood as an aspiration to a better tomorrow and an instrument of emancipation. 
Therefore, human rights are not a particularity of a given culture or people. Limiting 
human rights to Westerners is precisely denying the humanity of non-Westerners. People 
have rights not because they belong to a particular cultural or political context, but simply 
because of their “being humans.” If there is any difference between the Westerner and the 
non-Westerner, it will be at the level of the applicability of those rights and not at the 
level of the substance or basic norms of human rights.  
From the above considerations, it clearly appears that writing a dissertation on 
human rights is still relevant. Such an enterprise aims precisely at both shedding light on 
the confusion of interpretations of the discourse on human rights and reassuring those 
whose rights are violated of a society based on mutual respect of fundamental rights. If 
there should be a re-negotiation of human rights discourse, as Mutua suggests, it must be 
grounded in communication and equal respect for everyone, which “is not limited to 
those who are like us, [but] extends to the person of the other in his or her otherness.”15  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996), 52.  
15 I.O, xxxv.  
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2.	  Why	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Habermas?	  	  
If the re-negotiation of human rights discourse requires the participation of all, 
then it needs an approach that includes the “other.”16 Habermas offers such an approach. 
His account of human rights is grounded in his theory of communicative action. For him, 
communicative action, unlike strategic action, which aims at success, means action in 
which “actors coordinate their plans of action with one another by means of a process of 
reaching understanding, that is, in such a way that they draw on the illocutionary binding 
and bounding powers of speech acts.”17 Through communicative action people create and 
transmit meanings and values. As Ingram so nicely describes it, for Habermas 
communicative action and human mode of being are intrinsically related. He writes: 
“Because communicative action is the exclusive medium in which our own personal 
identities come into being and meaning and value are created and transmitted, it is 
inseparable from a human mode of being.”18  
The multiculturation that Mutua is advocating will be successful only if it is based 
on communication. That is, “a form of action that enables individuals to reach mutual 
understanding and agreement on the meaning, values, and norms that unite them and that 
constitute their identities [as human beings].”19 Thus, Habermas’s approach constitutes a 
less controversial basis on which the re-negotiation of human rights discourse can repose. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The “other” here is to be understood in its Habermasian sense. For Habermas, inclusion does not imply 
locking members into a community that closes itself off from others. The “inclusion of the other” means 
rather that the boundaries of the community are open for all, also and most especially for those who are 
strangers to one another and want to remain strangers (Jurgen Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other, 
xxxvi).  
17 Jürgen Habermas, On the Pragmatics of Communication, ed. M. Cooke (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), 
326.  
18 David Ingram, Habermas: Introduction and Analysis, 137-8.  
19 Ibid., 50.  
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His discourse principle sheds more light on the importance of adopting such an approach 
as it states: “Just those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons could 
agree as participants in rational discourses.”20  
3.	  Why	  Reconcile	  Law	  and	  Morality	  in	  Human	  Rights	  Discourse?	  	  
A close look at the literature on human rights reveals that many scholars perceive 
human rights either as moral rights or as legal rights, and rarely as both moral and legal 
rights. As Allen Buchanan observes, there are two main approaches to human rights. On 
the one hand, there are political or practical theorists who assert that human rights are 
rights that serve to limit sovereignty in the context of the state system, and on the other 
hand, there are orthodox or moral theorists who hold that human rights are rights that 
people have simply by virtue of their humanity and they do not presuppose a state 
system.21 To approach human rights simply as serving to limit the sovereignty of the state 
overlooks the obligation to guarantee to citizens minimum conditions for a dignified life. 
Similarly, to approach human rights merely as rights that people have by virtue of their 
humanity misses the necessity of having structural institutions that enable the 
implementation of those rights. That is why it becomes more urgent than ever to side with 
the very few people who approach human rights as both moral and legal rights. Such a 
move – that is, reconciling law and morality in human rights discourse – aims at showing 
that human rights are not only about what we are entitled to or what we deserve, but also 
about the duties of reciprocal respect as equal members of society and which in turn refer 
to the kind of world we want to live in. Or, as Ernst Bloch would put it, human rights are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 BFN, 107.   
21 Allen Buchanan, The Heart of Human Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 10.  
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about a realistic utopia. For him, such a utopia consists not in painting deceptive images 
of a social utopia, which guarantees collective happiness, but in anchoring the ideal of a 
just society in the institutions of constitutional states themselves.22  
Here the Kantian understanding of right plays a crucial role in grasping the 
imperatives of such a world. In his Metaphysics of Morals Kant defines rights as “every 
action which by itself or by its maxim enables the freedom of each individual’s will to 
co-exist with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law.”23 It 
follows from this definition that the Kantian principle of right establishes an order that 
should be based on the moral law of respect for the freedom of each person. Thus, a 
person’s freedom as a moral being “can be restricted only by reasons that would be 
generally and reciprocally applicable to each. A polity based on the principle of rights 
respects you as a moral being.”24  
From the above considerations, it appears that the importance of reconciling law 
and morality in human rights discourse is to increase the awareness that human rights are 
not favors granted to an individual, but rather requirements that transcend any human 
authority and legislation. Therefore, governments do not grant basic rights randomly, but 
they recognize them. Rainer Forst has advanced a similar view. Rights, he writes, are not 
goods received from some higher authority; rather, they are expressions of reciprocal 
respect between persons who accept that, whatever form these rights take, everyone to 
whom they apply has a basic right to be an agent of justification, such that no set of rights 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Ernst Bloch, Natural Law and Human Dignity, cited by Habermas, The Crisis of the European Union: A 
Response (Malden: Polity Press, 2012), 95.  
23 Immanuel Kant, Political Writings, ed. H.S. Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 133.  
24 Seyla Benhabib, Dignity in Adversity: Human Rights in Troubled Times (Malden: Polity Press, 2011), 67. 
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can be determined without adequate justification.25 This implies that human dignity 
should be the sole justification of any action on behalf of human rights. The will to build 
a world based on humanizing values should be accompanied by the firm determination to 
embody statements of intent contained in different treaties and declarations.  
4.	  The	  Claim	  of	  the	  Dissertation	  	  
Having answered these three questions, I would like now to situate the claim of 
the dissertation within the context of Habermas’s account of human rights. As I will show 
through this work, there are a variety of interpretations of human rights, and it is within 
that diversity of interpretations that one should read Habermas’s approach to human 
rights.  
Habermas’s account of human rights contains tensions and ambiguities that have 
provoked various criticisms. He seems to distinguish between the structure of human 
rights and moral rights. The former are “permissions” to act free of interference, and do 
not imply any duties toward the rights bearer. Moral rights, by contrast, derive directly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Forst, Justification and Critique, 69. It is important at this point to note that Rainer Forst’s right to 
justification can be understood as the equivalence of the Kantian second formulation of the categorical 
imperative, which states that every human being must always be treated as an end in himself. Forst 
expresses it as follows: “When I argue for the thesis that we should understand political and social justice 
on the basis of a single right – the right to justification – and that we should construct corresponding 
principles for the basic structure of society accordingly, this argument is based on the conviction that this is 
the best possible way to philosophically reconstruct the Kantian categorical imperative to respect other 
persons as ends in themselves” (Rainer Forst, The Right to Justification: Elements of a Constructivist 
Theory of Justice, New York: Columbia University Press, 2007, p. 2). For Forst, the right to justification 
“expresses the demand that there be no political or social relations of governance that cannot be adequately 
justified to those affected by them.” This implies “the right not to be subjected to laws, structure, or 
institutions that are ‘groundless,’ that is, that are regarded as an expression of power or rule without 
sufficient legitimation” (Forst, The Right to Justification, p. 2). Thus, the right to justification means that 
every person has the right to be given the justification of any action or decision that possibly can affect his 
or her life as a member of a community. For a more detailed discussion of the right to justification, see 
Rainer Forst, The Right to Justification: Elements of a Constructivist Theory of Justice (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2007), especially part I.  
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from moral duties. The obvious question is: does this structure of permissions relegate 
human rights to the status of negative liberties? If so, how can we accommodate positive 
liberties, such as entitlements to subsistence and other goods?  
I will offer an account of human rights that overcomes these problems; 
specifically, my thesis is that human rights are a system of complementary rights. They 
cannot simply be legal rights or moral rights. The legal and moral aspects of human rights 
are co-original. Differently stated, the claim of the dissertation is that human rights are a 
special class of moral rights that need to be put in the form of law. As moral rights, 
human rights need contextualization and specification in the form of legal norms. That is, 
they have to be secured in a legally binding form.  
It is worth noting, at this point, that Habermas’s account of human rights is to be 
situated within his theory of the system of rights whose task is to address the tension 
between private and public autonomy and between basic rights and popular sovereignty. 
As Ingeborg Maus nicely points out, “Habermas’s entire line of argument is aimed at 
explaining the internal link between human rights and popular sovereignty in a system of 
rights which is based on the equal value and mutual enabling of private and public 
autonomy.”26 This mediation between private and public autonomy and between human 
rights and popular sovereignty is also to be understood as an answer to the debate 
between civic republicanism and classical liberalism over the issue of legitimacy of law.  
For classical liberalism, we should “postulate the priority of human rights that 
guarantee the prepolitical liberties of the individual and set limits on the sovereign will of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Ingeborg Maus, “Liberties and Popular Sovereignty: On Jurgen Habermas’s Reconstruction of the 
System of Rights,” in Cardozo Law Review, Vol. 17 (1995-1996): 833-34.  
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the political legislator.”27 For civic republicanism the emphasis should be on “the 
intrinsic, noninstrumentalizable value of civic self-organization, so that human rights 
have a binding character for a political community only as elements of their own 
consciously appropriated tradition.”28 In brief, each view champions either popular 
sovereignty or human rights as the source of legitimacy. Classic liberalism emphasizes 
the precedence of human rights over popular sovereignty while civic republicanism 
stresses the importance of popular sovereignty over human rights.   
According to Habermas, the cause of the so-called competition between human 
rights and popular sovereignty resides in the attempt to oppose human rights, private 
autonomy, and the rule of law, on the one hand, to popular sovereignty, public autonomy, 
political rights, and democracy, on the other hand. More often, the attempt to solve this 
dichotomy overemphasizes one side to the detriment of the other. Habermas intends to 
solve this problem by showing that both private and public autonomy presuppose one 
another; therefore they are co-original and constitute the basis of legitimacy. In arguing 
for an “internal relation” between private and public autonomy, notes William Rehg, 
Habermas wants to provide an account of legitimate law in which both human rights and 
popular sovereignty play distinct, irreducible roles.29  
An attempt to reconcile human rights and popular sovereignty was made by Kant 
and Rousseau. But, according to Habermas, both Kant and Rousseau failed to reconcile 
popular sovereignty with individual rights because Kant, on the one hand, “emphasizes a 
moral reading of human rights that subordinates popular sovereignty and civic autonomy 
and Rousseau, on the other hand, provides an ethical reading of popular sovereignty – 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 BFN, 100. 
28 Ibid.  
29 Translator’s Introduction, BFN, xxv.  
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where, by ‘ethical’ Habermas means pertaining to a particular community’s form of 
life.”30 Differently put, “Kant grounded law in morality and Rousseau grounded it in the 
shared life of a unified and virtuous ethical community.”31 In both cases, notes Hugh 
Baxter, law’s legitimacy is established extralegally, by virtue of the postulated 
correspondence between the legal order and some other order – whether moral or 
ethical.”32  
In summary, for Habermas, the failure to reconcile human rights and popular 
sovereignty in a non-competitive manner is related to the tendency to interpret these two 
principles either as moral principles or as ethical values. The “moral principles” 
interpretation emphasizes self-determination and autonomy of individuals while the 
“ethical values” approach emphasizes the self-realization of the political community. 
Given this failure, Habermas develops a theory of rights or an account of human rights 
that affirms the co-originality of human rights and popular sovereignty. His account is 
grounded in discourse theory. By grounding the co-originality thesis in discourse theory 
he aims to show that the connection between human rights and popular sovereignty is 
made possible through the procedures of a discursive process of opinion- and will-
formation. This process is then institutionalized through law; and such an 
institutionalization leads to “a normative model of contemporary democracy, which is 
based on the substance of human rights as a formal condition for deliberative politics.”33   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Hugh Baxter, Habermas: The Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2011), 66.  
31 Ibid.  
32 Ibid.  
33 Jurgen Habermas, “Human Rights and Popular Sovereignty: The Liberal and Republican Versions,” in 
Ration Juris, vol.7, issue 1 (March 1994): 1.  
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Habermas’s account has met with much opposition because he contends that “the 
concept of human rights does not have its origins in morality, but rather bears the imprint 
of the modern concept of individual liberties, hence of a specifically juridical concept. 
Human rights are juridical by their very nature.”34 In other words, human rights, for 
Habermas, are primarily legal rights. And legal rights have a normative basis, but not a 
specifically moral one.  
Among the many people who challenge this understanding of human rights are 
Thomas Pogge, Rainer Forst, Jon Mahoney, and David Ingram. For Pogge, human rights 
are basically moral claims. They express ultimate and weighty moral concerns, which are 
unrestricted, broadly sharable, and normally override other normative considerations. 
These moral concerns are focused on human beings who all have equal status: They have 
exactly the same human rights, and the moral significance of these rights and their 
fulfillment do not vary with whose human rights are at stake.35 Thus, for Pogge, “making 
the law alone the decisive yardstick for a society’s human-rights record is implausible.”36  
In a similar vein, Rainer Forst criticizes Habermas for carrying out the 
justification of basic rights in a manner that is overly immanent to law.37 For him, 
Habermas’s conception of human rights does not adequately account for the moral-
constructivist content of basic principles of justice.38 Following the same line of criticism, 
Jon Mahoney contends that Habermas does not sufficiently emphasize moral injury and 
the concept of the person. According to Mahoney, Habermas’s conception of “rights 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 I.O, 190.  
35 Thomas Pogge, “The International Significance of Human Rights,” in The Journal of Ethics, vol. 4, 
no.1/2 (Jan. – Mar., 2000): 46.  
36 Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights (Malden: Polity Press, 2008), 66.  
37 Rainer Forst, The Right to Justification (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 109.   
38 Ibid., 101.  
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without dignity,” as he calls it, ignores the relation between rights and moral injury in an 
unacceptable way, because it cannot account for what Mahoney considers to be a basic 
moral intuition; namely, that citizens as persons are worthy of equal concern and respect 
and that this moral standing is prior to, rather than coextensive with, a just system of 
law.39 For Mahoney then, our obligation to regard others as bearers of rights is at least in 
part moral obligation. He thinks “this perspective is intentionally left out of Habermas’s 
theory of rights on the grounds that attempts to make law accountable to morality cannot 
but fail to be insensitive to the many non-moral functions that modern legal systems must 
carry out.”40 These claims are not entirely fair to Habermas’s view on human rights. I 
will say more about them when I deal with Habermas’s critics in the following chapters.  
Ingram’s criticism highlights Habermas’s deliberate decision to focus most 
exclusively on the legal aspect of human rights. He argues, “Habermas’s failure to 
adequately clarify the moral status of human rights prevents him from appreciating the 
unconditional moral ground of subsistence rights in basic human needs and 
capabilities.”41 For Ingram, “by focusing almost exclusively on the juridical notion of 
human rights as legal claims – and virtually ignoring the moral notion of human rights as 
aspirations – Habermas neglects what is perhaps most distinctive about a discourse theory 
of human rights, namely, the progressive genesis of human rights in a collective process 
of enlightenment.”42  
Though Habermas seems to overemphasize the legal aspect of human rights, as 
the above critics point out, he does, however, acknowledge the moral justification of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Jon Mahoney, “Rights without dignity? Some critical reflections on Habermas’s procedural model of law 
and democracy,” in Philosophy and Social Criticism, vol.27, n.3 (May 2001): 22.  
40 Ibid., 23.  
41 David Ingram, Habermas: Introduction and Analysis, 177.  
42 Ibid.  
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those rights. For him, “what lends [human rights] the appearance of moral rights is not 
their content, and most especially not their structure, but rather their mode of validity, 
which points beyond the legal orders of nation-states.”43 Thus, “Basic rights are equipped 
with a universal validity claim because they can be justified exclusively from the moral 
point of view.”44  
Forst does not seem to be satisfied with Habermas’s understanding of morally 
justified rights. He argues that it should be insisted against Habermas that basic rights and 
principles, which must be morally justified intersubjectively, maintain their moral content 
even if they can only become legitimate law via politically autonomous law-making, and 
even if they were justifiable as implications of the legal institutionalization of the 
discourse principle. The moral content must, and herein lies the point to be stressed, enter 
into the basic structure itself via social procedures of justification.45  
Another acknowledgment of the moral aspect of human rights appears – though 
not clearly enough – in Habermas’s article, “The Concept of Human Dignity and the 
Realistic Utopia of Human Rights.” This article is, for Habermas, an attempt to explain 
the moral-legal Janus face of human rights through the mediating role of the concept of 
human dignity. He argues that only membership in a constitutional political community 
that grants equal rights to each citizen can protect the equal human dignity of 
everybody.46 In this article, Habermas seems to reconsider his claim according to which 
human rights are primarily legal rights. In his view, the difference between human rights 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 I.O, 190.  
44 Ibid., 191.  
45 Rainer Forst, The Right to Justification, 110.  
46 Jürgen Habermas, “The Concept of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of Human Rights,” in 
Metaphilosophy, vol. 41, no. 4 (July 2010), 464. 	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and other legal rights resides in the fact that human rights are legal rights that have 
universal moral justification.  
As one can notice, in bringing in the concept of human dignity, Habermas is 
reframing the question of human rights in terms of a Judeo-Christian approach in which 
the individual possesses certain inherent dignity. Thus, it becomes important for human 
rights to be viewed not just as simple moral rights, but also as legal rights because of 
what they protect for the good of human association, which is something so vital. As 
Ingram clearly explains it, the enforcement of the liberal rights that constitute the core of 
human rights “is so crucial to the very existence of society that it cannot remain 
contingent on the caprice of private ‘moral’ conscience. As a related matter, human rights 
that are only moral rights suffer from the defects of a ‘state of nature’: their precise 
meaning, individual application (adjudication), and coercive enforcement are uncertain 
and subject to political opportunism.”47  
Reference to human dignity adds a new dimension to Habermas’s account of 
human rights; but does it change his view? A careful reading of this account reveals that 
there are many different claims that Habermas makes. This raises some important 
questions to be seriously considered: Do these different claims cohere? Are the changes 
in Habermas’s formulation of human rights consistent with his prior developments? Are 
the moral and legal aspects of human rights “mutually inclusive”?  
When seen as a whole, there is neither a profound shift nor a contradiction in 
Habermas’s account of human rights. He is simply becoming more explicit by integrating 
some of the elements he left out in his earlier account. His later account is not a revision 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 David Ingram, Habermas: Introduction and Analysis, 178.  
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of his development of the system of rights in Between Facts and Norms. Rather, it is “a 
complement to [his] original introduction of the system of rights.”48 After reading Jeffrey 
Flynn – with whom he agrees on the fact that “human rights differ from moral rights in 
that the former are oriented toward institutionalization and call for a shared act of 
inclusive will-formation, whereas morally acting persons regard one another without 
further mediation as subjects who are embedded from the start in a network of moral 
rights and duties” – Habermas admits that he did not originally take into account two 
things:  
First, the cumulative experiences of violated dignity [which] constitute a source of 
moral motivations for entering into the historically unprecedented constitution-
making practices that arose at the end of the eighteenth century. Second, the 
status-generating notion of social recognition of the dignity of others [which] 
provides a conceptual bridge between the moral idea of the equal respect for all 
and the legal form of human rights.49  
From the above, we can conclude that Habermas has been accused of neglecting 
the moral aspect of human rights. Such a criticism can be relevant only if we limit 
ourselves to the reading of Between Facts and Norms. But if we consider Habermas’s 
later reflections on human rights, it becomes obvious that he is giving an important place 
to their moral dimension.  
5.	  Organization	  of	  the	  Dissertation	  	  	  
I have divided the dissertation into five chapters. The first chapter focuses on the 
concept of human rights in Between Facts and Norms. In this chapter, I will present and 
discuss Habermas’s interpretation of human rights through the reading of his theory of 
rights. In his interpretation of human rights (in BFN), he wants to avoid the trend to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Habermas, “The Concept of Human Dignity,” footnote 10, p. 470.  
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subordinate human rights to morality. He makes it clear from the beginning that his 
approach to human rights is mainly a legal one. This can be explained by the fact that 
Habermas is resolving the tension between the classical liberal understanding of human 
rights and the civic republican approach to popular sovereignty. Each of these currents 
emphasizes either the priority of human rights over popular sovereignty or the opposite.  
For a classical liberal, individual rights should be given precedence in order to 
avoid the tyranny of the majority and set limits on the sovereign will of the political 
legislator. For a civic republican, popular sovereignty should be promoted in order to 
oppose any external imposition of law. This leads to a tension in the justification of the 
legitimacy of law. In order to solve the tension, Habermas outlines a normative 
conception of rights and democracy by applying the discourse principle to legal form. He 
defends the internal relation between human rights and popular sovereignty and between 
private and public autonomy. For him, “private and public autonomy, human rights and 
popular sovereignty, mutually presuppose one another.”50  
In Habermas’s view, rights of citizens must be the reflection of the will of the 
people. This is to say, there are no political rights without the will of the people. Thus, for 
him, the source of the legitimacy of law is neither human rights nor popular sovereignty, 
but rather their interdependence. This attempt to reconcile human rights and popular 
sovereignty – or private autonomy and public autonomy – raises an important question. Is 
it possible to conceive human rights neither as external moral constraints imposed on the 
legislator nor as a reflection of a particular community’s traditions? The answer to this 
question will show that the process of legally institutionalizing popular sovereignty 
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requires the securement of basic rights of legal persons (private autonomy). In that sense 
human rights can be regarded as conditions that make popular sovereignty possible.  
The presentation of Habermas’s interpretation will be followed by the discussion 
of his critics’ arguments. Thomas Pogge, for example, disagrees with Habermas’s legal 
approach to human rights. He contends that human rights are essentially moral rights. As 
such, they express ultimate moral concerns. That is, every person has a “moral duty to 
respect human rights, a duty that does not derive from a more general moral duty to 
comply with national or international legal instruments.”51 In advocating the moral 
approach to human rights, Pogge wants to avoid the understanding according to which 
“human rights are basic or constitutional rights as each state ought to set them forth in its 
fundamental legal texts and ought to make them effective through appropriate institutions 
and policies.”52  For Pogge, this understanding of human rights clearly appears in 
Habermas’s account when he claims that “the concept of human rights does not have its 
origins in morality… Human rights are juridical by their very nature.”53 This, in Pogge’s 
view, implies that “it belongs to the meaning of human rights that they demand for 
themselves the status of constitutional rights.”54  
Pogge argues that such an understanding of human rights (as legal rights) may 
render human rights weak, for even when a human right is appropriately juridified and 
the corresponding legal rights are observed and reliably enforced by the government and 
courts, social obstacles may still prevent citizens from enjoying the object of the human 
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right in question.55 In a similar vein, David Ingram argues that because Habermas rejects 
a moral theory of human rights, he ends up with a juridical account of human rights that 
marginalizes the rights to subsistence.  
From these critics’ arguments, it clearly appears that the general line of criticism 
against Habermas is that human rights should be moral rights and not legal rights. As a 
response to these critiques, I will argue that Habermas’s argument in Between Facts and 
Norms is more about legitimacy. Given that the entire burden of legitimation is borne by 
the democratic process, he wants to establish a close relationship between democracy and 
the rule of law. As he expresses it himself, “The argument developed in Between Facts 
and Norms essentially aims to demonstrate that there is a conceptual or internal relation, 
and not simply a historically contingent association, between the rule of law and 
democracy.”56 However, in his reconstructive argument – which is grounded in discourse 
principle and legal form – Habermas accords a pivotal importance to the legal form. That 
is why he is not very clear about the understanding of human rights as moral rights, 
though in his later work he characterizes them as morally valid claims.   
The second chapter will examine the relationship between law and morality. I will 
argue that law must be understood as a functional complement of morality because both 
legal and moral questions refer to the same problem of legitimately ordering interpersonal 
relationships through justified norms. Therefore, “politically enacted law, if it is to be 
legitimate, must be at least in harmony with moral principles that claim a general validity 
that extends beyond the limits of any concrete legal community.”57 This does not mean 
that morality should be regarded as a higher domain of value in which basic legal and 	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political principles must be grounded. Habermas’s distinction between law and morality 
challenges precisely this traditional assumption. For him, positive law cannot simply be 
subordinated to morality.  
I will first discuss the opposing arguments of legal positivists and natural law 
theorists with regard to the relationship between law and morality. Whereas legal 
positivists argue that law and morality are independent, natural law theorists hold that law 
and morality are interdependent. Second, I will examine Habermas’s consideration of the 
differences and similarities between law and morality. Finally, I will consider the 
complementarity between law and morality, especially in their role of regulating social 
interactions.  
The third chapter will deal with the relationship between human rights and human 
dignity. I will begin by presenting the current debate on the meaning and justification of 
human dignity as the foundation of human rights. Then, I will discuss Habermas’s view 
on the relationship between human dignity and human rights, especially in his article, 
“The Concept of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of Human Rights.” In this 
article, Habermas aims at explaining the moral-legal Janus face of human rights through 
the mediating role of the concept of human dignity.58 He argues that moral respect for the 
human person is primarily revealed through historical experiences. Reactions to those 
experiences help us identify human rights and enforce them. Therefore, “only 
membership in a constitutional political community can protect, by granting equal rights, 
the equal human dignity of everybody.”59  
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In the light of this article, I will argue that in order to understand fully the 
meaning of human rights, one has to consider human dignity. In other words, the need for 
a particular human right becomes obvious when human dignity is violated. The violation 
of human dignity raises the awareness of the importance of human rights. Thus, human 
rights and human dignity are intrinsically related. This brings to light the fact that human 
rights should not only be conceived as legal rights, but also as morally valid claims. 
However, human rights cannot be reduced to simple moral claims. In order to have an 
effect on the intersubjective relationship among citizens, they must be approached as 
legal norms as well, because what moral norms lack is brought to the positive level of 
effectiveness by legal norms.  
In addition to exploring the interdependence between human rights and human 
dignity, I will consider the two metaphors that Habermas uses in the article so as to 
describe the role of human dignity as the bridge between law and morality. The first 
metaphor describes human dignity as the door through which morality gets into the law. 
The second metaphor understands human dignity as the conceptual hinge that connects 
morality and positive law. I will also consider the question of whether human dignity 
should be regarded as the foundation of human rights. In order to do so, I will examine 
Jeremy Waldron’s position, which holds that the concept of human dignity lacks a clear 
meaning and therefore can be perceived as an obstacle to the claim that human rights are 
based on human dignity. Waldron has a legal approach, which claims that law is the 
natural habitat of dignity. For him, dignity seems to be at home in law. It should not “be 
treated in the first instance as a moral idea.”60  
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I will draw on Michael Rosen and George Kateb to respond to the foundational 
challenge of human dignity. For Rosen, there is a great deal of conflict about dignity in 
its use in the law than in morality.61 For Kateb, “the idea of human dignity not only 
serves to help defend the theory of individual rights but also gives a perspective on the 
dignity of the human species.”62 Human dignity is an existential value that pertains to the 
identity of a person as a human being. To injure or to try to destroy someone’s dignity is 
to treat that person as subhuman or as a thing. 
The fourth chapter, which is the continuation of chapter three, will discuss the 
importance of reconciling the moral and legal aspects of human rights. I will argue that 
both moral and legal aspects of human rights presuppose each other. That is, the concept 
of human rights consists of moral and legal dimensions. Valid moral claims must be 
legally recognized within a legal order in order to be effective human rights. The moral-
legal face of human rights helps us understand that human rights should no longer be 
conceived as a mere protection of human liberties and dignity. They must include the 
promotion and enhancement of conditions of life that give opportunities to every human 
person to pursue and achieve his or her dreams. Such a goal can be achieved only if there 
are institutions that can provide a stable basis for social integration. Hence the importance 
of a strong civil society that can “stimulate discussion in the public sphere and generate 
ideas that, one day, may influence the course of lawmaking or other official decision.”63  
The fifth chapter will deal with a cosmopolitan human rights regime. As 
Habermas notes, “the weak link in the general protection of human rights remains the 
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rights, if necessary by curtailing the sovereign power of nation-states.”64 He contends that 
the law prohibiting intervention is in need of revision given the fact that human rights 
need to be implemented in many cases despite the opposition of national governments. I 
will argue that the protection of human rights is a shared and common responsibility. 
Human rights secured in one country can stand the chance of being meaningful only if 
human rights are guaranteed in relations among the other countries of the world.  
Respect for human rights is not simply the primary responsibility of a single state. 
It is a moral duty and moral obligation of the entire human community. The primary 
responsibility of the state is the protection and promotion of those rights. This primary 
responsibility requires the assistance of the international community. Thus, protecting 
and promoting human rights should not be limited merely to preventing conflicts and 
wars around the world. They must provide means for dignified conditions of life for 
everyone. This will be more effective if the promotion and protection of human rights are 
founded on solidarity and politics of compassion. Here I will discuss concepts such as: 
state sovereignty, humanitarian intervention, responsibility to protect, solidarity, and 
politics of compassion.  
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 I.O, 182.  
	   25	  
Chapter	  1	  
Habermas’s	  Account	  of	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Between	  Facts	  and	  
Norms	  
 
The main aim of Habermas in Between Facts and Norms is to address the issue of 
the legitimacy of modern law. Here legitimacy means that there are good public 
arguments for a law to be recognized as right and just. Thus, given that the burden of 
legitimacy rests upon the democratic process, Habermas establishes an internal 
relationship between democracy and the rule of law. As he puts it, “The argument 
developed in Between Facts and Norms essentially aims to demonstrate that there is a 
conceptual or internal relation, and not simply a historically contingent association, 
between the rule of law and democracy.”65 In this process of addressing the issue of 
legitimacy, he wants to avoid the tendencies to ground the legitimacy of law either in 
human rights or popular sovereignty. He does this by overcoming the competition 
between human rights and popular sovereignty through the affirmation of their mutual 
presupposition in a system of rights within a constitutional democracy. For that reason, 
he avoids resorting to natural law.  
The mutual presupposition of human rights and popular sovereignty clearly 
appears in chapter three of Between Facts and Norms, where Habermas intends to 
rationally reconstruct the self-understanding of modern legal orders. He takes as his 
starting point the rights citizens must accord one another if they want to legitimately 
regulate their common life by means of positive law.66 This formulation of “regulating 
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life in common by means of positive law” highlights the central role of the concept of 
rights in understanding law. That role is to “fix the limits within which a subject is 
entitled to freely exercise her will.”67 In that sense, the concept of individual rights is 
identified with the concept of liberty of individual freedom of action. This understanding 
of rights is already found in the Declaration of Rights of Man and of the Citizen where, in 
article 4, political liberty is defined as the power of doing whatever does not injure 
another. This implies that the free exercise of the same rights must be secured for 
everyone. Here appears then the idea of equal treatment that is found in the concept of 
right and which is made explicit by the concept of law.  
Thus, an effective regulation of life in common requires that rights define the 
same liberties for everyone regarded as bearer of rights. A similar understanding of the 
role of rights is expressed both by Immanuel Kant and John Rawls. In his Metaphysics of 
Morals, Kant defines right as “every action which by itself or by its maxim enables the 
freedom of each individual’s will to co-exist with the freedom of everyone else in 
accordance with a universal law.”68 Following the same line of thought, Rawls formulates 
his first principle of justice as follows: “Each person has an equal claim to a fully 
adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the 
same scheme for all.”69  
Given the central role of rights in regulating life in common, Habermas introduces 
the four categories of rights that are necessary in order to constitute the legal status of 
legal persons belonging to an association of free and equal citizens. He shows that if we 	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understand human rights both as rights that have the legal form of subjective rights and as 
rights with a universal moral content, then we should admit that they could be sufficiently 
justified by moral arguments alone. Though these rights can be legalized, they are 
“unsaturated” as long as they are not implemented in a legal system. That is to say, they 
are not yet what they are meant to be. Thus, human rights count as effective legal rights 
only if they are implemented within a functioning and operating constitutional system.  
From this, we see why Habermas contends that human rights are legal rights from 
scratch. He refers to Hobbes’s understanding of subjective rights in order to support his 
claim. Hobbes was the first, so to speak, to introduce, in the Leviathan, a legal system 
that was built up from the bottom in terms of subjective rights that give each citizen the 
right to do what he or she wants within the state: “The right of nature is the liberty each 
man hath, to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own 
nature; that is to say, of his own life.”70 Thus, for Hobbes, “right is liberty, namely that 
liberty which the civil law leaves us.”71 Perez Zagorin nicely expresses it in the following 
way: “[For Hobbes, right] is the freedom to do what we wish in any and all matters in 
which we are not subject to the obligation of law to do or forbear.”72  
As we can notice, Hobbes’s conception of rights is generally one of subjective 
rights73. Such an understanding of rights has almost nothing in common with morality. 
Rather, it seems to be a totally new conception, which starts with the idea of constituting 
a sphere of legally protected autonomy for private citizens. For Habermas, this is the 	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starting point of the idea of subjective rights, which protect the sphere of what one wants 
to do. As such, it constitutes subjective freedom in the sense of arbitrary choice. It 
follows that arbitrary choice comes first. The logical implication is that modern legal 
systems are at the start not moral.  
But the moral content comes into play in two steps. The first step is the 
implementation of human rights and the second step is the claim against political 
domination in such a way that this claim can be democratically legitimated. This is where 
the real moral sense comes in. It comes in through the democratic procedure, through 
which citizens are both legislators and addressees of the law. Without this procedure no 
law can be regarded as legitimate.  
In what follows, I will present Habermas’s account of human rights in Between 
Facts and Norms. In order to do so, I will first sketch briefly the basic problems to which 
Habermas’s theory of rights is an answer; that is, the classical liberal conception of 
human rights and the civic republican conception of popular sovereignty. Second, I will 
examine the co-originality thesis in which Habermas affirms the interdependence of 
human rights and popular sovereignty. Third, I will explore the relationship between 
private and public autonomy. Fourth, I will present Habermas’s system of rights by 
highlighting the relationship between the discourse principle, the legal form, and the 
democratic principle. Fifth, I will present and discuss the arguments of some of 
Habermas’s critics.  
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1.1.	  Classical	  Liberalism	  Versus	  Civic	  Republicanism	  	  	  
In order to better understand the conception of human rights that Habermas 
develops in Between Facts and Norms, it is important to consider the two theories that are 
at the heart of his enterprise of reconstructing the system of rights. That is, classical 
liberalism and civic republicanism. These two currents of thought have different 
approaches to the question of the legitimacy of modern law. For a classical liberal, the 
source of legitimacy of law is human rights and for a civic republican, it is popular 
sovereignty. Differently put, the crucial difference between classical liberalism and civic 
republicanism resides in their understanding of the democratic process. They also differ 
from each other on their views on the concept of the citizen, on legal order, on law, on 
rights, on politics, and on opinion-and will-formation. Here, I will just consider 
differences on the democratic process, politics, opinion- and will-formation, the concept 
of citizen, and the source of legitimacy of modern law because the other aspects are 
implicitly developed in the notions I have chosen to look at.  
1.1.1.	  Differences	  on	  the	  Democratic	  Process,	  Politics,	  and	  Will-­‐formation	  	  	  	  
The understanding of the democratic process is a crucial difference between 
classical liberalism and civic republicanism. From a liberal point of view, “the 
democratic process takes place exclusively in the form of compromises between 
competing interests. Fairness is supposed to be guaranteed by rules of compromise-
formation that regulate the general and equal right to vote, the representative composition 
of parliamentary bodies, their order of business, and so on.”74 Such a conception of the 
democratic process reduces its task to “programming the state in the interest of society, 	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where the state is conceived as an apparatus of public administration, and society is 
conceived as a system of market-structured interactions of private persons and their 
labor.”75 As a result, this understanding of the task of the democratic process influences 
the conception of the function of politics, which, in the liberal view, is to bundle and 
bring to “bear private social interests against a state apparatus that specializes in the 
administrative employment of political power for collective goals.”76 Thus, the liberal 
view assigns to politics the function of mediating between private social interests and the 
administrative employment of political power.   
In addition to this function of mediation, the liberal view conceives politics as a 
struggle for positions with a view to administrative power. Thus, every political process 
is geared toward maintaining or acquiring political power. Similarly, political opinion- 
and will-formation no longer aims at reaching mutual understanding, but rather at gaining 
as many voters as possible. Simply put, political opinion- and will-formation becomes an 
instrument of success. Habermas compares the choices of voters in a success-oriented 
approach to the choices of participants in a market and describes the liberal view of will-
formation as follows:  
On the liberal view, politics is essentially a struggle for positions that grant access 
to administrative power. The political process of opinion- and will-formation in 
the public sphere and in parliament is shaped by the competition of strategically 
acting collectives trying to maintain or acquire positions of power. Success is 
measured by the citizens’ approval of persons and programs, as quantified by 
voters. In their choices at the polls, voters express their preferences. Their votes 
have the same structure as the choices of participants in a market, in that their 
decisions license access to positions of power that political parties fight over with 
a success-oriented attitude similar to that of players in the market.77  	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Unlike the liberal view, which understands politics as a struggle for administrative 
power and reduces its function to the mediation between private social interests and the 
administrative employment of political power, the republican view conceives politics as 
“the reflective form of substantial ethical life. [It] constitutes the medium in which the 
members of quasi-natural solidary communities become aware of their dependence on 
one another and, acting with full deliberation as citizens, further shape and develop 
existing relations of reciprocal recognition into an association of free and equal 
consociates under law.”78 From this, it clearly appears that for civic republicanism, the 
function of politics is to assure and foster the socialization process as a whole.  
This approach to politics influences the republican understanding of the political 
opinion- and will-formation. Contrary to the liberal view where opinion- and will-
formation in the public sphere obeys the logic and structure of the market processes, in 
the republican view opinion- and will-formation obeys “the obstinate structures of a 
public communication oriented to mutual understanding. For politics as the citizens’ 
practice of self-determination, the paradigm is not the market but dialogue.”79 It is 
founded on communicative power and preserves the meaning of the democratic process, 
which challenges compromises made between competing private interests. As Habermas 
rightly observes, the republicans conceive the citizens’ political will as “the medium 
through which society constitutes itself as a political whole… In the citizens’ practice of 
political self-determination the polity becomes conscious of itself as a totality and acts on 
itself via the collective will of the citizens.”80  
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Despite its ability to include everyone in the life of the political community and in 
the communicative process that leads to a collective self-understanding, the republican 
view on democratic process, politics, and opinion- and will-formation is very idealistic. It 
relies more on the good will and virtues of citizens. Thus, it misses the point of politics, 
which is not first of all about questions of ethical self-understanding. As Habermas 
convincingly points it out, politics is not concerned in the first place with questions of 
ethical self-understanding, but rather is about regulating our common life. The mistake of 
the republican view consists in an ethical foreshortening of political discourse.81  
1.1.2.	  Differences	  on	  the	  Concept	  of	  the	  Citizen	  	  	  
Both traditions – classical liberalism and civic republicanism – differ from each 
other on their conception of the “citizen.” On the one hand, classical liberalism conceives 
the individual rights that a person has vis-à-vis the state and others as the determinant and 
defining factor of his status as citizen. Therefore, the government has the duty to protect 
those individual rights as long as the person makes use of his private interests within the 
boundaries of the legal order. Seen from this perspective, individual rights are understood 
as “negative rights that guarantee a domain of freedom of choice within which legal 
persons are freed from external compulsion.”82 The same understanding is applied to 
political rights that “afford citizens the opportunity to assert their private interests in such 
a way that, by means of elections, the composition of parliamentary bodies, and the 
formation of a government, these interests are finally aggregated into a political will that 
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can affect the administration.”83 In this way the citizens are those who determine whether 
the government authority is exercised according to their interests or not.  
On the other hand, civic republicanism does not consider the negative liberties of 
private individuals to be the defining factor of their status as citizens. Rather, as 
Habermas puts it,  
Political rights – preeminently rights of political participation and communication 
– are positive liberties. They do not guarantee freedom from external compulsion, 
but guarantee instead the possibility of participating in a common practice, 
through which the citizens can first make themselves into what they want to be – 
politically responsible subjects of a community of free and equal citizens.  
Thus, from a republican point of view, political participation is not limited to the 
control of governmental activities by the citizens who already have a social autonomy 
through the exercise of their private rights, but aims at allowing “an inclusive process of 
equal opinion- and will-formation in which free and equal citizens reach an 
understanding on which goals and norms lie in the equal interests of all.”84 In this way, 
notes Habermas, the republican citizen is credited with more than an exclusive concern 
with his or her private interests.85  
1.1.3.	  Differences	  on	  the	  Source	  of	  the	  Legitimacy	  of	  Modern	  Law	  	  	  
In order to understand Habermas’s co-originality thesis, it is important to look at 
the way both classical liberalism and civic republicanism approach the issue of the 
legitimacy of modern law. Each of these two traditions attempts to resolve the apparent 
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tension about the source of legitimacy by championing either the precedence of human 
rights over popular sovereignty or the primacy of the latter over the former.  
Liberals, on the one hand, consider human rights to be the sole source of 
legitimacy of modern law. They conceive human rights as “the expression of moral self-
determination”86 and defend human rights so as to guarantee individual rights and avoid 
the tyranny of the majority. In so doing, they limit “the sovereign will of the political 
legislator.”87 Thus, for liberals, human rights impose themselves on our moral insight as 
something given. Civic republicans, on the other hand, tend to interpret popular 
sovereignty as “the expression of ethical self-realization.”88 For them, the value of civic 
self-organization should not be instrumentalized. Thus, from the republican view, 
“human rights have a binding character for a political community only as elements of 
their own consciously appropriated tradition.”89 It claims that nothing can be accepted 
unless it corresponds with the authentic life project of the ethical-political will of a self-
actualizing collectivity. Therefore, civic republicans consider popular sovereignty to be 
the sole source of legitimacy of modern law.  
From the perspective of both traditions, there is no mutual presupposition between 
human rights and popular sovereignty, but rather a competitive relationship. Habermas is 
of the opinion that in promoting either human rights or popular sovereignty as the source 
of the legitimacy of modern law, both traditions (classical liberalism and civic 
republicanism) fail to perceive the internal connection between human rights and popular 
sovereignty, which “lies in the normative content of the very mode of exercising political 	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autonomy, a mode that is not secured simply through the grammatical form of general 
laws but only through the communicative form of discursive processes of opinion- and 
will-formation.”90 Hence, he comes up with the co-originality thesis, which affirms the 
interdependence of human rights and popular sovereignty.  
1.2.	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Popular	  Sovereignty:	  The	  Co-­‐originality	  Thesis	  	  	  
 
Habermas’s co-originality thesis is a response to classical liberalism and civic 
republicanism approaches to the question of the source of the legitimacy of modern law. 
It affirms the interdependence of human rights and popular sovereignty. That is, human 
rights and popular sovereignty presuppose each other in justifying the legitimacy of 
modern law. Therefore, they are co-original and cannot be in contradiction with each 
other. To be sure, for Habermas modern law is justified by both human rights and popular 
sovereignty. Such a justification is realized through the democratic process that grants to 
everyone the opportunity to participate in the democratic will-formation and in the 
discussion of issues related to the functioning of the legal community. It does not derive 
from a higher-ranking law, be it moral or not. As he puts it, “positive law can no longer 
derive its legitimacy from a higher-ranking moral law but only from a procedure of 
presumptively rational opinion- and will-formation.”91 The aim of Habermas’s argument 
is to explain the internal link between human rights and popular sovereignty, which are 
the source of legitimacy of modern law.   
Before proceeding further, we should note that according to Habermas, the 
principle of popular sovereignty can be approached in two ways: in discourse-theoretic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 BFN, 103.  
91 Ibid., 457.  
	   36	  
terms and in terms of power. Considered in discourse-theoretic terms, “the principle of 
popular sovereignty states that all political power derives from the communicative power 
of citizens. The exercise of public authority is oriented and legitimated by the laws 
citizens give themselves in a discursively structured opinion-and will-formation.”92 
Considered in terms of power, the principle of popular sovereignty “demands that 
legislative powers be transferred to the totality of citizens, who alone can generate 
communicative power from their midst.”93 In this case, notes Habermas, justified and 
binding decisions about policies and laws demand, on the one hand, that deliberation and 
decision making take place face to face. On the other hand, at the level of direct and 
simple interactions, not all the citizens can join in the shared exercise of such a practice. 
A solution to this problem is provided by the parliamentary principle of establishing 
representative bodies for deliberation and decision-making.94  
Given the importance of communication in the process of opinion- and will-
formation and the necessity for those possibly affected to participate in the democratic 
process as free and equal citizens, it is crucial to have rules that guarantee fair and equal 
participation for all. The system of rights is precisely the tool that guarantees such an 
equality and fairness of participation. Here appears the relevance of the internal relation 
between human rights and popular sovereignty. Habermas expresses that internal 
relationship as follows:  
The sought-for internal relation between popular sovereignty and human rights 
consists in the fact that the system of rights states precisely the conditions under 
which the forms of communication necessary for the genesis of legitimate law can 
be legally institutionalized. The system of rights can be reduced neither to a moral 	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reading of human rights nor to an ethical reading of popular sovereignty, because 
the private autonomy of citizens must neither be set above, nor made subordinate 
to, their political autonomy.95  
 
For Habermas, there are normative intuitions that are associated with human 
rights and popular sovereignty. These intuitions “achieve their full effect in the system of 
rights only if we assume that the universal right to equal liberties may neither be imposed 
as a moral right that merely sets an external constraint on the sovereign legislator, nor be 
instrumentalized as a functional prerequisite for the legislator’s aims.”96 From this, he 
argues that the co-originality of private and public autonomy is first revealed in the motif 
of self-legislation according to which the addressees of law are simultaneously the 
authors of their rights. The substance of human rights then, he continues, resides in the 
formal conditions for the legal institutionalization of those discursive processes of 
opinion- and will-formation in which the sovereignty of the people assumes a binding 
character.97 Assuming a binding character implies comprehensive legal protection of 
individuals without which there cannot be participation in legislative processes. That is to 
say, the right to equal individual freedom of choice and action is a prerequisite for the 
principle of popular sovereignty.  
From this, it clearly appears that in Habermas’s view “the principle of popular 
sovereignty is expressed in rights of communication and participation that secure the 
public autonomy of citizens and [human rights] are expressed in those classical basic 
rights that guarantee the private autonomy of members of society. Thus, the law is 
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legitimated as an instrument for the equal protection of private and public autonomy.”98 
Therefore, the question of legitimation is answered by the interdependence of popular 
sovereignty and human rights. In other words, the source of legitimacy of modern law is 
both human rights and popular sovereignty. As Habermas rightly notes,  
The desired internal relation between human rights and popular sovereignty 
consists in this: human rights themselves are what satisfy the requirement that a 
civic practice of the public use of communicative freedom be legally 
institutionalized. Human rights, which make the exercise of popular sovereignty 
legally possible, cannot be imposed on this practice as an external constraint.99  
 
Despite the clarity of this interdependence, as described in the above paragraphs, 
the question of its applicability to certain rights still remains unanswered. When, for 
example, applied to the rights of communication and participation the interdependence 
between popular sovereignty and human rights addresses the question of the legitimacy 
of law; but when applied to classical rights that guarantee the private autonomy of the 
citizen – such as right to equal individual liberties, right to equal opportunities to pursue 
one’s private conception of the good – the interdependence between popular sovereignty 
and human rights seems to be limited. This because the right to participation involves 
both private and public autonomy whereas the right to equal opportunities to pursue one’s 
private conception of the good is related to the private domain of the individual’s life, and 
is not a matter of justifying the legitimacy of law. The interdependence of human rights 
and popular sovereignty makes sense only when it deals with the legitimation of law, 
which requires both private and public autonomy. Legitimacy of law cannot rest upon 
one type of autonomy alone, be it private or public. That is why the interdependence of 
human rights and popular sovereignty cannot be applied to classical rights that guarantee 	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the private autonomy of the citizen. Thus, in order to address this question, Habermas 
turns to the relationship between private and public autonomy.   
1.3.	  Private	  and	  Public	  Autonomy	  	  	  
Like human rights and popular sovereignty, private and public autonomy 
reciprocally presuppose one another. One without the other remains incomplete and 
cannot be fully realized. Private autonomy refers to basic individual rights that secure the 
sphere of individual freedom within the legal order. It is guaranteed by the classical rights 
to life, liberty, and property. As such, it “forms a protective cover for the individual’s 
ethical freedom to pursue his own existential life project or his current conception of the 
good.”100 This pursuit of one’s existential life project can be concretized only if the 
autonomy of the individual is exercised within a context that enables its full realization. 
The enablement of the full realization of one’s private autonomy requires that one 
participate in the process that formulates conditions under which he enjoys his individual 
liberties. Such participation is the expression of one’s public or political autonomy. Thus, 
public autonomy allows the individual to be both addressee and author of the law that 
regulates life in common. Differently put, “Citizens are politically autonomous only if 
they can view themselves as the joint authors of the laws to which they are subject as 
individual addressees.”101 That is why public autonomy is inseparable from private 
autonomy. Habermas expresses this inseparability as follows:  
There is no law without the private autonomy of legal persons in general. 
Consequently, without basic rights that secure the private autonomy of citizens 
there is also no medium for legally institutionalizing the conditions under which 
these citizens, as citizens of a state, can make use of their public autonomy. Thus 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 BFN, 451.  
101 I.O, 71.  
	   40	  
private and public autonomy mutually presuppose each other in such a way that 
neither human rights nor popular sovereignty can claim primacy over its 
counterpart. This mutual presupposition expresses the intuition that, on the one 
hand, citizens can make adequate use of their public autonomy only if, on the 
basis of their equally protected private autonomy, they are sufficiently 
independent; but that, on the other hand, they can arrive at a consensual regulation 
of their private autonomy only if they make adequate use of their political 
autonomy as enfranchised citizens.102  
This dialectical relation between private and public autonomy not only allows 
citizens to assume the status of legal subjects and enjoy subjective private rights, but also 
helps clarify the relationship between the autonomy of citizens and the legitimacy of the 
law. As Habermas puts it, “the autonomy of citizens and the legitimacy of law refer to 
each other.”103 For him, the only legitimate law is one that emerges from the discursive 
opinion-and will-formation of equally enfranchised citizens. The latter can in turn 
adequately exercise their public autonomy, guaranteed by rights of communication and 
participation, only insofar as their private autonomy is guaranteed. A well-secured private 
autonomy helps secure the conditions of public autonomy just as much as, conversely, 
the appropriate exercise of public autonomy helps secure the conditions of private 
autonomy.104  
Habermas calls this mutual dependency circular reinforcement. It is manifested in 
the genesis of valid law. There is circular reinforcement between private and public 
autonomy because “legitimate law reproduces itself only in the forms of a 
constitutionally regulated circulation of power, which should be nourished by the 
communications of an unsubverted public sphere rooted in the core private spheres of an 
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undisturbed lifeworld via the networks of civil society.”105 With this conception, notes 
Habermas, the burden of normative expectations in general shifts from the level of actors’ 
qualities, competences, and opportunities to the forms of communication in which an 
informal and noninstitutionalized opinion- and will-formation can develop and interact 
with the institutionalized deliberation and decision making inside the political system.”106  
The shift in the burden of normative expectations increases the importance of 
informal and non-institutionalized opinion- and will-formation in the process of decision-
making. Though the informal sector does not have a binding force, it exposes the real 
expectations of citizens and their vision and understanding of the well-ordered society. 
Ignoring such an aspiration may be an expression of the negation of citizens’ right to 
active participation in the life of the political community. That is why it is important to 
have a system of rights that fosters the interdependence between private and public 
autonomy on the one hand and between human rights and popular sovereignty on the 
other hand. Habermas’s system of rights aims to establish such a dialectical relationship, 
which outlines the basic rights that free and equal citizens should grant one another if 
they want to regulate their life in common by means of positive law.  
1.4.	  The	  System	  of	  Rights	  	  	  
The dialectical relationship between human rights and popular sovereignty and 
between private and public autonomy leads Habermas to introduce his system rights from 
a discourse-theoretic perspective. He provides a theoretical groundwork that allows us to 
develop a conception of human rights by describing categories of rights that give equal 	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weight to both private and public autonomy of legal citizens so as to regulate their life in 
common by means of positive law. He introduces a discourse principle, which is intended 
to assume the shape of a principle of democracy only by way of legal institutionalization. 
The discourse principle states, “Just those action norms are valid to which all possibly 
affected persons could agree as participants in rational discourses.”107  
The interpenetration of this principle and the legal form begets the principle of 
democracy. The principle of democracy, notes Habermas, is what confers legitimating 
force on the legislative process.108 It follows that for him the democratic principle is the 
sole principle of legitimacy because it derives from the interpenetration of valid action 
norms that are agreed by participants in rational discourses and the general right to equal 
liberties. As such, it constitutes the heart of Habermas’s system of rights. This key role of 
the principle of democracy within the system of rights can be explained by the fact that  
The principle of democracy must not only establish a procedure of legitimate 
lawmaking, it must also steer the production of the legal medium itself. The 
democratic principle must specify, in accordance with the discourse principle, the 
conditions to be satisfied by individual rights in general, that is, by any rights 
suitable for the constitution of a legal community and capable of providing the 
medium for this community’s self-organization.109  
 
Habermas calls the interpenetration of the discourse principle and the legal form a 
logical genesis of rights. As Ingebord Maus rightly observes, “Habermas’s conception of 
a logical genesis of rights is explicitly described as a circular process in which the 
liberties of autonomous private individuals and the rights of politically autonomous 
citizens to participate in the democratic lawmaking process are constituted 
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equiprimordially.”110 The way Habermas presents the order of the circular process can 
easily lead to understand the co-originality of the discourse principle and the legal form 
as the subordination of the democratic process to subjective liberties. He writes:  
One begins by applying the discourse principle to the general right to liberties – a 
right constitutive for the legal form as such – and ends by legally 
institutionalizing the conditions for a discursive exercise of political autonomy. 
By means of this political autonomy, the private autonomy that was at first 
abstractly posited can retroactively assume an elaborated legal shape.111  
 
Such an impression can be confirmed by the way Habermas introduces the 
categories of rights that constitute his system of rights. He begins by the three categories 
of rights that define the status of legal persons and result simply from the application of 
the discourse principle to the medium of law as such. Those three categories are: (1) basic 
rights that result from the politically autonomous elaboration of the right to the greatest 
possible measure of equal liberties, (2) basic rights that result from the politically 
autonomous elaboration of the status of a member in a voluntary association of 
consociates under law, and (3) basic rights that result immediately from the actionability 
of rights and from the politically autonomous elaboration of individual legal 
protection.112 Put in a simplified way, the first three categories of rights consist of the 
right to equal individual liberties, the right to membership, and the right to legal 
protection.  
These first three categories of rights are related to the sphere of private autonomy. 
They should not be regarded as liberal rights against the state. As Habermas says, “they 
only regulate the relationship among freely associated citizens prior to any legally 	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organized state autonomy from whose encroachments citizens would have to protect 
themselves.”113 In other words, the first three categories of rights allow legal subjects to 
mutually recognize one another as addressees of the law and to grant one another a status 
that allows them to claim rights from one another. For Habermas, these rights constitute 
the legal code and must be taken into account by democratic lawmakers if they want to 
enact legitimate laws.  
In spite of their role of addressees of the law, legal subjects who enjoy these first 
three categories of rights have not yet acquired the status of the authors of the law. In 
addition to the first three categories of rights, they need the right to political autonomy in 
order to become both addressees and authors of the law. As Habermas puts it, “Only with 
the next step do legal subjects also become authors of their legal order, to be exact, 
through the following: (category 4) “Basic rights to equal opportunities to participate in 
processes of opinion-and will-formation in which citizens exercise their political 
autonomy and through which they generate legitimate law.”114  
The above categories of rights (categories 1-4) remain ineffective if they are not 
complemented by conditions that enable citizens to have equal opportunities to fully 
enjoy their civil and political rights. That is why Habermas introduces a fifth category of 
rights. That is, “basic rights to the provision of living conditions that are socially, 
technologically, and ecologically safeguarded, insofar as the current circumstances make 
this necessary if citizens are to have equal opportunities to utilize the civil rights listed in 
(1) through (4).” 115   This fifth category of rights adds an important element in 
understanding Habermas’s system of rights, which is designed to reconcile longstanding 	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tensions between private autonomy and public autonomy and between the idea of basic 
rights and the idea of popular sovereignty. From this, it follows that the idea of 
Habermas’s system of rights is to show that human rights and popular sovereignty are not 
only compatible, but also co-original.  
Before proceeding further, it is important to note that for Habermas, applying the 
discourse principle to the medium of law generates the basic rights. Thus, for him, “the 
idea of democracy involves much more than formal governmental institutions and 
periodic voting rituals. It requires broad, active, and ongoing participation by the 
citizenry.”116 Robert A. Dahl describes a similar understanding of the democratic process. 
For Dahl, free, fair, and frequent elections are not enough for a country to be democratic. 
Freedom of expression is the main requirement of democracy. He writes:  
Freedom of expression is required in order for citizens to participate effectively in 
political life… Free expression means not just that you have a right to be heard. It 
also means that you have a right to hear what others have to say. To acquire an 
enlightened understanding of possible government actions and policies also 
requires freedom of expression. To acquire civic competence, citizens need 
opportunities to express their own views; learn from one another; engage in 
discussion and deliberation; read, hear, and question experts, political candidates, 
and persons whose judgments they trust; and learn in other ways that depend on 
freedom of expression. Without freedom of expression citizens would soon lose 
their capacity to influence the agenda of government decisions. Silent citizens 
may be perfect subjects for an authoritarian ruler; they would be a disaster for a 
democracy.117  
 
Simply put, democracy depends heavily on communication outside of formal 
governmental structures. Such communication must be capable of influencing official 
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governmental decision-making. That is why the notion of communicative power is the 
basis for Habermas’s reinterpretation of popular sovereignty.  
Let us go back to Habermas’s system of rights. As one can notice from the five 
categories of rights introduced by Habermas, there is no definitive list of detailed human 
rights actually contained in the major human rights conventions and treaties such as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 
the Convention on Eliminating All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the 
Genocide Convention. Habermas avoids using expressions such as “freedom of 
expression,” “freedom of association”, “right to vote,” “right to education,” etc. He rather 
provides general categories of rights that “must be interpreted and given concrete shape 
by a political legislature in response to changing circumstances.”118 If rights do not have 
a concrete shape, they remain “unsaturated.” They become actual human rights only 
when they can be implemented within a legal order.  
At this point, it is worth noting that the “human rights” Habermas is referring to, 
when he speaks of the tension between human rights and popular sovereignty, are classic 
liberal rights that protect the sphere of private autonomy. He is not referring to human 
rights the way we understand them from major documents on human rights. However, all 
the categories of rights contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other 
human rights treaties and conventions can be found in his account of the system of rights. 
Without this clarification in mind, one can easily misinterpret Habermas’s effort of 
mediation and legitimation of modern law.   
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Having said this, I would like to come back to the idea of not having a definitive 
list of human rights for all contexts and all circumstances. I believe we should respect the 
standard (list) of human rights provided by the major human rights conventions and 
treaties, but, at the same time, each society must develop other rights that are relevant and 
related to its own context. This is because all the rights do not have the same significance 
everywhere. Let us consider, for example, the right to leisure.119 This right is taken for 
granted in the context of a well-ordered society, but still remains a dream in the context 
of developing countries. Another example might be the enforcement of the right to 
freedom of expression, which is obvious in the context of democratic societies, but a 
serious concern in the context of countries with authoritarian regimes. In a liberal society, 
for example, citizens can publicly challenge the policy of their governments without fear 
of being threatened or intimidated. But, in other contexts with basic rule of law and 
rights, but where rulers enjoy the exercise of power for itself, any disagreement with the 
government’s way of running public affairs is a synonym of death threat. This shows that 
the way a person understands and enjoys certain rights depends on the context within 
which he lives. Therefore, it is important not to have a definitive list of human rights, 
which is applicable in the same way to all contexts irrespective of their particularities. 
Rather, there should be a dynamic nature of human rights norms.  
The practical approach to human rights, 120  which emphasizes the dynamic 
character of human rights, challenges the idea of a definitive list of human rights that 	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derives from some fundamental and unchanging values or principles on the basis of 
moral reasoning alone. In so doing, it rejects a static understanding of human rights. As 
Cristina Lafont points out, “the practical approach acknowledges the essentially dynamic 
nature of human rights norms, and thus rejects as wrongheaded the static assumption 
behind the traditional project of trying to derive a definitive list of human rights from 
some fundamental value or principle that stands upon the basis of moral reasoning 
alone.”121 The acknowledgement of the dynamic character of human rights allows the 
possibility of elaborating a human rights discourse that is context-oriented. Such an 
approach can have as its starting point a general right to individual liberties.   
From this, we can interpret Habermas’s five categories of rights as a paradigm of 
human rights from which each context can develop a list of rights that complements the 
standard list of human rights that are contained in the major human rights conventions 
and treaties. In fact, in providing general categories of rights to be used as “legal 
principles that guide the framers of constitutions” 122  in response to changing 
circumstances, Habermas seems to avoid having a definitive list of rights that reduces 
human rights to a catalogue of norms that would be respected without any possibility of 
dealing with specific contexts and cases beyond the written text. He makes it clear that 
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some of the rights developed in major human rights documents are contained in the five 
categories that he provides. He expresses it as follows:  
The classic liberal rights – to personal dignity, to life, liberty, and bodily integrity; 
to freedom of movement, freedom in the choice of one’s vocation, the 
inviolability of one’s home, and so on – are interpretations of, and ways of 
working out, what we might call a “general right to individual liberties,” however 
these may be specified. Similarly, the prohibition against extradition, the right to 
political asylum, and everything pertaining to the rights and duties of citizens (i.e., 
their material legal status) specify membership in a voluntary association of free 
and equal legal persons. Finally, the guarantees of equal protection and legal 
remedies are interpreted through procedural guarantees and basic legal standards. 
These include the prohibitions against retroactive punishment, double jeopardy, 
and ad hoc courts, as well as the guarantee of an independent judiciary, and so 
on.123  
 
A close reading of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in light of 
Habermas’s five categories of rights reveals that most of the rights described in the 
Declaration are contained in these categories. Habermas affirms the same thing when he 
contends that from a historical perspective, liberal (in the narrower sense) basic rights in 
fact make up the core of human rights declarations.124 The first Habermasian category – 
equal individual liberties – includes the right to freedom and equality in dignity and 
rights (article 1 of the UDHR), the right to marry and to found a family (art.16), the right 
to religious freedom and freedom of thought (art. 18), freedom of opinion and expression 
(art. 19), and freedom of association (art. 20). The second category – right to membership 
– includes the right to nationality (art. 15). The third category – right to legal protection – 
includes the right to life, liberty and security of person (art. 3), the right not to be held in 
slavery or servitude (art. 4), the right not to be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or 	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degrading treatment or punishment (art. 5), the right to equal protection of the law (art. 
7), the right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile (art. 9), the right to a 
fair trial (art. 10). The fourth category – right to political participation – includes the 
right to take part in the government of one’s country and the right to vote (art. 21). The 
fifth category – provision of living conditions (socially, technologically, and ecologically) 
– includes the right to own property (art. 17), the right to social security and economic, 
social and cultural rights that are indispensable for the dignity of the person and the free 
development of his personality (art. 22), the right to work, to free choice of employment, 
to equal pay for equal work, the right to just and favorable remuneration (art. 23), the 
right to good living conditions: health, housing, medical care (art. 25).  
As we can notice from this reading of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
in light of the five categories, the Habermasian categories of rights allow us to include as 
many rights as possible in a category of rights, depending on the context of the bearer of 
rights. Thus, the context-oriented approach to human rights, as I have already mentioned, 
becomes very important in the re-articulation of the modern human rights discourse. Such 
an approach not only enables us to use particular experiences so as to construct a theory 
of human rights, but also sheds light on the necessity of bringing into dialogue different 
contexts that do not necessarily share the same understanding of human rights ethics. I 
call this context-sensitive universality.  
Some people might object that a context-oriented approach makes human rights 
lose their universal character. If we understand universality as the applicability of all 
human rights equally to all people at the same time regardless of their socio-political and 
economic context, then rights that are developed as response to particular circumstances 
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will face the challenge of universality. But if we understand universality as equal moral 
concern for all human beings, then the objection becomes irrelevant. The confusion about 
the universality of rights developed from a particular context comes from the tendency to 
associate universality with simultaneity. Contextualization and universalization do not 
exclude each other. Once we dissociate simultaneity from universality, we grasp the 
universal character that resides in human rights developed in response to particular 
circumstances and contexts because they can be conceived so by any morally responsible 
being.  
If we were to paraphrase Martin Luther King who said, “injustice anywhere is a 
threat to justice everywhere […] Whatever affects one directly, affects all indirectly,”125 
we would say that violations of human rights anywhere are a threat to respect of human 
rights everywhere, because the humanity of those whose rights are violated is the same as 
the humanity of those who are not directly affected. Thus, what grants to human rights 
developed in a particular context a universal character is the shared humanity of all 
human beings.  
The above considerations lead me to argue that human rights become meaningful 
and relevant to people’s lives when they can be translated into rights that respond to 
particular circumstances and guarantee the basic conditions for citizens to live a dignified 
life. This is equally true for any system of rights. As Todd Hedrick notes, “according to 
Habermas, the rational reconstruction of the system of rights provides only a series of 	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abstract placeholders, and even the norms of basic human rights must be juridically 
concretized for them to have actuality.”126 Thus, in order for human rights to be 
connected with people’s reality, bearers of rights must be part of the process that 
determines conditions under which they should enjoy their rights. The exercise of their 
rights is the expression of their self-determination. As Habermas rightly observes, 
“Rights can be enjoyed only insofar as one exercises them. Moreover, individual self-
determination manifests itself in the exercise of those rights derived from legitimately 
produced norms.”127 For Habermas, “legitimately produced norms” are norms to which 
citizens agree as participants in rational discourses.  
From what precedes, it follows that through the production of legitimate norms 
citizens achieve their autonomy as legal subjects because they understand themselves and 
act both as authors and addressees of the rights that regulate their living together by 
means of positive law. Henceforth, the legal code becomes the only language through 
which they express their autonomy. As Habermas points out,  
As legal subjects [citizens] may no longer choose the medium in which they can 
actualize their autonomy. They no longer have a choice about which language 
they might want to use. Rather, the legal code is given to legal subjects in advance 
as the only language in which they can express their autonomy. The idea of self-
legislation must be realized in the medium of law itself. Hence the conditions 
under which citizens can judge whether the law they make is legitimate (in light 
of the discourse principle) must in turn be legally guaranteed.128  
 
This language of the legal code, through which citizens express their self-
determination, reveals that there is no other effective and meaningful way of approaching 
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human rights than from the citizens’ own context. In fact, citizens cannot do otherwise, 
because from the moment they decided to legitimately regulate their living together by 
means of positive law, they implicitly agreed that everything should be interpreted in a 
manner congruent with their own situation. In Habermas’s view, such an enterprise 
requires both the concept of legal form and an intuitive understanding of the discourse 
principle.129  
This requirement is important because it grants to law its legitimacy. But it needs 
to be supplemented by a structure that assures the effectiveness and enforcement of rights 
that citizens have to enjoy. That structure is the state or the political power. That is why, 
for Habermas, the internal relationship between law and political power becomes a 
necessary instrument in ensuring the effectiveness of basic rights. The right to equal 
liberties, he notes, assumes concrete shape in basic rights which are backed by the threat 
of sanctions and can be enforced against norm violations or opposing interests. Therefore, 
these rights presuppose the sanctioning power of the state, which possesses the means of 
legitimate force so as to ensure that legal norms are observed.130  
The same structure is needed for the equal rights of membership in the voluntary 
association of citizens. This right “presupposes a spatiotemporally delimited collectivity 
with which members can identity and to which they can attribute their actions as parts of 
a whole. Such a collectivity can constitute itself as a legal community only if it possesses 
a central authority acting on behalf of all the members.”131 Concerning the equal right to 
individual legal protection, Habermas notes that it assumes concrete shape in basic rights 
that ground claims to an independent and impartial judiciary. These rights, he continues, 	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“presuppose the establishment of a state-organized system of courts whose authority in 
deciding disputes relies on the sanctioning power of the state and whose administration 
and further development of the law draw on the organizational capacity of the state.”132  
He finally considers the equal right to political self-determination, which, he 
argues, “assumes concrete shape in civil rights that ground equal claims to participation 
in democratic legislative processes.” He contends that such claims “must be established 
with the help of governmental power. In addition, political will-formation set up as a 
legislature depends on an executive power that can carry out and implement adopted 
programs.”133 From this Habermas highlights the central role of the state as the structure 
that ensures the concretization and the effectiveness of rights that regulate citizens’ life in 
common. He writes:  
The state becomes necessary as a sanctioning, organizing, and executive power 
because rights must be enforced, because the legal community has need of both a 
collective self-maintenance and an organized judiciary, and because political will-
formation issues in programs that must be implemented. To be sure, these are not 
just functionally necessary supplements to the system of rights but implications 
already contained in rights.134  
 
From what has been said so far, it clearly appears that for Habermas, “the system 
of rights becomes meaningful only when connected to particular legal orders and cannot 
be conceptualized independently of the medium of law.”135 This is the reason why he 
declares that his project is juridical from the start. Because of this juridical-oriented 
approach to his project, Habermas has been accused of neglecting the moral aspect of 
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human rights in his account of human rights in Between Facts and Norms. The following 
section will consider some of these criticisms.  
1.5.	  Habermas	  and	  His	  Critics	  	  	  
Habermas has been criticized for not being clear enough about the moral 
dimension of human rights in his account of the system of rights in Between Facts and 
Norms. In this section, I will essentially focus on criticisms that are related to the moral 
and legal aspect of human rights in Habermas and leave aside other criticisms. However, 
I will briefly mention Charles Larmore’s and Klaus Günther’s criticisms against 
Habermas’s argument in Between Facts and Norms because they deal with the two 
important concepts that constitute the heart of Habermas’s development of the source of 
legitimacy of modern law: human rights and popular sovereignty. I will look to Ingeborg 
Maus’s response to both critics because it makes exactly the point I want to make.  
1.5.1.	  Larmore	  and	  Günther	  vs	  Habermas	  	  	  
Commentators like Charles Larmore have understood Habermas’s 
equiprimordiality or co-originality thesis either as the subordination of the democratic 
lawmaking process to subjective liberties or as the dominion of popular sovereignty over 
classical individual rights that guarantee the private autonomy of the citizen. Larmore’s 
criticism against Habermas is essentially about Habermas’s conception of the relationship 
between basic individual rights and the democratic ideal of popular sovereignty. 
According to Larmore, Habermas not only shares the communitarian assumption that 
individual rights need to be nurtured and shaped by an antecedent, substantial vision of 
the good life, but also he rejects the contrary standpoint of liberalism, which has usually 
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assigned to individual rights – at least those of a fundamental kind – the function of 
delimiting the proper scope of popular sovereignty.136 That is, notes Larmore, liberal 
thinkers have generally seen fundamental individual rights as a distinct value from 
democratic self-rule and as taking precedence over it.137  
Larmore underlines the fact that Habermas rejects this outlook and takes a middle 
way between the opposing camps of liberalism and communitarianism by announcing the 
co-originality thesis, which affirms that fundamental individual rights and democratic 
self-rule are co-original values. At one level, he notes, this co-originality is for Habermas 
a relation of mutual rights, so rights are best understood as providing the necessary 
conditions for the exercise of popular sovereignty. Larmore goes on to argue that 
“individual rights in [Habermas’s view] draw their rationale from their supposed ability 
to make democratic self-rule possible. Their basic purpose cannot be, as liberals generally 
believe, to limit the authority of popular sovereignty.” From this, Larmore accuses 
Habermas of not only privileging popular sovereignty over individual rights, but also of 
assigning priority to democracy. For him, “a clear sign of the priority Habermas assigns 
to democracy is the basic value he sees as underlying the co-originality of rights and self-
government.”138  
This leads Larmore to argue that Habermas has undermined his agenda for 
explaining the equality and equiprimordiality of liberties and popular sovereignty in a 
system of rights by coming out in favor of popular sovereignty. In other words, Larmore 
accuses Habermas of disavowing the democratic lawmaker by favoring popular 	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sovereignty. Here Larmore seems to ignore that the people are the real lawmakers. For 
Larmore, notes Ingeborg Maus, the central thesis in Between Facts and Norms, namely 
that subjective liberties, as enabling conditions of sovereign democratic lawmaking, 
cannot at the same time restrict it, is a scandalous element in Habermas’s theory of 
democracy. [Larmore], continues Maus, claims that Habermas recognizes democratic 
autonomy as the only and therefore total foundation of the modern constitutional state.139  
In defense of Habermas, Maus argues that Larmore misunderstands the 
underlying principle that popular sovereignty does not acknowledge any norms other than 
those which it generates itself to imply random decisionism.140 In order to oppose 
Habermas’s postmetaphysical understanding of democracy, observes Maus, Larmore 
claims that “democratic lawmaking should itself be based on a basic moral principle, 
namely that of universal recognition of persons, a principle which, for its part, is prior to 
all justifications and has necessarily always been presumed to be valid.”141  
Larmore’s reading of Habermas’s system of rights makes him think that 
Habermas merely derives subjective liberties from the concept of popular sovereignty. 
For him, notes Maus, this derivation ultimately proves to be circular.142 With regard to 
such an understanding, Maus wonders whether Larmore’s reading of the system of rights 
is at all tenable. Habermas’s own description of the logical genesis of the system of rights 
as a circular process, argues Maus, is absolutely fundamental for an adequate 
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understanding of his conception of the relationship between subjective private liberties 
and democratic participatory rights.143  
Following Larmore’s line of thought, Klaus Günther thinks that there is a 
contradiction in Habermas’s conception of democratic lawmaking process. He “shows 
that in the form of subjective private liberties the legal code preexists for lawmaking and 
constitutional law-giving citizens, but only as the ‘depth grammar’ of the language of law 
which must be transformed into the ‘surface structure’ of the language of law by the 
speakers themselves in order to be enacted at all.”144 In response to this view, Maus first 
notes that the fact that in Habermas’s work subjective liberties are presented as both the 
result of and the prerequisite for democratic lawmaking is not a contradiction, but rather 
the whole point of the argument. She then stresses that for Habermas, the primary motive 
for the “change in perspective” from one side of the circular process to the other was the 
wish to avoid implying an expertocracy.145  
Having briefly presented Larmore’s and Günther’s objections to Habermas’s 
argument in Between Facts and Norms, I would like now to turn to critics who deal with 
the question of whether human rights should be conceived as moral rights or legal rights. 
I will begin with Thomas Pogge’s claim about human rights, followed by David 
Ingram’s, Rainer Forst’s, and Jon Mahoney’s positions.  
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1.5.2.	  Pogge’s	  Approach	  to	  Human	  Rights	  	  	  
In his book, World Poverty and Human rights,146 Thomas Pogge has entitled the 
second chapter, “How Should Human Rights be Conceived?” In this chapter and in an 
article entitled, “The International Significance of Human Rights,”147 he argues that there 
are moral human rights whose validity does not depend on any and all governmental 
bodies. On the contrary, the legitimacy of governmental bodies depends on their respect 
for moral human rights. That is, “the capacity to create moral obligations to comply with, 
and the moral authority to enforce, their laws and orders.”148 Therefore, for Pogge, the 
drafting and interpretation of legal rights are meant to give effect to preexisting moral 
rights.  
From this conviction, he rejects the idea that our human rights are whatever 
governments agree them to be. For him, this might be true of legal rights but not of moral 
human rights, because governments cannot legislate these rights out of existence. Thus, 
he conceives human rights as a response to weighty moral demands that arise from 
certain basic needs. As a result, “a commitment to human rights involves one in 
recognizing that human persons with a past or potential future ability to engage in moral 
conversation and practice have certain basic needs… The object of each of these basic 
human needs is the object of a human right.”149 It follows that for Pogge human rights are 
essentially moral rights.  
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He lists six central elements that any plausible understanding of human rights 
must incorporate. First, human rights express ultimate moral concerns. That is, persons 
have the moral duty to respect human rights, a duty that does not derive from a more 
general moral duty to comply with national or international legal instruments. Second, 
human rights express weighty moral concerns, which normally override other normative 
considerations. Third, these moral concerns are focused on human beings. Fourth, with 
respect to these moral concerns, all human beings have equal status: They have exactly 
the same human rights, and the moral significance of these rights and their fulfillment do 
not vary with whose human rights are at stake. Fifth, human rights express moral 
concerns that are unrestricted. That is, they ought to be respected by all human agents 
irrespective of their particular culture, moral tradition or philosophy. Sixth, these moral 
concerns are broadly sharable.150 By “broadly sharable,” he means the capacity to be 
“understood and appreciated by persons from different epochs and cultures as well as by 
adherents of a variety of different religions, moral traditions, and philosophies.”151  
Having listed the six central elements that any theory of human rights must 
incorporate, Pogge presents three of the more prominent understandings of human rights 
that provide a background to his own approach to human rights. The first understanding, 
he writes, “conceives human rights as moral rights that every human being has against 
every other human being or perhaps, more generally, against every other human 
agent.”152 This understanding of human rights raises the question of whether we should 
only postulate human rights that impose negative duties or also include human rights that 
postulate positive duties. In some cases, the duty to protect the human rights of 	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individuals is the first responsibility of the state. Therefore, postulating human rights that 
impose positive duties on the individual level might not be concretized. In order to 
overcome the shortcomings of this first understanding, Pogge considers a second 
understanding of human rights.  
The second understanding of human rights states that human rights are moral 
rights that human beings have specifically against governments, understood broadly so as 
to include their various agencies and officials. This understanding, observes Pogge, 
distinguishes between official and unofficial violations, between assaults committed by 
the secret police and those committed by a petty criminal husband.153 The limitations of 
this understanding of human rights arise when the person has to deal with certain rights 
outside the territory which is under the jurisdiction of his own government. The right not 
to be subjected to arbitrary arrest, for instance, is to be respected by any government 
whether the person is within his own country or out of his country. But the right to 
education, for example, is related to the moral duty of every government to ensure that 
every citizen receives an appropriate education.  
In Pogge’s view, the main problem with this understanding “is that it completely 
unburdens private human agents. So long as one is not at all a government official, one 
need not worry about human rights.”154 Such an attitude vis-à-vis human rights is 
immoral. Though the government is the body primarily responsible for protecting and 
promoting human rights, the responsibility to respect human rights is a collective one. 
Every citizen has the moral duty to respect the human rights of everyone else. Because of 
the limitations of this understanding of human rights, Pogge considers a third 	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understanding according to which “human rights are basic or constitutional rights as each 
state ought to set them forth in its fundamental legal texts and ought to make them 
effective through appropriate institutions and policies.”155 This third understanding of 
human rights is similar to the position that Habermas develops in Between Facts and 
Norms, with which Pogge disagrees. He points out that for Jürgen Habermas, “the 
concept of human rights is not of moral origin, but… by nature juridical. Human rights 
belong, through their structure, to a scheme of positive and coercive law, which supports 
justiciable subjective right claims. Hence it belongs to the meaning of human rights that 
they demand for themselves the status of constitutional right.”156  
This third understanding conceives human rights as legal rights. It implies that 
every right to something must be enshrined in the constitution of every state or in similar 
basic legal documents. This is what Pogge calls the juridification component of human 
rights. The juridification component is accompanied by the observance component, 
which states that “A human right to X would contain a moral right to effective legal 
rights to X, which gives every citizen of a state a weighty moral duty to help ensure that 
an effective and suitably broad legal right to X exists within this state.”157 At the same 
time, the observance component of human rights gives a weighty moral duty to the 
government to ensure that every right, be it a legal right or not, is observed.  
Pogge raises three problems related to this third understanding of human rights. 
These problems can be interpreted as an objection to Habermas’s juridical approach to 
human rights. First, the understanding of human rights as legal rights can “render human 
rights weak, for even when a human right is appropriately juridified and the 	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corresponding legal rights are observed and reliably enforced by the government and the 
courts, citizens may still be prevented by social obstacles from enjoying the object of the 
human right in question.”158 A good illustration of this problem is the case of people with 
limited incomes and lack of education and knowledge. Such people can neither know 
what their legal rights are, nor use the proper legal channels to claim their rights. It 
follows that the legalization of human rights is not enough to enable citizens to enjoy 
their rights if it does not provide necessary means to overcome social obstacles. 
According to Pogge, this problem can be avoided by making human rights fully (not 
merely legally) effective so as to ensure secure access to their objects. He defines secure 
access as follows: “A person has secure access to the object of some human right only 
when she is not prevented by social obstacle from acquiring the knowledge and know-
how necessary to secure this object for herself.”159  
The second problem related to the understanding of human rights as legal rights is 
the excessive demand of its juridification component on some human rights. This 
component of human rights may not be necessary for certain rights that citizens enjoy in 
some countries without them being juridified. Consider the right to adequate nutrition, for 
example. It does not necessarily require the existence of legal rights in order to provide 
adequate food for citizens. Thus, for Pogge, “The juridification component [of legal 
rights] is likely to lead to a conception of human rights diluted by elements that are not 
truly essential.”160 The insistence on the juridification of human rights can create self-
interested individuals who do not care about other people’s rights as long as theirs are 
guaranteed and secured.  	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The third problem with the understanding of human rights as legal rights is its 
limitations for promoting human rights in other countries, because of the task of private 
citizens or government officials, which is primarily to ensure that human rights are 
juridified and fulfilled in their own country. In other words, with this understanding of 
human rights, citizens become unburdened agents as far as violations of human rights in 
other countries are concerned. They have no weighty moral duty to help stop human 
rights violations by foreign governments. Thus, for Pogge, making the law alone the 
decisive yardstick for a society’s human-rights record is implausible.  
In order to avoid the shortcomings of these three understandings of human rights, 
Pogge suggests a fourth understanding based on article 28 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, which states that “everyone is entitled to a social and international order 
in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.” 
According to this fourth understanding, notes Pogge, “postulating a human right to X is 
tantamount to declaring that every society (and comparable social system) ought to be so 
organized that all its members enjoy secure access to X.”161 From this he proposes the 
idea of reasonable security thresholds, which states that “your human rights are fully 
realized (fulfilled) when their objects are sufficiently secure – with the required degrees 
of security suitably adapted to the means and circumstances of the relevant social 
system.”162 He then concludes that a person’s human rights entail not merely moral 
claims on the institutional order of his own society, which are claims against his fellow 
citizens, but also analogous moral claims on the global institutional order, which are 
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claims against his fellow human beings.163 Thus, unlike Habermas who, in Between Facts 
and Norms, conceives human rights as legal rights, Pogge conceives them as essentially 
moral claims on social and global institutions as well as on fellow citizens.  
1.5.3.	  Ingram’s	  Approach	  to	  Human	  Rights164  
Like Thomas Pogge, David Ingram argues against a legal interpretation of human 
rights. For him, human rights are primarily moral rights, first, because they provide a 
standard for evaluating social and legal institutions and second, because some of the 
goods they protect need not (and in some instances, should not) be legally mandated. He 
argues that without a comprehensive defense of human rights that incorporates liberal 
democratic as well as subsistence and developmental rights, no theory of global justice 
will satisfactorily address the worst humanitarian evils of global poverty and corrupt, 
authoritarian rule.  
This conviction leads Ingram to posit four criteria that any adequate theory of 
human rights must satisfy.165 The first criterion is universality. An adequate theory of 
human rights must articulate universal rights that any rationally self-interested and 
reasonably fair-minded person could accept, regardless of cultural allegiance. The second 
criterion is prescriptive determinacy, which states that an adequate theory of human 
rights should articulate rights that are sufficiently defined in order to be prescriptive and 	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not merely regulative in some vague and general way. The third criterion is priority. An 
adequate theory of human rights should distinguish basic from non-basic rights, where 
basic rights are understood as guaranteeing the conditions necessary for the exercise of 
non-basic rights. Ingram does not interpret the distinction between basic rights and non-
basic rights in terms of privileging one category of rights over other categories. The 
fourth criterion is completeness. An adequate theory of human rights should be complete, 
in that it includes all categories that are necessary for the full exercise of any human 
rights. Ingram argues that completeness is achieved only when liberal democratic rights 
are included among the schedule of basic human rights. These rights, in turn imply 
cultural, social, and economic rights.166  
Ingram’s main concern is about the tension between moral and legal 
interpretations of human rights. He contends that if we view human rights in juridical 
terms, we limit their core content to fulfilling legal functions, securing basic civil and 
political freedoms, or demarcating boundaries setting forth permissible humanitarian 
interventions. Conversely, by conceiving human rights as utopian moral aspirations, we 
run the risk of succumbing to human rights inflation. In order to avoid both the truncation 
and inflation of human rights, Ingram opts for a moral account that delimits the range of 
human rights claims vis-à-vis some comprehensive account of human nature, human 
need, or human capability.  
According to Ingram, Habermas denies this approach to human rights and 
develops his view on the function, content, and justification of human rights within a 
legalistic framework that eschews any prior appeal to human nature, natural law 	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reasoning, or universal moral foundations. He argues that Habermas’s refusal to justify a 
juridical account of human rights in terms of a more comprehensive moral philosophy 
leads him to deny the necessity or centrality of some subset of human rights. Ingram 
faults Habermas for denying the equal centrality of economic and cultural rights to 
subsistence and development. Instead of assigning an auxiliary role to certain rights, we 
should acknowledge that “at least some economic, cultural, and social rights are more 
than mere auxiliary goods and capacities that contingently realize the fair value of 
human, civil, and political rights. They are structurally, if not conceptually, embedded in 
these very same rights.”167  For Ingram, Habermas not only rejects the theoretical 
possibility of deriving human rights from moral theory, but also fails to adequately clarify 
the moral status of human rights. Such a failure “prevents him from appreciating the 
unconditional moral ground of subsistence rights in basic human needs and 
capabilities.”168 Thus, Habermas’s doctrine of human rights fails to capture the full 
meaning and scope of human rights.  
From the above considerations, it follows that for Ingram understanding human 
rights as legal rights is very problematic not only because the legal purposes ascribed to 
human rights conceal the moral purpose underlying such rights generally, but also 
because as legal rights human rights are essentially defined as permissions to act free 
from constraint.169 Being defined as “permissions to act free of constraint” implies that 
there is a higher authority that permits people to act freely. If we apply this understanding 
to the right to political participation, for example, it means that citizens need permissions 
from a higher authority in order to participate in the political life of their society. Such a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 Ingram, “Between Political Liberalism and Postnational Cosmopolitanism,” 373.  
168 Ingram, Habermas: Introduction and Analysis, 177.  
169 Ibid., 170.  
	   68	  
search for permission might deny the right of some people because the authority that 
grants the permission may deny it to some citizens he considers to be dissidents. In this 
case, instead of promoting the human right to political participation, the legal approach to 
human rights becomes a source of violations of citizens’ rights.  
Though Ingram argues against a juridical interpretation of human rights, he 
acknowledges the importance of a legal understanding of human rights in the effort to 
maintain a balance between the caprice of private moral conscience and the obligation to 
guarantee adequate living conditions conducive to a dignified life. In that sense, he shares 
Habermas’s concern about making the concept of right explicit through the concept of 
law so as to avoid severe and widespread violations. He explains why Habermas holds 
that human rights are legal rights as follows:  
Here, then, is Habermas’s main reason for holding that human rights are legal 
rights. The liberal rights that constitute the core of human rights as Habermas 
understands it are conceptually and functionally embedded in modern law, and 
their enforcement is so crucial to the very existence of society that it cannot 
remain contingent on the caprice of private “moral” conscience. As a related 
matter, human rights that are only moral rights suffer from the defects of a “state 
of nature”: their precise meaning, individual application (adjudication), and 
coercive enforcement are uncertain and subject to the kinds of political 
opportunism that critics of human rights, such as Carl Schmitt, are quick to seize 
on. Without a legal decision procedure to resolve conflicting interpretations, 
judgments, and actions, the discourse of human rights quickly degenerates into an 
abyss of endless disputation.170  
 
It becomes clear that the observance and respect of human rights require an 
enforcement mechanism that helps those who are not morally motivated to refrain from 
violating the rights of others. Thus, conceiving human rights only as moral rights may 
lead to anarchy because such an approach would imply that we exclusively rely on the 	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good will and moral motivation of the people. This can be less challenging if we deal 
with people who have already incorporated moral values in their lives. But in the case of 
those who need guidance in order to live according to the rules and regulations of human 
society there should be measures that enable them to attain the goal of life in common. 
That is why translating certain human rights into law becomes necessary.  
It is important, at this point, to note that conceiving human rights solely as legal 
rights – that is, as constitutional law – does not necessarily guarantee their respect. 
Consider, for example, freedom of expression. Enshrining it in the constitution of a 
country does not automatically lead to its observance. As Pogge rightly observes, 
“societies may be officially committed to Article 19 [of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights], may even incorporate an appropriate right to freedom of expression into 
their constitutions, and their officials may nonetheless violate this legal right frequently 
and with impunity.”171 That is why Ingram emphasizes consistent enforcement of rights 
as an important element of legal certainty. He then raises the question of whether a 
juridical understanding of human rights can adequately explain the importance of 
specifically second- and third-generation human rights that fall outside of the classical 
liberal model. The meaning of the right to subsistence, for example, cannot be explained 
juridically. This leads Ingram to highlight two weaknesses of a juridical understanding of 
human rights:  
Its tendency to emphasize what Thomas Pogge calls an “interactional” conception 
of human rights that cannot easily accommodate impersonal institutional 
impediments to the secure enjoyment of rights, and its corresponding embrace of 
a “liability” model of responsibility that focuses on punishment and compensation 
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(distributive justice) rather than on political reform aimed at eliminating class and 
gender domination.”172  
 
From what precedes, it appears that Habermas does not accord an equal weight to 
all the categories of rights. For him, civil, politic, and economic rights are more important 
than social and cultural rights and the right to subsistence. In fact, he himself affirms that 
the first four categories of his system of rights – that constitute liberal and political rights 
– are absolutely justified, while the fifth category that constitutes the category of social 
rights and right to subsistence is justified in relative terms. This can be interpreted in 
terms of priority of rights. Being only relatively justifiable can mean that these rights are 
dependent on the first four categories. Seen that way, these rights would not be as 
important as the rights of the first four categories. Here appears Ingram’s dissatisfaction 
with Habermas’s juridical approach to human rights. He writes,  
What is disturbing is that the right to subsistence as it is here presented, within a 
juridical derivation of rights, cannot be treated as a basic (viz., unconditional) 
human right on par with other human rights to civil, political, and economic 
freedom… Habermas justifies the right to subsistence instrumentally. Its function 
is to provide opportunities for the equal exercise of constitutionally guaranteed 
civil, political, and economic liberties, not to secure protection of intrinsic goods. 
The right to subsistence, as statutory right, exists only as a legal right that is 
claimed against legal institutions. It is not a claim against oppressive economic 
structures or traditional systems of patriarchy and racial caste that have been 
imposed on the poor by the cumulative aggregation of unintended consequences 
extending backward in time over many generations.173  
 
In Ingram’s view, Habermas resists linking human rights discourse to the moral discourse 
of needs and capabilities. Therefore, he (Habermas) has a moral theory of rights, but he 
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does not have a moral theory of human rights. Instead, he has a legal theory which points 
out that justification of rights is based upon moral experiences.  
1.5.4.	  Forst’s	  Approach	  to	  Human	  Rights	  	  	  
Rainer Forst understands human rights as “first and foremost weapons in 
combatting certain evils that human beings inflict upon one another; they emphasize 
standards of treatment that no human being could justifiably deny to others and that 
should be secured in a legitimate social order.”174 He highlights five aspects of human 
rights: moral life, legal life, political life, historical existence, and social aspect. The 
moral life of human rights expresses urgent human concerns and claims that must not be 
violated or ignored anywhere on the globe. The legal life of human rights is related to 
their enshrinement in national constitutions and in lists of basic rights, as well as in 
international declarations, covenants, and treaties. The political life of human rights 
expresses standards of basic political legitimacy. The historical existence of human rights 
is about the time of the materialization of the idea of human rights. The social aspect of 
human rights is related to the respect of the dignity of human beings.175  
Using a reflexive argument, Forst explains its three dimensions and posits the 
ground of human rights. The first dimension of his reflexive argument states that human 
rights have a common ground in one basic moral right, the right to justification. For 
Forst, the right to justification “expresses the demand that there be no political or social 
relations of governance that cannot be adequately justified to those affected by them.” 
This implies “the right not to be subjected to laws, structure, or institutions that are 
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‘groundless,’ that is, that are regarded as an expression of power or rule without sufficient 
legitimation.”176 Thus, the right to justification means that every person has the right to 
be given the justification of any action or decision that possibly can affect his or her life 
as a member of a community. In that sense, the right to justification can be understood as 
the equivalent of the Kantian second formulation of the categorical imperative, which 
states that we should treat humanity either in ourselves or in others always as an end in 
itself and not merely as a means. Forst himself expresses it as follows:  
When I argue for the thesis that we should understand political and social justice 
on the basis of a single right – the right to justification – and that we should 
construct corresponding principles for the basic structure of society accordingly, 
this argument is based on the conviction that this is the best possible way to 
philosophically reconstruct the Kantian categorical imperative to respect other 
persons as ends in themselves.177  
 
The second dimension of the reflexive argument states that the legal and political 
function of human rights is to make the right to justification socially effective, both 
substantively and procedurally. By “substantively,” Forst means the formulation of rights 
that express adequate forms of mutual respect whose violation cannot be properly 
justified among free and equal persons. The procedural aspect highlights the essential 
condition that no one should be subjected to a set of rights and duties whose 
determination he or she cannot participate in as an autonomous agent of justification.178 
The third dimension of the reflective argument claims that this way of grounding human 
rights is not open to the charge of ethnocentrism that haunts so many justifications of 
human rights.  
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From the three dimensions of the reflexive argument, Forst contends that a 
conception of human rights needs to have an independent and sufficient moral substance 
and justification, though not one of an ethical kind that relies on a conception of the 
good.179 Thus, for him, the moral basis for human rights is respect for the human person 
as an autonomous agent who possesses a right to justification, that is, a right to be 
recognized as an agent who can demand acceptable reasons for any action that claims to 
be morally justified and for any social or political structure or law that claims to be 
binding upon him or her.180 It clearly appears here that, for Forst, “when it comes to 
grounding fundamental human rights, the starting point is a basic claim to be respected as 
a ‘normative agent’ who can give and who deserves justifying reasons.” This, he notes, is 
a notion of respecting another person’s autonomy which is not attached to a reasonably 
contestable notion of the good and does not require a translation of a prudential ethical 
value “for me” into a moral reason “for all.”181  
Thus, Forst’s main idea with regard to normative agency is that “the moral point 
of human rights does not just lie in protecting normative agency but also in expressing 
our normative agency and autonomy in a practical sense as ‘norm-givers.’”182 Such an 
expression requires mutual recognition as people having a right to justification. It follows 
that for Forst the ground of human rights is the moral recognition of the other as having a 
right to justification.  
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From his argument for the right to justification, Forst criticizes Habermas for 
carrying out the justification of basic rights in a manner that is overly immanent to law.183 
For him, Habermas’s conception of human rights does not adequately account for the 
moral-constructivist content of basic principles of justice.  He argues that Habermas turns 
away from the idea of positing and answering the question of political and social justice 
primarily from the perspective of moral theory.184 With Rawls, says Forst, it should be 
insisted against Habermas that basic rights and principles, which must be morally 
justified intersubjectively, maintain their moral content even if they can only become 
legitimate law via politically autonomous law-making, and even if they were justifiable 
as implications of the legal institutionalization of the discourse principle.185  
1.5.5.	  Mahoney’s	  Criticism	  of	  Habermas	  	  	  
In his article “Rights without dignity? Some critical reflections on Habermas’s 
procedural model of law and democracy,” Jon Mahoney argues that Habermas’s 
proposed system of rights fails to offer an adequate account of the relation between rights 
and moral injury. For him, in providing a non-moral justification for rights, Habermas’s 
functional-normative argument excludes the moral intuition that persons are worthy of 
being protected from a class of injurious actions.186 He claims that Habermas does not 
sufficiently emphasize moral injury and the concept of the person. In proposing a 
justification for rights, says Mahoney, Habermas fails to leave room for an adequate 
account of the relation between rights, moral harm, and persons. Thus, according to him, 
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Habermas’s conception of “rights without dignity,” as he calls it, ignores the relation 
between rights and moral injury in an unacceptable way, because it cannot account for 
what he considers to be a basic moral intuition; namely, that citizens as persons are 
worthy of equal concern and respect and that this moral standing is prior to, rather than 
coextensive with, a just system of law.187  
From this, Mahoney contends that one of the most important bases for regarding 
agents as bearers of rights is that persons are autonomous and that this entitles them to a 
special moral standing. Therefore, we have a moral obligation to regard others as bearers 
of rights. He thinks that “this perspective is intentionally left out of Habermas’s theory of 
rights on the grounds that attempts to make law accountable to morality cannot but fail to 
be insensitive to the many non-moral functions that modern legal systems must carry 
out.”188 This leads Mahoney to argue that any approach to human rights must stress the 
importance of morality, especially in the case of false imprisonment because “morality 
enjoins us to refrain from imprisoning the innocent because doing so violates a basic 
supposition of moral obligation, namely, that agents must be treated as autonomous and 
that undermining the autonomy of others is inconsistent with the very idea of rights that 
can be shared.”189  
Thus, Mahoney contends that what is required, for any human rights theory, is a 
moral justification of rights. To work such a justification out “requires an understanding 
of the principle of equal concern and respect as premised on a concept of human 
dignity.”190 He thinks that Habermas does not appeal to dignity in his justification of 	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rights. He writes, “The premises of postmetaphysical thought motivate Habermas to 
defend rights without appealing to respect or dignity, in fact without appealing to a 
concept of the moral subject at all.”191 He concludes his criticism against Habermas by 
positing that “the key to understanding Habermas’s position is that he believes he can 
provide a non-moral yet normative foundation for law and democracy, and thus 
demonstrate that no direct reference to morality is needed when laying out the 
groundwork for a legitimate constitutional state.”192 For Mahoney, Habermas’s attempt to 
avoid subordinating law to morality ends up in subordinating morality to law.  
1.6.	  A	  Quick	  Response	  to	  Habermas’s	  Critics	  	  	  
The general line of criticism against Habermas is that human rights should be 
conceived as moral rights rather than as legal rights. To some extent these criticisms are 
valid because Habermas is not clear enough about the moral aspect of human rights in his 
development of the system of rights in Between Facts and Norms. However, in his later 
work, especially in his article, “The Concept of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia 
of Human Rights,” Habermas clarifies the moral dimension of human rights by appealing 
to the concept of human dignity as the foundation of human rights.  
The apparent neglect of the moral aspect of human rights in Between Facts and 
Norms can be explained by the fact that there Habermas’s aim is to demonstrate that there 
is a conceptual or internal relation between the rule of law and democracy. In other 
words, Habermas is more concerned with the source of legitimacy of modern law, which 
is to be understood within the framework of a democratic constitutional state. This is 
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what most of these critics did not take into account in formulating their criticisms against 
Habermas. They read his system of rights from a perspective that ignores the motivation 
behind his attempts to avoid a strictly moral reading of human rights. Habermas himself 
makes it very clear that “the argument developed in Between Facts and Norms essentially 
aims to demonstrate that there is a conceptual or internal relation, and not simply a 
historically contingent association, between the rule of law and democracy.”193  
Besides this statement of what he intended to do in Between Facts and Norms, 
Habermas does not ignore the moral dimension altogether. He acknowledges that these 
rights have a universal moral content. As he puts it, “Basic rights are equipped with a 
universal validity claim because they can be justified exclusively from the moral point of 
view.”194 He insists on the legal aspect of human rights in order to give a concrete content 
to these rights. Unless they are legalized, rights remain abstract concepts. Habermas 
expresses this as follows:  
Citizens cannot produce basic rights in abstracto but only particular basic rights 
with a concrete content. For this reason, the participants who thus far were 
engaged in inward reflection, focused on a kind of philosophical clarification, 
must step out from behind the veil of empirical ignorance… Only when they are 
confronted, we say, with the intolerable consequences of the use of physical 
violence do they recognize the necessity of elementary rights to bodily integrity or 
to freedom of movement.195  
 
In fact, when citizens discursively justify a particular system of rights, they make 
moral arguments. Todd Hedrick makes a similar point when he notes that “arguments 
about whether persons ought to be recognized as bearers of certain kinds of basic human 
rights are certainly moral arguments on Habermas’s model, for there is no doubt that he 	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sees the basic categories of human rights as justified from a moral point of view that 
overshoots any positive legal order.”196 So, argues Hedrick, when critics remark that 
Habermas’s justification of rights misses its mark because it is unconnected to the moral 
reasons about how we think human subjects deserve to be treated, we need to realize that 
the reconstruction of democratic legal orders is intended to justify not so much the idea of 
basic rights, as such, but the democratic legal order as a whole, the framework through 
which individual rights are articulated.197  
Individual rights are articulated within a framework that recognizes citizens as 
both addressees and legislators of the law. It follows that creating an environment where 
citizens regard themselves both as authors and addressees of the law that regulates their 
living together is nothing other than taking into account their dignity. The dignity of the 
person is expressed through his capacity of self-determination. And the capacity of self-
determination is the expression of the person’s autonomy. In acknowledging the person’s 
autonomy we acknowledge his dignity. Therefore, to acknowledge citizens as authors of 
the law is to acknowledge their autonomy, which is the expression of their dignity. Since 
human dignity is the moral foundation of human rights, it follows that Habermas takes 
into account the moral aspect of human rights. Ingram seems to agree with this view. 
Despite his disagreement with Habermas on the understanding of human rights as legal 
rights, he acknowledges that Habermas does not dismiss the moral aspect of human rights 
altogether. As he notes, “for Habermas, a juridical understanding of human rights is not 
freestanding of moral argumentation in the way Rawls and some other prominent 
theorists have argued. Human rights, [for Habermas], are Janus-faced: they are legal 	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rights that are grounded not in the political value, ends, and policies of a particular people 
but in universal morality.”198  
When the critics, especially Mahoney, argue that Habermas does not appeal to the 
concept of the moral person at all, they seem to overlook the fact that the validity of 
rights that Habermas develops refers to human beings as such and not merely as citizens 
of the state. Referring to human beings as such implies that the justification of the rights 
that they grant one another requires a moral argument. The motivation for moral 
argument arises from the requirement of what Seyla Benhabib, following Hannah Arendt, 
calls “the right to have rights.” That is, “to be recognized by others, and to recognize 
others in turn, as persons entitled to moral respect and legally protected rights in a human 
community.”199 In order for this “right to have rights” to have a concrete content, there 
must be a law that guarantees and secures everyone’s rights. This is why Habermas 
emphasizes the role of law in his account of human rights. Because of this emphasis, 
Mahoney accuses Habermas of being a modern positivist. 200  He misunderstood 
Habermas. Habermas’s emphasis on law, as Flynn rightly notes, “is not a version of legal 
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positivism; quite the opposite, his deontological conception of law aims at establishing 
the complementary relation between morality and law, and the way that morality comes 
into the law-making process.”201  
Already in the “Tanner Lectures” Habermas emphasized the complementarity of 
law and morality. He argued that  
Moral argumentation penetrates into the core of positive law, which does not 
mean that morality completely merges with law. Morality that is not only 
complementary to but at the same time ingrained in law is of a procedural nature; 
it has rid itself of all specific normative contents and has been sublimated into a 
procedure for the justification of possible normative contents. Thus a procedural 
law and a proceduralized morality can mutually check one another.202  
 
Thus, Habermas rejects the idea according to which positive law can maintain its 
autonomy on its own through the doctrinal accomplishments of a faithful judiciary, which 
operates, however, independently of politics and morality. For him, if the normative 
validity of law were to lose all moral relation to aspects of justice that reach beyond the 
contingent decisions of the political legislator, the identity of law itself would become 
diffuse. In this case, he argues, legitimating criteria would be lacking under which the 
legal system could be tied to the preservation of a specific internal structure of law.203 
Habermas’s choice to focus on law, as I have already mentioned, was deliberate and 
aimed at addressing the relationship between human rights and popular sovereignty in a 
constitutional democratic state.  
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1.7.	  Conclusion	  	  	  
In this chapter, I intended to present Habermas’s account of human rights in 
Between Facts and Norms, which highlights the fact that human rights remain abstract 
concepts if they are not implemented in a legal system that gives them a shape and 
content. Such an implementation is legitimate only if it is done through a democratic 
procedure through which citizens regard themselves both as addressees and authors of the 
law that regulates their living together. I started by considering classical liberalism and 
civic republicanism, which are the two traditions at the heart of Habermas’s enterprise of 
reconstruction of the system of rights. These two traditions differ from each other in their 
understanding of the source of legitimacy of modern law, or their understanding of the 
democratic procedure. Whereas they conceive a competitive relationship between human 
rights and popular sovereignty, Habermas posits a mutual presupposition between these 
two concepts, which constitute the two pillars of legitimacy of modern law.  
Thus, Habermas develops a system of rights that gives an equal weight to both 
private and public autonomy of legal subjects in order to regulate their living together. 
This system of rights shows that human rights and popular sovereignty are not only 
compatible, but also co-original. Such compatibility makes the legal code the only 
language through which legal subjects express their autonomy. The expression of the 
autonomy, both private and public, of the citizens requires a structure that enables every 
legal subject to regard himself or herself as both legislator and addressee of the law. The 
state then appears as that structure through which basic rights assume concrete shapes. It 
ensures the concretization and the effectiveness of rights that regulate life in common. 
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Thus, for Habermas, there is no conceptualization of the system of rights without the 
medium of law.  
Such an approach has led to criticisms according to which Habermas does not 
stress the importance of morality in his account of human rights. Therefore he denies the 
moral aspect of human rights. Such criticisms overlooked the main aim of Habermas in 
Between Facts and Norms, which was to address the issue of the legitimacy of modern 
law. In the following chapter I will argue that Habermas takes into account the moral 
dimension of human rights in his account. Raising the question of law is in itself raising 
the question of morality, because such a question deals with conditions that are conducive 
to a dignified life for every human being. In his consideration of law and morality, 
Habermas aims to show that law and morality are complementary. As he himself puts it, 
“in important sectors of social life, the weak motivating force of morality must be 
supplemented by coercive law.”204 In a similar way, since human rights are an important 
aspect of human life, the fragility of their moral dimension should be supplemented by 
the requirement of their legal aspect.  
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Chapter	  2	  
Law	  and	  Morality	  
 
In the first chapter, I presented Habermas’s account of human rights in Between 
Facts and Norms. Such an account was criticized for underemphasizing the moral aspect 
of human rights and therefore, in his effort to avoid subordinating law to morality, argued 
some critics, Habermas ended up subordinating morality to law. That criticism appeared 
to be inaccurate because raising the question of law is raising the question of morality. 
Thus, the first place to start in order to understand the moral and legal aspects of human 
rights in Habermas is the relationship he establishes between law and morality. For him, 
there is a complementary relationship between law and morality. They both deal with the 
same problem: legitimately ordering interpersonal relationships through justified norms. 
In other words, both law and morality aim at controlling conduct of individuals within the 
human community so as to secure the welfare of the individual and the common good of 
the entire political community.  
Such securement points to the idea of equal treatment, which is made explicit 
through the concept of law or legal status. All subjects receive the same rights only as 
legal subjects. Here appears the importance for modern law not to be limited to meeting 
“the functional requirements of a complex society; it must also satisfy the precarious 
conditions of a social integration that ultimately takes place through the achievements of 
mutual understanding on the part of communicatively acting subjects, that is, through the 
acceptability of validity claims.” 205  Thus, in order for that legitimate ordering of 
interpersonal relationships to be effective, law and morality must be in harmony. The 	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requirement of harmony is justified by the fact that law and morality share the concept of 
individual autonomy and equal respect for everyone. This can be seen as the common 
foundation of law and morality.  
Affirming that law and morality share the concept of autonomy might raise the 
objection that the notion of individual autonomy is a Western view that does not account 
adequately for claims of community. Such an objection may be relevant if one 
understands “individual autonomy” as a radically exclusive notion that does not allow 
any openness to the other. This individualistic approach to autonomy has been supported 
by the traditional understanding of autonomy as “the individual’s ability to govern 
herself, independent of her place in a metaphysical order or her role in social structures 
and political institutions.”206 The same traditional understanding of autonomy contends 
that to be autonomous “is to be one’s own person, to be directed by considerations, 
desires, conditions, and characteristics that are not simply imposed externally upon one, 
but are part of what can somehow be considered one’s authentic self.”207  
If it is true that the idea of autonomy refers to the idea of self-rule or self-
government, and implies the independence of the self in his decision and choice from the 
manipulation and paternalistic interventions of others, then it is equally true that 
autonomy is connected to questions of moral responsibility. Such a responsibility is not 
limited to the self; it is extended to the relation of the self to the other. In that sense, 
individual autonomy has a communal dimension. Thus, to be a self-governing individual 
does not dispense the person from moral obligation and responsibility towards the 	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community. The communal aspect of autonomy is referred to as “relational autonomy.” 
This expression was developed by some critical feminists in order to replace the 
individualistic notion of autonomy. Andrea Westlund, for example, contends that 
autonomy is “a disposition of an agent to hold herself answerable, for her action-guiding 
commitments, to external critical perspectives.” 208  She continues noting that 
“autonomous agents will, in one way or another, manifest responsiveness to justificatory 
challenges and their disposition to do so is partly constitutive of their status as self-
governing.”209  
The main argument of this alternative to traditional models of the autonomous 
individual can be summarized in the following way: “insofar as autonomy is self-
government and the self is constituted by relations with others, then autonomy is 
relational.”210 Or, as Charles Taylor would express it, “we define our identity always in 
dialogue with, sometimes in struggle against, the things our significant others want to see 
in us.”211 Thus, my use of “autonomy” should be understood in this relational sense.  
In this chapter, I will first consider the classic opposition between legal positivism 
and natural law theories, by presenting the arguments of both positions with regard to the 
relationship between law and morality. Whereas legal positivists argue that law and 
morality are independent – which does not mean that they are unrelated – natural law 
theorists affirm the dependence of legal validity of law on morality. That is, any positive 
law, which conflicts with morality is not law at all. The second section will examine 
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Habermas’ s consideration of the phenomenological differences and similarities between 
law and morality. The third section will focus on the complementarity between law and 
morality, especially in their role of regulating social interaction. For Habermas, law 
compensates for the functional weaknesses of morality and morality tempers the 
mechanical implementation of positive law through the notions of solidarity and 
responsibility.  
2.1.	  Legal	  Positivism	  Versus	  Natural	  Law	  Theories	  	  	  
The main point of controversy between legal positivism and natural law theories 
is “the question of how to explain the specific validity of law,”212 or the question of the 
source of legitimacy of positive law. This question of the source of legitimacy can be 
expressed in the following way: does morality define the legal validity of positive law? 
The two classic responses to this question are: (1) legal validity of positive law is not 
determined by morality. Indeed, on an extreme “exclusivist” view, law is valid – even 
though it is grossly unjust – as long as the procedure of its enactment was respected. This 
first position is defended by legal positivists. (2) A valid positive law is necessarily a just 
law. Any unjust law is not a valid law. That is why thinkers like Augustine, Aquinas, and 
many others after them maintain that an unjust law is not a law at all. For them, legal 
norms are valid only if they are consistent with morality. In this sense, morality is a 
necessary condition of legal validity. This second position is defended by natural law 
theorists.  
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In the following lines, I will develop in detail the classic opposition between legal 
positivism and natural law theory. After considering different contemporary theories of 
natural law, I will present Aquinas’s theory of natural law and his approach to 
human/positive law, and then I will present the contemporary debate between legal 
positivist approach to the relationship between law and morality and non-positivism.  
2.2.	  Natural	  Law	  Theories	  	  	  
There are different contemporary approaches to natural law. Many thinkers have 
referred to natural law without necessarily meaning the same thing. As Charles E. Curran 
rightly observes, “they often came to different conclusions about what the natural law 
called for in human conduct.”213 Michael Bertram Crowe, for example, describes natural 
law as “an unwritten law, which is superior to and is the measure of man-made law.”214 
Such a law is regarded as “an objective standard of right and wrong, independent of the 
individual conscience.”215 In that sense, natural law constitutes “the unwritten body of 
universal moral principles that underlie the ethical and legal norms by which human 
conduct is sometimes evaluated and governed.”216 This idea of universality of natural law 
also appears in Daniel Chernilo’s approach. He describes natural law as “a general 
framework that centers on the ways in which peoples have imagined, and sought to 
foster, a sense of common human identity and belonging that includes all human 
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beings.”217 For him, natural law can be understood as “a universal set of laws that are 
valid irrespective of place, time or culture.”218 That is, natural law is universal and 
immutable.  
A different understanding of natural law is proposed by Costa Douzinas and 
emphasizes the well-being and integral human fulfillment of every person. For Douzinas, 
“natural law represents a constant in the history of ideas, namely the struggle for human 
dignity in freedom against the infamies, degradations, and humiliations visited on people 
by established powers, institutions and laws.”219 In a similar vein, Robert P. George 
describes theories of natural law as “reflective critical accounts of the constitutive aspects 
of the well-being and fulfillment of human persons and the communities they form.”220 
For him, natural law theories “propose to identify principles of right action – moral 
principles – specifying the first and most general principle of morality, namely, that one 
should choose and act in ways that are compatible with a will towards integral human 
fulfillment.”221 Among these principles, he mentions respect for rights that people 
possess simply by virtue of their humanity.  
Another understanding of natural law theory appears in John Finnis’ approach. He 
defines natural law as “the set of principles of practical reasonableness in ordering human 
life and human community.”222 He argues that an account of practical reasonableness can 
be called a theory of natural law because practical reasoning’s very first principles are 	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those basic reasons which identify the basic human goods as ultimate reasons for choice 
and action.223 The idea of natural law as “a set of principles” also appears in Joseph 
Boyle’s account of natural law. Boyle observes that the expression natural law “has 
commonly been understood by natural law theorists (and by many of their theoretical 
opponents as well) as referring to a set of universal prescriptions whose prescriptive force 
is a function of the rationality which all human beings share in virtue of their common 
humanity.”224 These principles constitute the fundamental ground for moral life and 
judgment. In other words, “natural law is believed to be a rational foundation for moral 
judgment.”225  
From these different conceptions of natural law, it appears that universality is one 
of the main characteristics of natural law: natural law applies to all human beings at all 
times and in all circumstances. This main characteristic of natural law (universality) 
constitutes one of the claims of natural law proponents. William O. Einwechter 
enumerates four of those claims: (i) principles of natural law are unchanging principles of 
law that exist in nature (a part of the natural realm) that define for man what is right, just, 
and good, and which ought to govern his actions; (ii) these principles of law are 
accessible to all human beings and are discovered by the right use of reason; (iii) these 
principles of law apply to all men at all times and in all circumstances; (iv) man-made 
laws (e.g., those promulgated by the state) are just and authoritative only insofar as they 
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are consistent with the principles of law in nature.226 Having presented these different 
contemporary approaches to natural law, I would like to present, in the next section, 
Aquinas’s theory of natural law, which is still influential for contemporary natural law 
theory.   
2.1.1.	  Aquinas’s	  Theory	  of	  Natural	  Law	  	  	  
A better understanding of Aquinas’s theory of natural law requires that it be 
situated within the context of his discussion of law in general, which he defines as “an 
ordinance of reason for the common good, made by one who is in charge of the 
community, and promulgated.” (ST., Q. 90, a. 4) It also requires a consideration of the 
four types of law that Aquinas distinguishes: eternal law, natural law, human law, and 
divine law. He defines eternal law as “nothing other than the divine wisdom’s conception 
insofar as it directs all acts and movements.” (ST. Q. 93, a. 1) Differently put, eternal law 
is God’s plan for all creation. It is “the plan of divine governance.” (ST., Q.93, a. 4).  
The main idea that comes out of Aquinas’s theory of law is the idea of 
participation. For him, everything participates in eternal law and eternal law is imprinted 
in them. From this idea of participation, he defines natural law as “the rational creature’s 
mode of participation in the eternal law.” (S.T., Q.91, a.2) Given that natural law is a 
participation in the eternal law, Aquinas contends that “natural law is nothing other than 
the imprint of God’s light within us.” (ST., Q. 91, a. 2) Then, putting these two elements 
together (participation and imprint), he concludes that “natural law is nothing other than a 
participation in eternal law on the part of a rational creature.” (ST., Q.91, a.2)  	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Having defined natural law, Aquinas introduces the first precept of natural law: 
“good ought to be done and pursued and evil ought to be avoided.” All the other precepts 
of the law of nature are founded upon this principle. (ST., Q. 94, a. 2) From this, Aquinas 
establishes an ordering of the precepts of the natural law that corresponds to the natural 
inclinations. First, man has an inclination toward the good with respect to the nature he 
shares in common with all substances, viz., insofar as every substance strives for the 
conservation of its own esse in accord with its own nature. Second, man has an 
inclination toward certain more specific [goods] with respect to the nature that he shares 
in common with the other animals. Third, man has an inclination toward the good with 
respect to the rational nature that is proper to him; for instance, man has a natural 
inclination toward knowing the truth about God and toward living in society. (ST., Q. 94, 
a. 2) From this ordering of the precepts of natural law, it comes out that for Aquinas “the 
law of nature has to do with what man is inclined toward in accord with his nature.” (ST., 
Q. 94, a. 4)  
Before proceeding any further, we must note that “the natural” that accompanies 
natural law refers to reason. In that sense, natural law can be referred to as “the law of 
reason,” or the “requirements of reason.” It is identified with human reason. This appears 
in Aquinas’s explanation. As Finnis rightly puts it, “Aquinas takes good care to make his 
meaning, his order of explanatory priorities, quite clear. The criterion of conformity with 
or contrariety to human nature is reasonableness. And so whatever is contrary to the order 
of reason is contrary to the nature of human beings as such; and what is reasonable is in 
accordance with human nature as such.”227 From this concept of reasonableness, the first 
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precept of natural law implies that “the good of the human being is being in accord with 
reason, and human evil is being outside the order of reasonableness.”228  
As regards the question of whether natural law can be changed, Aquinas describes 
two ways in which it can be. First, it is changed by something being added to it. In this 
sense nothing prevents the natural law from being changed. For many things useful to 
human life have been added to the natural law, both by the divine law and also by human 
laws. Second, the natural law might be thought of as being changed by way of subtraction 
– so that, namely, something that was previously in accord with the natural law ceases to 
belong to the natural law. Given this sense of change, the law of nature is altogether 
unchangeable with respect to its first principles […] However, in a fewer number of cases 
it can be changed in some particular because of special causes that obstruct the 
observance of the secondary precepts. (ST., Q. 94, a. 5) From this, one can argue with 
Aquinas that “the natural law contains in the first place certain very general precepts that 
are known to everyone [by means of reason], but it also contains secondary, and more 
particular, precepts that are like conclusions lying in the neighborhood of the principles.”  
(ST., Q. 94, a. 6)  
2.1.2.	  Aquinas	  on	  Human	  Law	  	  	  
Having dealt with the issue of natural law, Aquinas addresses the question of 
human law. He defines human law as “a command of reason for the common good, made 
by him who has care of the community, and promulgated.” (ST. Q. 90, a. 4) Four 
important elements need to be underlined with regard to this definition. First, law is about 
actions in accordance with the common good. It is not just about individual actions. The 	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common good is precisely what makes law distinct from any kind of command. As Jean-
Pierre Torrell rightly observes, Aquinas’s definition of human/positive law “is not 
centered first upon obligation, but rather upon the common good as that for the sake of 
which a law exists. The punitive understanding that many consider essential to law is not 
mentioned in this context, nor does Thomas’s definition utilize the notion of the limiting 
of one’s freedom that often marks many people’s approach to law.”229 Second, coercion 
is not an essential part of the definition of law. That is why the coercive aspect does not 
enter into the definition of law in Aquinas. Coercion can be according to law and 
presupposes law but it is not law itself. This does not mean that coercion is totally 
excluded from the application of law. The question is about justified and unjustified 
coercion. Third, only a competent authority has the power to give laws to the community, 
not any citizen. That is, a person who has been invested with power by the community. 
Fourth, the law must be promulgated in order to have the force of law. But promulgation 
cannot be confused with executive force. To promulgate is not to force, but to make 
known. Law should be known to its subjects.  
Having defined positive human law, Aquinas distinguishes three ways in which 
laws may be just and three ways in which they may be unjust. On the one hand, laws are 
said to be just, (i) from the end: when they are ordered to the common good, (ii) from the 
author or the lawmaker: when the law passed does not exceed the lawmaker’s authority, 
and (iii) from the form: when burdens are imposed on the subjects according to 
proportionate equality for the common good. For Aquinas, such laws are just and obligate 
in conscience and are legal. On the other hand, laws can be unjust when they are contrary 	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to the human good either because of (i) their end: when the authority imposes burdens on 
the subjects that do not pertain to the common utility, but rather to his own greed or 
glory, (ii) their author: when someone makes a law that is beyond the authority granted to 
him, and (iii) their form: when burdens are unequally distributed in the community, even 
though they pertain to the common good. For Aquinas, such laws are not laws and do not 
obligate in conscience. They are violence rather than laws. Here Aquinas connects the 
validity of a law with justice. He shares Augustine’s view that a law that is not just is not 
law at all. Therefore, such a law does not bind in conscience, except perhaps in order to 
avoid scandal or disturbances.  
Applying the notion of justice to human affairs, Aquinas establishes a relationship 
between being just and being right. He writes, “in human affairs something is called just 
by virtue of its being right (rectum) according to the rule of reason. [And] the first rule of 
reason is the law of nature.” (ST., Q. 95, a. 2) From this, he argues that “every humanly 
made law has the character of law to the extent that it stems from the law of nature.” (ST., 
Q. 95, a. 2) Thus, conformity to and consistency with natural law becomes the condition 
of the validity of the law. Aquinas expresses it in the following way: “if a humanly made 
law conflicts with the natural law, then it is no longer a law, but a corruption of law.” 
(ST., Q. 95, a. 2)  
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2.1.3.	  Some	  Criticisms	  	  	  
There are some objections to be made to Aquinas’s theory of natural law. The 
main objection concerns the relationship between natural law and human law. Aquinas 
contends that human law derives from natural law. Given that in his account natural law 
is defined as a participation in the eternal law and the eternal law is described as the 
imprint of God within us or the plan of divine governance, one can conclude that positive 
law, which derives from natural law, is an expression of the plan of divine governance. In 
that sense, God would be the giver and author of positive law. This would support the 
idea of a high authority who establishes the law, makes it exist, and makes it known 
without the participation of all possibly affected persons. As Jacques Maritain rightly 
observes, “the notion of law is essentially bound up with that of an ordering reason. 
Indeed, in the case of natural law, human reason has no share in the initiative and 
authority establishing the law, either in making it exist or in making it known […] The 
divine reason is the only reason which is author of the law.”230 Such an approach to law 
seems to be ineffective in a pluralistic world, characterized, as John Rawls would put it, 
by different comprehensive doctrines. Legal positivists reject this approach to law, not 
only because of its affirmation of a transcendent source of the legitimacy of positive law, 
but also because of its tendency to relate the legal validity of law to its justness.  
As a response to the criticism against Aquinas’s approach to the relationship 
between natural law and human/positive law, Finnis argues that in Aquinas’s conception 
of law, positive law is not conceived as a mere emanation from or copy of natural law. 
Legislators have the creative freedom to enact laws that serve the common good of the 	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community. He expresses it in the following way: “Aquinas indeed asserts that positive 
law derives its validity from natural law; but in the very same breath he shows how it is 
not a mere emanation from or copy of natural law, and how the legislator enjoys the 
creative freedom of an architect.”231 Finnis goes on to note that Aquinas thinks that 
positive law is needed because the natural law already somehow in existence “does not 
itself provide all or even most of the solutions to the co-ordination problems of 
communal life.”232  
2.1.4.	  Contemporary	  Debate	  Between	  Legal	  Positivism	  and	  Non-­‐Positivism	  	  	  
The question regarding morality and law still has a hold on legal scholarship. In 
his book, The Argument from Injustice: A Reply to Legal Positivism, Robert Alexy points 
out that “the central problem in the debate surrounding the concept of law is the 
relationship of law and morality.”233 Today, two main positions can be considered, 
defined respectively by the separation thesis and the connection thesis. The first position 
is voiced by legal positivists and the second by non-positivists whose theory is regarded 
as one of the expressions or descriptions of modern natural law theories. The separation 
thesis, states that there is “no necessary connection between legal validity or legal 
correctness on the one hand, and moral merits and demerits or moral correctness and 
incorrectness on the other.”234 The connection thesis maintains that the concept of law is 
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to be defined such that moral elements are included.235 Thus, from the perspective of non-
positivism any law that does not take into account moral arguments cannot be legally 
valid. In other words, any moral defect undermines the validity of a legal norm. In order 
to avoid unjustified generalization, different variants can be distinguished within the two 
main positions: legal positivism and non-positivism.  
2.1.4.1.	  Variants	  of	  Legal	  Positivism	  	  	  
Legal positivism can be divided into exclusive legal positivism and inclusive legal 
positivism. On the one hand, exclusive legal positivism maintains that valid law does not 
conceptually depends on its morality. That is, legal validity is not determined by 
morality. The logical implication is that moral validity is neither a necessary nor 
sufficient condition for legal validity. The judge or the lawmaker is never logically 
compelled to consider morality in lawmaking process. Thus, there is no justificatory 
connection between moral validity and legal validity. As Matthew H. Kramer expresses 
it, “exclusive legal positivists maintain that the very nature of law is inconsistent both 
with the role of moral principles as legal norms and with their role as criteria for 
validating legal norms.”236  
From what precedes, it can be argued that “it is never a condition of validity or 
existence of law that moral standards or considerations are satisfied. The existence and 
content of law always depend on what the officials of the legal system actually practice 
as law.”237 Thus, for an exclusive legal positivist a law cannot be disregarded simply 	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because it is morally indefensible. This implies that “determining what the law is does 
not necessarily, or conceptually, depend on moral or other evaluative considerations 
about what the law ought to be in the relevant circumstances.”238  
On the other hand, inclusive legal positivism argues that morality is neither 
necessarily excluded nor necessarily included. The inclusion is declared to be 
conventional, that is, a contingent matter, turning on what the positive law in fact says.239 
This idea is well expressed by Joseph Raz in the following way:  
Since by the social thesis what is law is a matter of social fact, and the 
identification of law involves no moral argument, it follows that conformity to 
moral values or ideals is in no way a condition for anything being a law or legally 
binding. Hence, the law’s conformity to moral values and ideals is not necessary. 
It is contingent on the particular circumstances of its creation or application.240  
 
From the perspective of an inclusive legal positivist, conflict with morality may 
sometimes justify invalidating a law, or moral demands may sometimes justify making a 
law. Thus, for an inclusive legal positivist, the judge may invoke moral considerations in 
defining valid law. In that sense, legal justification may or should take conventional 
morality into account. In brief, inclusive legal positivism does not rule out the possibility 
for positive law to refer for its determination to moral principles. 
2.1.4.2.	  Variants	  of	  Non-­‐Positivism	  	  	  
Non-positivism can be divided into exclusive non-positivism and inclusive non-
positivism. On the one hand, exclusive non-positivism “claims that every injustice, every 
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moral defect of a norm precludes its being legally valid, its being law.”241 Aquinas made 
a similar claim by contending that something has the force of law to the extent that it 
shares in justice; otherwise, it is not a law at all. (ST. Q. 95, a. 2) For an exclusive non-
positivist, valid law is morally valid. One must take consistency with moral 
considerations into account as necessary conditions on justified enactment and evaluation 
of valid law. Thus, from the perspective of an exclusive non-positivist, the judge or 
lawmaker is logically compelled to consider morality because law and morality are 
interdependent. On the other hand, inclusive non-positivism “maintains that moral defects 
undermine legal validity if and only if the threshold of extreme injustice is transgressed. 
Injustice below this threshold is included in the concept of law as defective but valid 
law.”242  
Having presented the contemporary debate between legal positivism and non-
positivism, I will now offer a brief critical assessment. A close consideration of some 
legal positivist arguments with regard to the relationship between law and morality raises 
an important concern. If the inclusion of morality in law becomes a contingent matter, as 
it is suggested by inclusive legal positivism, then we run the risk of falling into moral 
relativism in the way we apply the law in our interaction with one another. The law 
would become a set of rules that are reduced to a mere instrument of organization. In that 
sense, it would lose both any connection with justice and its genuine normative character. 
That is why it is important to insist on the interdependence of law and morality. As 
Ronald Dworkin nicely puts it, “the law is not separate from morality, because the best 
underlying explanatory theory of law includes the morally best justification of the settled 	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constitution, judicial decisions, legislative enactments, and legal practices.” 243  This 
allows me to discuss Habermas’s account of the relationship between law and morality.  
2.3.	  Habermas	  on	  the	  Phenomenological	  Differences	  and	  Similarities	  
Between	  Law	  and	  Morality	  	  
 
The presentation of the approach to law by both legal positivists and natural law 
theorists, in the previous section, was intended not only to highlight the common feature 
of legal positivism and build on it so as to continue responding to Habermas’s critics, 
especially those who accuse him of being a legal positivist, but also to enables us to 
understand, in what follows, that Habermas seeks a middle path between legal positivism 
and natural law theories. As Daniel Chernilo puts it, Habermas’s project “seeks to break 
from the metaphysical burden of previous natural law.”244 Such a break is not to be 
interpreted as a total rejection of natural law. Rather, it is a reassessment of natural law. 
Though Habermas challenges some aspects of natural law theories, he however 
“acknowledges a debt and at times even a family resemblance between social theory and 
rational or modern natural law.”245 This acknowledgement also appears in Habermas’s 
consideration of the role of the tradition of natural law in his work of reconstruction and 
reassessment of the normative foundations of modern democratic and legal theory. He 
expresses it in the following way:  
In connection with questions raised by modern natural law, I attempt to show how 
the old promise of a self-organizing community of free and equal citizens can be 
reconceived under the conditions of complex societies […] Recasting the basic 	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concepts of “practical reason” in terms of a “communicative rationality” has the 
advantage of not cutting social theory off from issues and answers developed in 
practical philosophy from Aristotle to Hegel. In fact, it is far from clear that the 
price we have to pay for the premises of postmetaphysical thinking must be an 
indifference to such questions, which in any case continue to be felt within the 
lifeworld.246  
 
Habermas’s project of reassessing natural law can be explained by the decline of 
natural law theory in modernity. Such a decline, observes Chernilo, can be seen as the 
“integrated result of three different challenges for which the tradition of natural law has 
found no answers: teleological approaches to history lose empirical plausibility; the 
pluralism of complex societies makes substantive ideas of human nature and the 
uncritical recourse to our own intellectual or cultural traditions highly problematic; the 
gap between facts and norms becomes wider and deeper.”247  This socio-historical 
constellation, notes Chernilo, creates the intellectual conditions within which natural law 
arguments have lost a great deal of their previous normative plausibility and justificatory 
legitimacy.248  
With this decline of natural law, some of its weaknesses become obvious. Among 
these weaknesses we can mention the inability of natural law approach to address the 
issue of reasonable pluralism in a society characterized by what John Rawls calls 
different moral, religious, and philosophical comprehensive doctrines. Another limitation 
of natural law is the lack of a clear distinction between the notion of law and the notion of 
morality. This clearly appears both in Aquinas’s approach and in non-positivism, 
especially exclusive non-positivism, which is regarded as a form of modern natural law 	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theory. For Aquinas, as I mentioned above, a human law is valid only insofar as its 
content conforms to the content of the natural law. For exclusive non-positivism, every 
moral defect of a norm precludes its being law.  
Given these limitations, Habermas develops an approach to law that not only 
affirms the complementarity of law and morality, but also acknowledges their differences 
and similarities. Unlike legal positivism, which does not tie up the legal validity of law 
with moral considerations, and unlike natural law, which includes morality into law in a 
monological way, Habermas’s approach, as I will present it later in this chapter, argues 
for the integration of law and morality through interaction or rational discourses. This 
approach is well expressed by the discourse principle: “just those action norms are valid 
to which all possibly affected persons could agree as participants in rational 
discourses.” 249  Habermas understands “action norms” as “temporally, socially, and 
substantively generalized behavioral expectations.” (BFN, 107) Among those affected, he 
includes “anyone whose interests are touched by the foreseeable consequences of a 
general practice regulated by the norms at issue.” (BFN, 107) Finally, in rational 
discourse he includes “any attempt to reach an understanding over problematic validity 
claims insofar as this takes place under conditions of communication that enable the free 
processing of topics and contributions, information and reasons in the public space 
constituted by illocutionary obligations.” (BFN, 107-8)  
As I have already pointed out, Habermas establishes a distinction between law 
and morality. In order to better grasp that distinction, it is important to consider first his 
conception of law and morality. In what follows, I will first present Habermas’s 	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conception of law, then his notion of morality followed by the differences between law 
and morality. Finally, I will present the similarities between law and morality.  
2.3.1.	  Habermas’s	  Conception	  of	  Law	  	  	  
Habermas’s conception of the law is always related to morality. He argues against 
any attempt to separate law from morality. In the Tanner Lectures on human values, for 
example, he develops the thesis that legality can derive its legitimacy only from a 
procedural rationality with a moral impact.250 This thesis is a response to Max Weber’s 
contention that law possesses its own rationality independent of morality. Weber 
excludes from his account of the legitimacy of law any moral preoccupation. For him, 
law derives its legitimacy from “(i) a system of legal norms, developed by professional 
jurists, that bring order to existing social norms; (ii) a legislature which creates laws that 
are generally valid and are formulated in the abstract; and (iii) a judiciary and 
government that are bound by these laws with regard to application and execution.”251 
Thus, for Weber these formal properties of law make law and morality two separate 
realities. In Weber’s view, notes Habermas, any fusion of law and morality threatens the 
rationality of law and thus the basis of the legitimacy of legal domination.252 Hence, 
Weber’s critical thesis posits that the rationality intrinsic to the medium of law as such is 
destroyed to the degree that an internal connection is established between law and 
morality.253  
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Unlike Weber, Habermas conceives the relationship between law and morality as 
inseparable. For him the formal properties of law have “an implicit moral dimension from 
which law derives its legitimacy.”254 Differently put, Habermas’s counterargument is that 
“the semantic form of abstract and general laws can be justified as rational only in the 
light of morally substantive principles.”255 Therefore, for him, if the law has to fulfill its 
function of regulating and stabilizing behavioral expectations among those who want to 
intersubjectively share life in common, it must “be at least in harmony with moral 
principles that claim a general validity that extends beyond the limits of any concrete 
legal community.”256  
Habermas’s critics have not grasped this aspect of his approach to law. Besides, 
they overlook the fact that in Between Facts and Norms Habermas had to accomplish a 
specific task in his project of reconstructing law: to justify the source of the legitimacy of 
law. In other words, his approach in Between Facts and Norms aims at addressing the 
problem of the relationship between the factual acceptance of norms and the validity of 
these norms. For him, the law – as it can be interpreted from the title of the book 
(Between Facts and Norms) – is understood as the hinge between facticity and validity. 
Andrew Edgar explains this mediating or “connecting” role of the law as follows:  
On the one hand, as facticity, law holds together a society that at worst can be 
characterized in terms of conflicts over interests or values – law is “what is left of 
the crumbling cement of society” – and at best in terms of contacts between 
strangers… On the other hand, a legitimate law suggests a post-conventional 
moral consciousness, which accepts norms on the grounds of good reasons.257   
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This understanding of the law plays a key role in the way the addressees of the law 
approach it and respond to its requirements. Either they understand the law as factual 
constraints and adopt a strategic attitude, which consists in obeying the law out of fear of 
punishment, or they understand the law as a body of valid norms and comply with it out 
of respect for the law itself. Once the law is obeyed it becomes effective and guarantees 
social integration and social order. Habermas expresses this double approach to law as 
follows:  
The addressees of the law can approach it in either of these two ways. They can 
either consider norms merely as factual constraints on their freedom and take a 
strategic approach to the calculable consequences of possible rule-violations, or 
they can comply with legal statutes in a performative attitude, indeed comply out 
of respect for results of a common will-formation that claim legitimacy.258  
 
Habermas describes this double approach to law as the Janus-faced presentation 
of modern law to its addressees. These two moments are very important in understanding 
modern law and its legitimacy. Modern law must be fashioned in such a way that it is 
viewed simultaneously as coercive and as law of freedom. The coercive moment ensures 
that “interpersonal relations within a given collective are regulated in a just manner,”259 
and that the rights of all legal persons are respected and their autonomy equally 
guaranteed. The notion of coercion is always associated with that of sanction. To say that 
the law is coercive means that it is sanctioned by the state and applied to legal behavior. 
The second moment of the Janus-faced presentation of modern law to its addressees, law 
viewed as law of freedom, is determinant in understanding the legitimacy of law. 
Through an act of freedom legal individuals consent to the law that they have given to 
themselves after taking part in rational discussions. Thus, for Habermas, “a law may 	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claim legitimacy only if all those possibly affected could consent to it after participating 
in rational discourses.” 260  This participation in rational discourses is described by 
Habermas as a procedure of lawmaking that begets legitimacy. It follows that for him, the 
“law receives its full normative sense neither through its legal form per se, nor through an 
a priori moral content, but through a procedure of lawmaking that begets legitimacy.”261  
The two moments of the Janus-faced presentation of the law help to grasp the five 
characteristics of modern law. For Habermas, modern law is formal, individualistic, 
coercive, positive, and procedurally enacted. First, modern law is formal in that it rests on 
the premise that anything that is not explicitly forbidden is permitted; second, it is 
individualistic in that it makes the individual person the bearer of rights; third, it is 
coercive in that it is sanctioned by the state and applies only to legal or rule-conforming 
behavior. That is, the law can or should permit the practice of religion, for example, but it 
cannot prescribe religious views; fourth, it is positive law in that it derives from the 
(modifiable) decisions of a political legislature; and finally, it is procedurally enacted law 
in that it is legitimated by a democratic process.262  
Before proceeding any further, we need to say a few words about the positivity of 
law. Positive law can be defined as an ensemble of general and abstract rules of conduct, 
enacted and sanctioned by public authority in view to achieve in human interaction an 
order that is the most favorable to the common good. Positive law is always concrete, 
particular, and historical. That is, it always regulates a given legal community at a given 
moment. There is no universal and unique positive law. Each legal community has its 
own positive law. Thus, dependent upon concrete historical circumstances, which are 	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particular to each legal community, positive law will always have a provisional character. 
That is, it can change with the evolution of some realities that are tied to the life of the 
community. Therefore, positive law is always in becoming.  
A clarification is needed at this point. Affirming that positive law is concrete and 
particular and at the same time defining it as an ensemble of general and abstract rules of 
conduct can appear contradictory. That is why it is important to specify that the concepts 
“general” and “abstract” here mean that the rule of law is enacted for each and every 
legal person. It is not formulated on the basis of specific particularities. However, it takes 
into account aggravating and mitigating circumstances. That is to say, from the point of 
view of principles, there is no particularity; but from the point of view of the applicability 
of law some circumstances can influence the way the law is applied to a particular case.  
Given that the positivity of law (fourth characteristic) implies temporality, that is, 
the possibility for the law to be amended in order to respond to new realities and 
challenges that society is confronted with, it can easily be instrumentalized and reduced 
to a means of realizing political goals. Hence the question arises whether the law can still 
fulfill its function of stabilizing behavioral expectations once it has been instrumentalized 
and politicized. As Habermas nicely formulates the question: “if the function of law 
consists in stabilizing normatively generalized behavioral expectations, how can this 
function still be fulfilled by a law that can be arbitrarily changed and whose validity is 
due solely to the decision of a political legislator?”263  
In order for the law to maintain its function of stabilizing behavioral expectations, 
the moment of indisponibility, which “constitutes an irrevocable counterweight to the 
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political instrumentalization of law as medium,”264 must be respected. Habermas uses the 
notion of indisponibility to explain how and why modern law is the primary mode of 
social integration. He writes:  
In essential features [of the law] the structure familiar in all civilizations was 
repeated —the branching into sacred and secular law, whereby, within the horizon 
of one of the few great world religions, sacred law was closely tied to the order of 
the cosmos and to sacred history. This divine, or natural, law was not at the 
disposal of the political ruler; in this sense, it was indisponible (unverfügbar). 
Rather, the canopy of sacred law provided the legitimating context within which 
the ruler exercised his secular power through the functions of adjudication and 
bureaucratic legislation.265  
 
As we learn from this passage, the indisponibility of law is related to its sacred 
character, which is closely tied to the order of cosmos and to sacred history. This sacred 
character is moral in its nature. Indisponibility is that element of the sacred that is 
retained in modern law and enables it to fulfill its function of stabilizing behavioral 
expectations. In other words, modern law would not be possible if it were not for that 
moment of indisponibility. Law would not be possible as the primary mode of social 
integration if it were separated from morality. Thus, “morality functions as a catalyst in 
the fusion of compulsory law and political power.”266  
2.3.2.	  Habermas	  on	  the	  Notion	  of	  Morality	  	  	  
Generally speaking, the concept of morality can be approached either from a 
descriptive perspective or from a normative one. From a descriptive perspective, morality 
refers to codes of conduct from which a given society or a group of people regulates the 
interaction of its members and their living together. But these codes of conduct or moral 	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rules cannot be understood in isolation. They have to be understood within a wide moral 
system. The requirement of understanding moral rules within a wide moral system helps 
transcend the limitations of a descriptive approach, which would reduce morality to 
practices of a particular group or society and could easily lead to the denial of a 
universalistic character of morality, which applies to all human beings.  
From a normative perspective, morality also refers to codes of conduct that 
regulate the life of those who can understand it, and not necessarily the life of all human 
beings. In other words, from a normative point of view, morality refers to moral rules that 
apply only to rational beings who not only will endorse codes of conduct that govern 
their lives, but also will freely conform their behavior to the requirements of those codes 
regardless of their belonging to a particular community. Thus, a normative approach to 
morality emphasizes its universalistic character. Such a character calls for respect for 
everybody and responsibility of all for all.  
This understanding of morality clearly appears in Habermas’s approach. For 
Habermas, morality has to do with binding norms of interpersonal treatment. These 
norms not only respond to our mutual vulnerability to harm, but also express the respect 
and concern we owe to each person. Thus, moral norms are not limited by group 
boundaries, but are potentially universal though there may be special moral obligations 
based on role responsibilities. In that sense, moral rules provide the basic framework in 
which people can cooperate, and thus provide the basic for solidarity. This is the kind of 
moral approach that Habermas develops and defends: “the rational content of a morality 
based on equal respect for everybody and on the universal solidarity and responsibility of 
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each for all.”267 Such a morality requires the recognition of the other in his or her 
otherness. Seen from this perspective, “equal respect for everyone is not limited to those 
who are like us; it extends to the person of the other in his or her otherness.”268 This 
approach to respect sheds light on the necessity of understanding solidarity as the 
inclusion of the other. As Habermas puts it,  
Solidarity with the other as one of us refers to the flexible ‘we’ of a community 
that resists all substantive determinations and extends its permeable boundaries 
ever further. This moral community constitutes itself solely by way of the 
negative idea of abolishing discrimination and harm and of extending relations of 
mutual recognition to include marginalized men and women.269  
 
This understanding of solidarity highlights the fact that “we can’t expect to find a 
generally binding answer [to our challenges as a human community] when we ask what is 
good for me or for us or for them; instead, we must ask what is equally good for all.”270 
Asking the question of what is equally good for all, is acknowledging that solidarity 
“postulates empathy and concern for the well-being of one’s neighbor.” 271  This 
Habermasian description of solidarity finds an echo in the biblical notion of the neighbor, 
which corroborates the understanding of solidarity. The question asked by the scholar of 
the law in the story of the Good Samaritan – who is my neighbor? – in order to prove his 
self-righteousness is not merely a spiritual question. It is an ethical question. It means: 
what is expected of me as a moral agent open to the light of reason? The attitude of the 
Good Samaritan is an exemplar of solidarity, which, as Pope John Paul II described it in 
his encyclical letter, Sollicitudo rei Socialis, “is not a feeling of vague compassion or 	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shallow distress at the misfortunes of so many people, both near and far. On the contrary, 
it is a firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good; that is 
to say to the good of all and of each individual, because we are all really responsible for 
all.”272 This notion of “all being responsible for all” clearly appears in Habermas’s 
additional explanation of the concept of solidarity. For him, solidarity refers to the well-
being of associated members of a community who intersubjectively share the same 
lifeworld.273  
From the above considerations, it appears that every morality must revolve around 
equality of respect, solidarity, and the common good. These notions show that morality 
has to do with the way people are related to one another as members of the same human 
society. The quality of their living together heavily depends upon the quality of their 
communication. From this we can affirm with Habermas that “the common core of all 
kinds of morality can be traced back to the reciprocal imputations and shared 
presuppositions actors make when they seek understanding in everyday situations.”274 
Therefore, there is a requirement of shifting from an individualistic “I” to an engaging 
“We” through which we intersubjectively come to the self-realization of our being. That 
is to say, being a person is always being persons-in-relation. In other words, I am because 
we are. It is always in relation with others that I become more aware of my own 
individuality.  
In order for the shift from the individualistic “I” to the engaging “We” to be 
efficacious it must be rooted in the notion of obligation, which “presupposes the 
intersubjective recognition of moral norms or customary practices that lay down for a 	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community in a convincing manner what actors are obliged to do and what they can 
expect from one another.”275 Here, Habermas does not want to reduce the notion of 
obligation to the recognition of moral norms. He includes the feeling of being obligated. 
Therefore, for him, “the key concept of obligation refers not only to the content of moral 
injunctions but in addition to the peculiar character of moral validity which is also 
reflected in the feeling of being obligated.”276 This mutual expectation brings to light the 
reflexiveness of moral rules, which bind the will of moral actors and orient it in a certain 
way by providing grounds for actions. Habermas explains the reflexiveness of moral 
rules as follows:  
Moral rules operate in a reflexive manner; their power to coordinate action is 
confirmed on two interconnected levels of interaction. On the first level, they 
regulate social action immediately by binding the will of actors and orienting it in 
a particular way; on the second level, they govern the critical positions actors 
adopt when conflicts arise. The morality of a community not only lays down how 
its members should act; it also provides grounds for the consensual resolution of 
relevant conflicts.277  
 
For Habermas, this force of morality to coordinate actions and to govern the 
critical positions actors adopt when conflicts arise comes from its credible cognitive 
content. Such content has an advantage over other forms of action coordination, “such as 
the use of direct force, or the exercise of influence through the threat of sanctions or the 
promise of rewards.”278 The advantage of the cognitive content of morality over other 
forms of action coordination resides in its capacity to let the morally free person be able 
to understand himself simultaneously as the author of moral commands to which he is 
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subjected as addressee. Such understanding is the outcome of a reached consensus on 
generalizable maxims. That is why for Habermas the moral principle is so conceived as 
to exclude as invalid any norm that could not meet with the qualified assent of all who 
are or might be affected by it. His “universalization principle,” which makes consensus 
possible, ensures that only those norms are accepted as valid that express a general 
will.279  
Here we see the particularity of Habermas’s moral theory known as discourse 
ethics. He refers to it as the “grounding of moral norms in communication.”280 This moral 
theory gives up the traditional concern of morality, which focused on good and happiness 
in order to exclusively focus on justice and solidarity. As Habermas explains it,  
Discourse ethics takes its orientation for an intersubjective interpretation of the 
categorical imperative from Hegel’s theory of recognition but without incurring 
the cost of a historical dissolution of morality in ethical life. Like Hegel, it insists, 
though in a Kantian spirit, on the internal relation between justice and solidarity. 
It attempts to show that the meaning of the basic principle of morality can be 
explicated in terms of the content of the unavoidable presuppositions of an 
argumentative practice that can be pursued only in common with others.281  
 
As Thomas McCarthy notes in his introduction to Moral Consciousness and 
Communicative Action, Habermas is closest to the Kantian tradition in his approach to 
moral theory.282 He affirms elsewhere that Habermas’s idea of “discourse ethics” “can be 
viewed as a reconstruction of Kant’s idea of practical reason in terms of communicative 
reason… It involves a procedural reformulation of the categorical imperative.”283 Despite 
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this closeness to the Kantian tradition, Habermas distances himself from Kant on three 
aspects of his moral theory. He explains how. First, discourse ethics gives up Kant’s 
dichotomy between an intelligible realm comprising duty and free will and a phenomenal 
realm comprising inclinations, subjective motives, political and social institutions, etc. 
Second, discourse ethics rejects the monological approach of Kant, who assumed that the 
individual tests his maxims of action foro interno or, as Husserl put it, in the loneliness of 
his soul. Third, discourse ethics improves upon Kant’s unsatisfactory handling of a 
specific problem of justification when he evasively points to the alleged “fact of pure 
reason” and argues that the effectiveness of the “ought” is simply a matter of experience. 
Discourse ethics solves this problem by deriving (U) from the universal presuppositions 
of argumentation.284  
At this point the obvious question is: why is Habermas developing a different 
moral theory and distancing himself from Kant? In order to answer this question one has 
to look at the starting point of Habermas’s moral reflection. Habermas begins his moral 
reflection by raising the question of whether the cognitive content of a morality of equal 
respect and solidaristic responsibility for everybody can still be justified after the collapse 
of its religious foundation. For him, modern morality is a postconventional morality, 
which no longer appeals to metaphysical views. Its religious foundation has collapsed. 
Thus for Habermas, the collapse of the religious foundation of morality has two 
unwelcome consequences: “on the one hand, moral knowledge becomes detached from 
moral motivation, and on the other, the concept of morally right action becomes 
differentiated from the conception of a good or godly life.”285 Therefore, for Habermas, 	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uncoupling morality from questions of the good life leads to a motivational deficit. 
Because there is no profane substitute for the hope of personal salvation, we lose the 
strongest motive for obeying moral commands.286  
Given the motivational deficit of modern morality, due to the loss of its religious 
foundation, Habermas develops a moral theory, which “defends a morality of equal 
respect and solidaristic responsibility for everybody. [This is done] in the first instance 
through a rational reconstruction of the contents of a moral tradition whose religious 
foundations have been undermined.”287 Thus, discourse ethics is understood as a moral 
theory based on justice and respect of the other. It gives every individual the possibility 
and the opportunity to participate in the discussion and choices of norms that are to be 
regarded as valid for the life of the community. In other words, Habermas’s moral theory 
highlights the obligation to respect the inherent dignity of the individual and emphasizes 
the intersubjectivity of moral subjects. This is not the case with the social contractarian 
approach, which seems to be individualistic. The search for self-preservation prevails 
over the concern for the well-being of all the members of the political community. For 
Habermas the social contractarian approach is confronted with two important problems: 
the problem of long term trust among the parties in the contract without a legal 
mechanism that secures the parties’ compliance and the problem of the meaning of being 
morally obligated. Being morally obligated is not necessarily related to having virtuous 
intentions, as Kant seems to conclude when he affirms that what distinguishes a moral 
person is his possession of a good will.  
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Because of these two problems, Habermas “accepts the basic idea behind Kant’s 
moral philosophy – the connection between duty, moral responsibility, freedom, and 
universalizability – but rejects both the metaphysics behind it as well as the 
‘monological’ procedure Kant recommends for implementing it.”288 Habermas thinks that 
the procedure of implementation of Kant’s moral philosophy is monological because “it 
requires that each person conduct a thought experiment within the privacy of her own 
mind in which she asks whether her maxim of action can be willed consistently as a 
universal law for humanity.”289 In Habermas’s view, such a procedure leads an individual 
subject to impose his maxims of action on the rest of humanity uncritically. The same 
procedural criticism is applied to the Golden rule – according to which we should do unto 
others as we would have them do unto us – because it has an egocentric understanding of 
self and the world. Habermas puts it this way: “the principle ‘Do unto others as you 
would have them do unto you’ will be found wanting because it remains bound in an 
egocentric fashion to an unthematized individual understanding of self and world.”290  
That is why for Habermas discourse ethics is the only procedure that can 
overcome the limitations of a monological procedure of implementation of morality 
because “only moral rules that could win the assent of all affected as participants in a 
practical discourse can claim validity.”291 As Ingram puts it,  
Discourse ethics provides a better model of moral reasoning… because only it 
overcomes structural ‘monologism,’ or moral self-centeredness. Instead of asking 
whether I can will my maxim to be a universal law for others without 
contradiction – the method proposed by Kant – discourse ethics asks whether all 
of those who are affected by the adoption of a proposed norm could agree to it in 	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light of the likely consequences its general observance would have for the 
interests of each person affected by it. Instead of asking what principles of justice 
a single ideal observer would choose, discourse ethics asks what principles of 
justice everyone would choose after having dialogically transformed their 
particular interests into generalizable interests.292  
Thus, for Habermas discourse ethics is the appropriate procedure for moral 
universalizability because “all affected can in principle freely participate as equals in a 
cooperative search for the truth in which the force of the better argument alone can 
influence the outcome.”293 Here we see the importance of the notion of complete 
reciprocal respect, which is a prerequisite for interaction among participants in rational 
discourses.  
 In order to avoid any misunderstanding about reciprocal respect, Habermas draws 
attention to the distinction between “respect in the sense of esteem” and “respect for a 
person qua person.” Drawing from Tugendhat’s morality of mutual recognition, 
Habermas argues that a person’s respect for others cannot be conditioned by one’s 
interest in self-respect. Similarly, other people’s respect for me should not determine the 
way I respect myself. If interest in self-respect becomes the condition for my respect for 
others and respect for myself is determined by other people’s respect for me, then the 
mutuality of recognition becomes instrumentalized. Habermas expresses it as follows:  
If my esteem for other persons and their respect for me are ultimately rooted in 
the fact that each individual can respect himself only if he is respected by others 
whom he does not hold in contempt, then there is something purely instrumental 
about the mutuality of recognition: respect for others is mediated by the concern 
with self-respect. But my respect for others cannot be made conditional on the 
satisfaction of my interest in self-respect if relations of mutual respect are to 
generate the perfectly symmetrical structures of recognition commensurate with 	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our intuitive understanding of noninstrumental relations between autonomously 
acting persons.294  
 
The egocentric character on which the need to be respected is based raises the 
question of whether a person’s value as a person is determined by the recognition of the 
other members of the community to which she belongs. It is true that personal identity of 
an individual is interwoven with his social identity. But his value as a person is not 
dependent upon the recognition of others. Rejection or acceptance by the community 
does not determine the person’s personhood. However, a person’s social identity is 
defined by the community to which he belongs. He can value himself as a social being 
only if the community confirms him in his status as a member. This is where the 
distinction between respect in the sense of esteem and respect for a person as person 
becomes very important. While the latter is always a moral matter, the former is not 
always a moral matter.  
On the one hand, respect in the sense of esteem is always related to the person’s 
competence or reliability. In this sense, we respect a person because of outstanding 
personal qualities that he possesses. For example, he is a good public speaker, an 
excellent runner, or an amazing singer. These qualities are not moral matters. However, 
respect in the sense of esteem can also have moral elements. When for example we refer 
to a person who possesses the quality of sacrificing himself for others, a person who 
refrains from acting immorally, we admire his moral qualities. Thus, in this case, respect 
in the sense of esteem is a moral matter. On the other hand, respect for a person as such 
does not depend on his outstanding characteristics. “We respect a person as such on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
294 JA, 44.  
	   119	  
account of his capacity to act autonomously, that is, to orient his actions to normative 
validity claims; we respect him solely on account of the accomplishment or quality that 
makes him a person.”295  
Respect for a person as person imposes on each member of the community the 
obligation to regard him as a bearer of rights. That is, a person who deserves recognition 
and protection by the community. In this sense, “morality can be understood as a 
protective mechanism that compensates for the intrinsic vulnerability of persons”296 and 
must emphasize the inviolability of the dignity of each individual. Thus, morality 
challenges both the community as a whole and each individual to create conditions that 
are susceptible to lead each individual to live so as to flourish and achieve well-being. Or, 
as William Rehg puts it, “moral norms set down baseline requirements about how to treat 
persons with the kind of respect and concern that recognizes their status as persons.”297 
The kind of respect and concern that recognizes the status of persons as autonomous 
agents points to notions such as duty, rights, and obligation. These notions, in their turn, 
promote the establishment of a structure that guarantees the realization of individual 
freedom. In that sense, they constitute the bridge between morality and law.   
2.3.3.	  Differences	  Between	  Law	  and	  Morality	  	  	  
Law and morality differ from each other in some respects. The obvious difference 
between law and morality appears in their mode of expression. Whereas morality is 
expressed through the conduct of the individual and his relationship with others, and 
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deals with motivations and convictions, law applies essentially to external behavior of 
individuals in their relation to one another as citizens and bearers of rights, and is 
expressed by having explicit written rules and penalties that can be interpreted and 
applied in case someone breaks the law. As Ciaran Cronin and Pablo De Greiff put it, 
“whereas morality must rely on the weak sanctions of a guilty conscience, the 
enforcement of legal norms is ensured by the polity and penal power of the state.”298 
From this point of view, it appears that law has some important structural advantages that 
morality does not have.  
This difference can be referred to as an institutional difference. Whereas morality 
does not have an institutional character and relies on the subject’s motives and 
convictions, “the institutional character of law liberates individuals from the burden of 
motivation.”299 In contrast to morality, notes Habermas, law is not just a cognitive system 
but also a practical system. While morality appeals to insight and good will, law restricts 
itself to requiring action in conformity with law.300 Law has a structure that gives 
primacy to entitlements and morality points to individuals’ obligations towards one 
another. As Habermas puts it, “Whereas morality imposes duties concerning others that 
pervade all spheres of action without exception, modern law creates well-defined 
domains of private choice for the pursuit of an individual life of one’s own.”301  
Another significant difference between law and morality appears in the way they 
regulate interpersonal relationships and the groups of people they refer to. As Habermas 
notes, “moral norms regulate interpersonal relationships and conflicts between natural 	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persons who are supposed to recognize one another both as members of a concrete 
community and as irreplaceable individuals. By contrast, legal norms regulate 
interpersonal relationships and conflicts between actors who recognize one another as 
consociates in an abstract community first produced by legal norms themselves.”302 This 
reference to groups whose interpersonal relationships and conflicts are regulated points to 
the fact that the moral universe is unlimited in social space and historical time and “refers 
to the moral protection of the integrity of fully individuated persons,”303 whereas the legal 
universe is limited in time and space and “protects the integrity of its members only 
insofar as they acquire the status of bearers of individual rights.”304 This temporality of 
positive law is explained by the fact that positive law is always particular and historical. 
That is, it regulates a specific legal community in a specific time. There is no unique and 
universal positive law. Each legal community has its own positive law.  
For Habermas, law and morality also differ from each other in their extensions. 
Whereas the areas that the force of morality embraces include both private conscience 
and public accountability, the force of law primarily serves to protect the autonomous 
domain of the individual’s life from the arbitrary interference of public power. In that 
sense, “law represents a selective, non-holistic way of regulating behavior and does not 
affect individuals in their concrete existence as persons individuated by their life 
histories, but only insofar as they as natural persons acquire the artificial and carefully 
circumscribed status of legal persons, i.e. of bearers of subjective rights.”305 This 
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difference concerning the extension of the force of law and morality is also manifested in 
matters that both law and morality regulate. Habermas expresses it as follows:  
The matters that are in need of, and capable of, legal regulation are at once 
narrower and broader in scope than morally relevant concerns: they are narrower 
inasmuch as legal regulation has access only to external, that is, coercible, 
behavior; they are broader inasmuch as law, as a means for organizing political 
rule, provides collective goals or programs with a binding form and thus is not 
exhausted in the regulation of interpersonal conflicts. Policies and legal programs 
have a greater or lesser moral weight from case to case, for the matters in need of 
legal regulation certainly do not raise moral questions only, but also involve 
empirical, pragmatic, and ethical aspects, as well as issues concerned with the fair 
balance of interests open to compromise.306  
 
From what precedes, we can say that law has a more complex structure than 
morality because of two main reasons. First, law “simultaneously unleashes and 
normatively limits individual freedom of action (with its orientation toward each 
individual’s own values and interests) and second, it incorporates collective goal setting, 
so that its regulations are too concrete to be justifiable by moral considerations alone.”307 
This concreteness of the law’s regulations points to the fact that in addition to its function 
of protecting the individual from the arbitrary interference of public power and of 
impartially settling conflicts of action among individuals, the law serves the realization of 
political programs. Such realization should be achieved in such a way that it does not 
impinge on the autonomy of the individual. Here appears an important level of the 
difference between law and morality: self-determination or what Habermas refers to as 
the difference between legal autonomy and moral autonomy. On the one hand, moral 
autonomy or moral self-determination refers to the capacity for rational self-binding. That 
is, “each person obeys just those norms that he considers binding according to his own 	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impartial judgment.”308 On the other hand, legal autonomy or self-determination of 
citizens, also known as the autonomy of the legal person, includes  “the jointly exercised 
autonomy of citizens, and the capacities for rational choice and for ethical self-
realization.”309  
2.3.4.	  Similarities	  Between	  Law	  and	  Morality	  	  	  
There are concepts that are common to both law and morality, such as right, duty, 
and obligation. In denying the intrinsic relationship between law and morality one denies 
the possibility for these concepts to express the same reality in both law and morality. It 
is true that a law qualifies as law though it is morally indefensible. That is, the legality of 
a law is not necessarily dependent upon its legitimacy. But it is precisely because such a 
law lacks the moral ingredient that it lacks the internal strength that can allow it to be 
more effective and have an impact on people’s lives so as to guarantee the harmony, 
which is necessary for public order. The effectiveness of a law often depends on moral 
reasons that are constitutive of that law. As Habermas points out, “moral reasons, in 
addition to empirical, pragmatic, ethical, and legal reasons, also play an important role, 
and often even the decisive role, in justifying norms that exhibit the formal characteristics 
of modern law. After all, laws must in general be so constituted that they can be obeyed 
out of respect for the law.”310  
It follows that a law is effective if it is obeyed for its own sake and not because it 
is regarded as a system of threats. Whenever the law is understood as a system of threats, 
it becomes a machine that inflicts fraud and harm on citizens, and contradicts the first 	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precept of natural law, which states that “good ought to be done and pursued and evil 
ought to be avoided.”311 It might be objected that public order is possible if the citizens of 
a society embrace values on which their law is grounded regardless of their moral 
dimension. This might be possible. But grounding law on values that a significant portion 
of the society unanimously embraces does not necessarily grant it validity. People can 
embrace any kind of values as long as these values guarantee the interests of those who 
embrace them.  
It is important at this point to note that in the argument about the connection 
between law and morality, morality is to be understood as a persuasive source of law and 
not as its authoritative source. Otherwise law would be subordinated to morality. This is 
precisely what Habermas has avoided in his account of the relationship between law and 
morality. For him, morality and law both serve to regulate interpersonal conflicts, and 
both are supposed to protect the autonomy of all participants and affected persons 
equally.312 He contends that moral and legal questions refer to the same problems: “how 
interpersonal relationships can be legitimately ordered and actions coordinated with one 
another through justified norms, how action conflicts can be consensually resolved 
against the background of intersubjectively recognized normative principles and rules.”313 
This similarity between law and morality points to the fact that for Habermas law and 
morality cannot be distinguished from each other by means of the concepts “formal” and 
“substantive.” The legitimacy of legality cannot be explained in terms of some 
independent rationality, which, as it were, inhabits the form of law in a morally neutral 
manner. It must, rather, be traced back to an internal relationship between law and 	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morality.314  
In line with Habermas, Tony Honoré notes that the connection between law and 
critical morality is necessary in that it is not contingent. It applies to every law and every 
legal system. This relationship is so important that the proposed interpretation of every 
law in every legal system can legally be challenged on the ground that it is not morally 
defensible, whether the challenge succeeds or fails in a particular instance.315 Speaking of 
recourse to moral arguments so as to challenge a legal system, Matthew Kramer writes,  
If the Court were to decide a case without making any apparent effort to ground 
its judgment in the morally best interpretation of the Constitution, the judgment 
would not be upheld by the other officials within the American legal system. If, 
for instance, the Court were ever to advert to some aleatory procedure such as the 
flipping of a coin as the basis for a ruling on the legal validity of enactments that 
regulate abortions, the ruling itself would not be treated as legally binding by 
other officials.316  
  
From this passage I argue that moral considerations are often used to assess laws 
that govern the political community. This frequently happens when the community has to 
deal with constitutional review. Even someone like Raz, who advocates exclusive legal 
positivism,317 acknowledges that when it comes to the protection of rights of moral 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
314 Jürgen Habermas, “Law and Morality,”  
315 Tony Honoré, “The Necessary Connection Between Law and Morality,” in Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies, vol. 22, no. 3 (2002): 494.  
316 Kramer, Where Law and Morality Meet, 117.  
317 Exclusive positivism states that moral considerations must be excluded from the concept of law. As 
Didier Mineur notes, Raz contends that determining what the law is does not necessarily, or conceptually, 
depend on moral or other evaluative considerations about what the law ought to be in the relevant 
circumstances (Didier Mineur, “The Moral Foundation of Law and the Ethos of Liberal Democracies,” in 
Ratio Juris, vol. 25, no. 2, June 2012, p. 140). In line with Mineur, Michael Giudice notes that on Raz’s 
account it is never a condition of validity or existence of law that moral standards or considerations are 
satisfied. The existence and content of law always depend on what the official of the legal system actually 
practice as law (Micheal Giudice, “The Regular Practice of Morality in Law,” in Ratio Juris, vol. 21, no. 1, 
March 2008, p. 95).  
	   126	  
significance, moral considerations are to be taken into account in the process of 
modifying the law. As Giudice notes,   
Raz’s notion of a directed power explains well the appeal to such rights in cases 
of judicial review, where subordinate legislation is subject to constitutionally 
recognized moral standards and considerations. Often the result is that 
subordinate legislation is modified or altered to achieve the recognized objectives 
of moral significance, yet such modifications or alterations do not come into 
existence until implemented by official decision.318   
 
As we can see, the connection between law and morality enhances the chance of 
the law to be respected by everyone. The same connection, arising from the claim of law 
to be morally in order, notes Honoré, “has served to inspire reformers and promote law 
reform. Hence, the values of fairness, equity, justice, honesty, humanity, dignity, 
prudence, abstention from violence and a host of other values that conduce to co-
operation and co-existence play a prominent role in the law even when they are not 
incorporated in any formal source of law.”319 The separation between law and morality 
might be sustained at a theoretical level, but at the practical level it is not sustainable. The 
law is produced in order to apply to real and concrete situations and cases. It is not meant 
to remain theoretical. Therefore, such a separation becomes meaningless. Consider the 
ruling of a judge on the custody of children for example. The decision is always made on 
the basis of moral considerations. Only the parent who can further the best interests of 
children should have their custody.   
This interlocking of law and morality raises the question of the independence of 
legal proceedings. Can positive law be autonomous on its own when there is a faithful 
judiciary? Habermas considers legal proceedings independent only on two conditions. 	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First, if the legal programs do not violate the moral core of modern law and, second, if 
“the political and moral considerations unavoidably entering into the administration of 
justice take effect through their rational substance and not through the mere 
rationalization of legally irrelevant interests.”320 However, he rejects the idea according 
to which positive law can maintain its autonomy on its own through the doctrinal 
accomplishments of a faithful judiciary, which operates, however, independently of 
politics and morality. For him, if the normative validity of law were to lose all moral 
relation to aspects of justice that reach beyond the contingent decisions of the political 
legislator, the identity of law itself would become diffuse. In this case, he argues, 
legitimating criteria would be lacking under which the legal system could be tied to the 
preservation of a specific internal structure of law.321 We would then assist in the 
instrumentalization of law by political power. Thus, the law would be dissolved into 
politics and reduced to the commands of the one who is in charge of running public 
affairs. Habermas expresses such a reduction of law to political power as follows:  
The reduction of legal norms to the commands of a political sovereign would 
mean that law, in the course of modernity, had been dissolved into politics. But 
the very concept of the political would thereby be undermined. Under this 
premise political power could no longer be understood as legal authority, since a 
law, which has become completely at the disposal of politics would lose its 
legitimating force.322  
 
The loss of the legitimating force of law because of its instrumentalization by 
political power does not necessarily imply that the law should be dissociated from 
politics. On the contrary, politics, as Habermas rightly points out, “not only equips the 
law with the means of sanction of the state but also itself makes use of the law, both as a 	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medium for its administrative and organizational activities and as a source of 
legitimation.”323 It follows that there is a relation of mutual dependence between law and 
politics. Law grants to political power its legitimacy through which legally valid 
decisions can be made and political power strengthens the binding force of law. In order 
to maintain a balanced relationship between law and politics, the internal relationship of 
law and morality must be maintained so as to avoid, as mentioned earlier, the 
instrumentalization of law by political power. Once such an internal relationship is 
maintained, it becomes clear that “the relation between law and morality is more of 
complementarity than of subordination.”324  
2.4.	  Complementarity	  Between	  Law	  and	  Morality	  	  	  
In order to understand the complementary relationship that Habermas establishes 
between law and morality, one has to begin by considering why Habermas rejects both 
natural law and legal positivist approaches. As I mentioned in section 2.1, the controversy 
between legal positivism and natural law theories is about the question of the validity of 
law. Both positions have difficulty acknowledging the complementarity between law and 
morality. They conceive the relationship between these two notions in terms of 
superiority and inferiority of one over the other, and tie the source of legitimacy of law to 
a higher authority. Positivists, notes Habermas, conceive legal norms as binding 
expressions of the superior will of political authorities. Like legal realists, who treat legal 
norms just as the result of policy-decisions, positivists cannot explain how legitimacy can 
spring from sheer legality. For him, both positivists and realists refuse to recognize any 
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claim to legitimacy stronger than the kind of legal validity that terminates in formally 
correct enactment and efficient enforcement.325  
With regard to natural law theories, Habermas contends that proponents of these 
theories “derive the legitimacy of positive law immediately from a higher moral law. 
Positive law here figures as the lowest level in a hierarchy of laws, the top of which is 
occupied by natural law which is explained in metaphysical or religious terms.”326 These 
two ways of understanding the specific validity of law are seen by Habermas as 
complementary weaknesses of both positions, which lead him to the conclusion that 
“legitimacy of law must not be assimilated to moral validity, nor should law be 
completely separated from morality. Law is best understood as a functional complement 
of a weak post-traditional morality which is, beyond institutionalization, only rooted in 
the conscience of the individual person.”327 Habermas expresses the complementarity 
between law and morality in the following way: “Modern law can compensate for the 
uncertainties of a moral conscience that usually works well only in the context of face-to-
face contacts, whereas coercive law has an impact far beyond that. At the same time, 
positive law does not lose all moral content, at least not as long as it meets the legitimacy 
requirement.”328  
From what has been said so far, it is evident that the relationship between law and 
morality should be understood neither in terms of hierarchy of norms nor in terms of 
subordination of positive law by morality. For Habermas “at the postmetaphysical level 
of justification, legal and moral rules are simultaneously differentiated from traditional 	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ethical life and appear side by side as two different but mutually complementary kinds of 
action norms.”329 From the perspective of natural law, morality seems to be ranked above 
positive law. For Habermas, moral references should not lead to a hierarchy of norms that 
places morality above law. Though he accepts the idea that “legal order can be legitimate 
only if it does not contradict basic moral principles,”330 and that in virtue of the 
legitimacy components of legal validity positive law has a reference to morality inscribed 
within it, he also emphasizes that this moral reference must not mislead us into ranking 
morality above, as though there were a hierarchy of norms.331  
For Habermas, the notion of a higher law belongs to the premodern world. 
Autonomous morality and the enacted law that depends on justification stand in a 
complementary relationship.332 Thus, in order to avoid the subordination of law by 
morality, as it is the case in natural law approach, Habermas views the law as a functional 
complement to morality. That is, “law compensates for the functional weaknesses of a 
morality that, from the observer perspective, frequently delivers cognitively 
indeterminate and motivationally unstable results.”333 For Habermas, this compensation 
of the functional weaknesses of morality is very important because it allows some 
characteristics of positive law to become intelligible. He writes: “important 
characteristics of positive law become intelligible if we conceive of law from this angle 
of compensating for the weaknesses of an autonomous morality.”334 Thus, as a functional 
complement to morality, law “relieves the judging and acting person of the considerable 	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cognitive, motivational, and organizational demands of a morality centered on the 
individual’s conscience.”335  
It is important to note here that in Habermas’s view, the complementarity of law 
and morality does not imply the moral neutrality of law, which, as he notes, “is 
sometimes understood to mean that political questions of an ethical nature must be kept 
off the agenda and out of the discussion by ‘gag rules’ because they are not susceptible to 
impartial legal regulation.”336 For Habermas there are always moral reasons that enter 
into law by way of the legislative process. This means that legal programs, political 
decisions, and law must be compatible with morality. There is a pregiven suprasensible 
order that should be taken into account in the enactment of new laws. Here Habermas 
seems to side with non-positivists who claim that there is a necessary connection between 
legal validity and moral correctness. Thus, any law that is disconnected from moral 
preoccupations or moral realities cannot achieve its function of regulating behavioral 
expectations of citizens in their relation to one another nor can it foster the right to equal 
concern and respect of all legal persons.  
From what precedes, one can argue that the validity of a legal system can be 
challenged on moral grounds. This idea is echoed by Didier Mineur who contends that 
the validity of the legal system depends above all on the appreciation of its moral value 
by its subjects.337 In a similar vein, Robert Alexy argues that “law necessarily raises a 
claim to correctness, and this claim comprises a claim to moral correctness. This claim to 
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correctness is the source of the necessary relation between law and morality.”338 From 
this concept of correctness Alexy shows that legal decisions always refer to both social 
facts and morality. He writes:  
Legal decisions regularly concern questions of distribution and compensation. 
Questions of correct distribution and compensation are questions of justice, for 
justice is nothing other than correctness in distribution and compensation. 
Questions of justice, however, are moral questions. In this way, the open texture 
of law, taken together with the nature of legal questions, implies that the claim to 
correctness raised in legal decision-making necessarily refers not only to the real 
or factual but also to the ideal and critical dimension… The claim of law to 
correctness always has reference not only to social facts but also to morality.339  
 This reference to social facts and morality seems to be the reason why Habermas 
approaches the relationship between law and morality from a discourse-theoretic 
perspective. In so doing, he wants to avoid the shortcomings of both legal positivism and 
natural law. He does so in order to preserve the inviolable moment of legal validity of 
positive law. He writes, “if the legitimacy of positive law is conceived as procedural 
rationality and ultimately traced back to an appropriate communicative arrangement for 
the lawgiver’s rational political will-formation, then the inviolable moment of legal 
validity need not disappear in a blind decisionism nor be preserved from the vortex of 
temporality by a moral containment.”340 This leads Habermas to reformulate the leading 
question of modern law from discourse-theoretic premises: “what rights must citizens 
mutually grant one another if they decide to constitute themselves as a voluntary 
association of legal consociates and legitimately to regulate their living together by 
means of positive law?”341  	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This reformulation of the question raises three important questions. First, is it 
possible to conceive law without reference to a higher or prior law enjoying moral 
dignity? Second, can the equal guarantee of private and public autonomy be possible if 
liberty rights (conceived as human rights) and political rights are situated in the same 
dimension of positive law? Third, how should we understand the standard for the 
legitimacy of law? The best way to proceed in answering these questions would be to 
start with the last question concerning the legitimacy of law.  
2.4.1.	  Legitimacy	  of	  Positive	  Law	  	  	  
For Habermas, the legitimacy of positive law does not derive from a higher-
ranking moral law. Rather, it only derives from a procedure of rational opinion- and will-
formation, which allows all those who could possibly be affected by the law to be 
participants in rational discourses. From these discussions emerges the same law to which 
these participants are going to be subjected. Thus, through the procedure of rational 
opinion- and will-formation, citizens are both authors and addressees of the law.  
Given that the law of a society is the product of the social forces of that society, 
such law is in one way or another influenced by the beliefs of that society. These beliefs 
are moral, philosophical, and religious. In that sense, it can be argued that law has a 
ground that is constituted by the beliefs of a given society. Thus, though positive law 
does not derive from a higher-ranking moral law, it is imbued with moral content. As 
Jerome E. Bickenbach notes, “we cannot deny that, in at least some respects, the law is 
intrinsically imbued with moral content.”342 The truth of this statement can be confirmed 
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by the use of some moral concepts in a number of legal procedures. In the case of 
criminal law, for example, moral concepts such as responsibility, fault, and justice, play 
an important role in decision-making. This example highlights points where morality and 
law substantially overlap and also shows that law and morality complement each other in 
providing a framework that enables the individual to live so as to flourish and achieve 
well-being. As Habermas would put it, “like morality, law too is supposed to protect the 
autonomy of all persons equally.”343  
From what precedes, it can be argued that moral and legal questions refer to the 
same problems of legitimately ordering interpersonal relationships and coordinating 
actions with one another through justified norms, and consensually resolving action 
conflicts against the background of intersubjectively recognized normative principles and 
rules. (See BFN, 106) The intersubjectively recognition of normative principles and rules 
enables us not only to avoid any approach that conceives law as a mere device of 
punishment against violations without maintaining or enhancing the well-being of 
citizens as a whole, but also to avoid grounding the legitimacy of law on the existing 
legal discourse of those who are in charge of the political community and on the practices 
in place. Law should not be identified with the will of the one who has the authority to 
decide on the fate of the community without considering the well-being of the members 
of that community.  
It is important at this point to note that understanding the circumstances of the 
legalization of certain norms helps to have a better assessment of existing legal norms. 
Otherwise, legitimacy will be grounded on preposterous bases. As Bickenbach notes, “a 
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critical assessment of existing legal norms requires an understanding of the practices in 
which those norms are situated, and in terms of which they acquire their legal 
significance. And since these practices do not stand alone, but are themselves located 
within a matrix created by a normative structure, one must also seek to identify the 
preconditions of the normative rationality of that structure.”344  
A perfect illustration of the necessity of understanding practices in terms of which 
existing legal norms acquire their legal significance is slavery, which partly depended on 
widespread early modern ideas of European superiority and the rightness of enslaving 
inferiors. For many years in the United States of America and in some Western countries 
slavery and racial discrimination were considered to be legal practices and they acquired 
a kind of legitimacy, which unfortunately was based on the widespread acceptance of 
such practices by the white population. This understanding of legality led to the 
interdiction of interracial marriage, separation of seats in buses, courtrooms, and 
churches, separation of schools and hospitals, denial of admission to universities based on 
the color of the skin of the student or his/her cultural background. Ronald Dworkin 
reports that in 1945 a black man named Sweatt applied to the University of Texas Law 
School, but was refused admission because state law provided that only whites could 
attend. A similar incident was recorded in 1971 when a Jew named DeFunnis was denied 
admission in Washington Law School, despite his test scores, simply because he was 
neither a black nor a Filipino or an American Indian.345  
Some years later, those practices revealed the risk of grounding legitimacy of law 
on the fact of widespread social acceptance of legal norms. It then becomes obvious that 	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any normative system must include a discourse that enables citizens not only to assess, 
evaluate, and rate human conduct and state actions, but also to participate in processes of 
adjudication that lead to normative validity. Habermas’s discourse ethics provides a 
model of such a discourse, which enables the individual to be participant in the process of 
adjudication that leads to normative validity.  
2.4.2.	  Discourse	  Ethics	  as	  a	  Model	  of	  Active	  Participation	  	  	  
In a pluralist society, it is important to have a discourse that integrates a variety of 
elements susceptible to allow individuals to be or to become active participants in the 
process of lawmaking. Habermas’s discourse principle allows that active participation. It 
states, “Just those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons could 
agree as participants in rational discourses.”346 As we can notice from this formulation, 
participants in rational discourses are expected to offer convincing reasons in defense of 
norms that can be endorsed by their fellow participants. In other words, participants in 
rational discourses must justify norms that are to be regarded as valid. William Rehg 
raises very important questions with regard to the justification of those norms. If we link 
the validity of a moral norm or judgment to the possibility for one to offer convincing 
reasons in the defense of the norm, then we should ask two questions: “reasons 
convincing to whom? And what kind of reasons?”347 As Rehg rightly notes, Habermas 
gives us two principles as far as the justification of moral norms are concerned: the 
discourse principle and the universalization principle. The former “states the conditions 
for impartially justifying norms of action in general, that is, not only moral norms but 
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also legal-political norms and other sorts of institutional and cultural-specific rules and 
obligations.”348 The latter “specifies the audience of affected persons. That is, moral 
norms must be justified to those whose ‘interests and value-orientations’ are foreseeably 
affected persons.”349  
As we can notice, the universalization principle clarifies some unclear aspects of 
the discourse principle. The discourse principle does not specify the good reasons that 
need the consent of those affected. Rather, it “answers the question of audience, those to 
whom good reasons must be convincing: ‘all those possibly affected’ by the norm in 
question. But [it] does not say what count as good reasons, beyond the condition that they 
be convincing in rational discourse.”350 In Rehg’s view, this lack of specifying what 
count as good reasons can be explained by the fact that discourse principle “covers all 
types of social norms, and the content of good reasons varies by norm-type.”351  
In order to address this problem, Habermas brings in the universalization 
principle, which deals with “the justification of moral norms, which potentially bind all 
persons and not merely members of a particular polity or group,”352 and states that “a 
norm is valid when the foreseeable consequences and side effects of its general 
observance for the interests and value-orientations of each individual could be jointly 
accepted by all concerned without coercion.”353 From this we learn that “according to 
[the universalization principle] when we accept a moral norm, we accept the foreseeable 
ways in which that norm governs and affects the pursuit of goods, whether by individuals 	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or groups.”354 It becomes clear that Habermas’s justification of moral norms set down the 
requirements about how we should treat each other in our effort to live so as to flourish 
and achieve well-being. Such a treatment requires respect and concern that recognize the 
humanity of other people. In this sense, we can affirm with Rehg that the universalization 
principle represents Habermas’s version of Kant’s moral principle, the categorical 
imperative, which states that we should treat humanity either in ourselves or in others 
always as an end in itself and not only as a means.  
Treating others always as an end is such an important aspect of life in common 
that it should not be left to “the weak sanctions of a guilty conscience.”355 Rather, it 
requires structures that guarantee equal respect for everybody, including “the person of 
the other in his or her otherness.”356 As Habermas puts it, “in important sectors of social 
life, the weak motivating force of morality must be supplemented by coercive positive 
law.”357 In the same way, the mechanical implementation of positive law must be 
tempered with the moral notions of solidarity and responsibility for everybody. This 
complementarity of law and morality does not imply the suppression of their differences.   
2.5.	  Conclusion	  	  	  
Law and morality are two normative systems that control and regulate behaviors 
in a human community so as to allow harmonious and effective intersubjectivity between 
individuals who recognize one another as bearers of rights. Different legal thinkers have 
interpreted the relationship between law and morality in different ways. On the one hand, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
354 Rehg, “Discourse Ethics,” 121.  
355 I.O, Editors’ introduction, xii.  
356 Ibid., xxxv.  
357 Ibid., note 51, p. 274.  
	   139	  
there are those who argue that law and morality are independent – though not unrelated. 
For this first group, a law cannot be disregarded merely because it is morally 
indefensible. On the other hand, there are those who maintain that law and morality are 
interdependent. For this second group, any law that claims to regulate behavioral 
expectations must be in harmony with moral norms. Approached from this perspective, 
the law must be enacted in such a way that it secures the welfare of the individual and the 
good of the community. Thus, the aim of all laws should be both the attainment of the 
end of the state and the common good of the community, both immediate and ultimate. 
As Arthur Scheller, Jr. notes, “the immediate common good of a state is peace, while the 
ultimate common good of the state is the life of reason for the whole community, i.e. the 
assurance of the opportunity to follow the law of reason to individual perfection.”358  
Once this twofold role is fulfilled, citizens can become active participants in the 
making of rules that define their life in common and then the law can claim legitimacy. 
For, “law can be preserved as legitimate only if enfranchised citizens switch from the role 
of private legal subjects and take the perspective of participants who are engaged in the 
process of reaching understanding about the rules for their life in common.”359 Reaching 
understanding about the rules of life in common requires a morality of equal respect and 
equal concern or, as Habermas puts it, a morality based on solidarity and responsibility of 
each for all. The implementation of such a morality depends upon a legal system that 
fosters the autonomy of citizens so that they can equally enjoy their human rights. In 
allowing citizens to enjoy their human rights, we recognize their dignity as beings worthy 	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of respect and concern. Such recognition sheds light on the necessity of conceiving law 
and morality in a complementary way. This complementarity clearly appears in 
Habermas’s approach to the relationship between human rights and human dignity. That 
approach confirms Habermas’s consideration of the moral dimension of human rights, 
which was not clearly expressed in Between Facts and Norms. The third chapter of this 
work will explore that relationship.  
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Chapter	  3	  
Human	  Rights	  and	  Human	  Dignity	  
 
In chapter two I presented the relationship that Habermas establishes between law 
and morality as the starting point for understanding his consideration of the moral aspect 
of human rights, which was not clearly expressed in Between Facts and Norms. My 
presentation highlighted three important elements of that relationship: (i) differences 
between law and morality (e.g. whereas morality relies on the conscience of the 
individual in order to regulate interpersonal relationships in society, law resorts to 
coercive measures to secure those relationships), (ii) similarities between law and 
morality (both deal with the problem of legitimately ordering interpersonal relationships 
through justified norms), and (iii) complementarity between law and morality (law 
compensates for the functional weaknesses of morality and morality tempers the 
mechanical implementation of positive law through the notions of solidarity and 
responsibility).  
Given that human rights are more about the kind of world we would like to live 
in, than about what we are entitled to – as I argued in the introduction – the 
complementary aspect of law and morality plays an important role in securing such a 
world. In order to promote the realization of such a world, one has first to accurately 
grasp the relationship between human rights and human dignity. Here we see the 
relevance of Habermas’s development of the moral aspect of human rights. As I have 
already pointed out, the common view in reading Habermas on human rights is that he 
overemphasizes the legal aspect of human rights to the detriment of the moral dimension. 
In response to this common view, I argue that the key to understanding how Habermas 
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integrates both aspects in his account of human rights must be found elsewhere. In order 
to grasp the moral aspect of human rights in Habermas one has to go beyond Between 
Facts and Norms. Habermas gives a clear description of his approach to the moral and 
legal aspects of human rights in his article entitled, “The Concept of Human Dignity and 
the Realistic Utopia of Human Rights.”360 As Habermas himself clearly notes, this article 
is not “a revision of but a complement of [his] original introduction of the system of 
rights”361 in Between Facts and Norms.  
Before I lay out Habermas’s discussion of the relationship between human rights 
and human dignity, I shall first look at the current debate on that relationship, especially 
the justification of human dignity as the foundation of human rights. My focus will be on 
three justifications: the religious-based justification, the secular justification based on 
Kant’s account of dignity, and what I call experiential justification. Then, I will discuss 
Habermas’s account of the relationship between human rights and human dignity, which 
clarifies his consideration of the moral aspect of human rights.   
3.1.	  Human	  Dignity:	  Meaning	  and	  Justification	  	  	  
Human rights are intimately related to the notion of human dignity. Both notions 
are connected in such a way that one cannot be understood without the other. As 
Christopher McCrudden notes, “given the close connection between human rights and 
human dignity, there has also been an understandable tendency, in this recent history, 
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simply to regard the two ideas as different sides of the same coin.”362 The importance of 
human rights and the requirement to respect everyone’s rights is based on the notion of 
human dignity. In that sense, human dignity is considered to be the foundation of human 
rights. It is omnipresent in every discourse on human rights and appears in almost all the 
important documents on human rights. As Oliver Sensen puts it, “human dignity is now 
the cornerstone of the constitution of many states and political manifestos.”363 For 
example, the term “dignity” appears five times in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR): twice in the preamble, once in article 1, once in article 22, and once in 
article 23. The preamble begins by stating that “recognition of the inherent dignity and of 
the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of 
freedom, justice and peace in the world […]” And a little later: “Whereas the peoples of 
the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human 
rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and 
women and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in 
larger freedoms…” Article 1 affirms that all human beings are born free and equal in 
dignity and rights. Articles 22 and 23 invoke the notion of dignity in reference to social 
rights and decent living conditions.  
The Preambles of both UN Covenants (The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) 
affirm that human rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person: “The 
States Parties to the present Covenant, considering that, in accordance with the principle 	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proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and 
of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation 
of freedom, justice and peace in the world, recognizing that these rights derive from the 
inherent dignity of the human person…”364 Many countries and regional organizations 
have incorporated dignity in their constitutions. For example, Article 1 of the Basic Law 
for the Federal Republic of Germany states, “Human dignity is inviolable. To respect it 
and protect it is the duty of all state power. The German people therefore acknowledge 
inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of every community of peace and of 
justice in the world.”365  The South African Constitution of 1996, in its founding 
provisions, chapter 1, states, “The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic 
state founded on the following values: a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and 
the advancement of human rights and freedoms.”366 The preamble of the Charter of the 
Organization of African Unity affirms, “We the Heads of African States and 
Governments assembled in the city of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, conscious of the fact that 
freedom, equality, justice and dignity are essential objectives for the achievement of the 
legitimate aspirations of the African peoples.”367 Article I-2 of the European Constitution 
reads: “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of 
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persons belonging to minorities.”368  
Advocates of human rights and different social movements resort to human 
dignity in order to justify their claims and their actions. The attack against global poverty, 
the fight against discrimination, torture and inhumane treatments, and the condemnation 
of injustice, are all grounded in the notion of human dignity. Human dignity is 
extensively used in the judicial world for the interpretation and application of human 
rights texts. In some jurisdiction it is even considered to be a right as other rights, and not 
simply the foundation of human rights. In brief, human dignity provides the ground from 
which human rights are interpreted and justified. As it clearly appears, the notion of 
human dignity has become central to human rights discourse. This central role of human 
dignity leads to the question of its justification: where does the power of human dignity 
come from? Or better, why does a person have the dignity that justifies the requirement to 
respect his rights? The answer to this question depends on the perspective from which 
one is speaking. That is, from a religious point of view, a philosophical point of view, or 
an experiential point of view. In the following lines, I will consider these three 
perspectives.  
3.1.1.	  Religious	  Justification	  of	  Human	  Dignity	  	  	  	  
As I pointed out in the previous section, human dignity is regarded as the 
foundation of human rights. It is the standpoint from which individuals can claim rights 
from one another. In other words, people have human rights because of their dignity. In 
many religious traditions (Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism) the notion of human 	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dignity is central to the understanding of the value of the human person. In this section I 
will focus mainly on the Christian perspective in general and Catholic perspective in 
particular.  
From a Christian perspective, the notion of human dignity is to be traced to the 
creation of the human person in the image and likeness of God: “God said, ‘Let us make 
man in our own image, in the likeness of ourselves, and let them be masters of the fish of 
the sea, the birds of heaven, the cattle, all the wild beasts and all the reptiles that crawl 
upon the earth.’ God created man in the image of himself, in the image of God he created 
him, male and female he created them.” (Genesis 1:26-27) This image and likeness are 
the foundation of the person’s dignity and distinguish him from other created beings. In 
short, the human person has dignity because he is created in the image of God. Because 
of this “Imago Dei,” human dignity is a value to be considered with great respect. As 
Pope John Paul II put it:  
Human dignity is a transcendent value, always recognized as such by those who 
sincerely search for the truth. Indeed, the whole of human history should be 
interpreted in the light of this certainty. Every person, created in the image and 
likeness of God and therefore radically oriented towards the Creator, is constantly 
in relationship with those possessed of the same dignity.369  
 
Taking into account the origin and the destiny of the individual helps us grasp the 
relevance of the attitude of respect with which he should be treated. Such dignity places 
the human person above other creatures. The Second Vatican Council’s Pastoral 
Constitution on the Church in Modern World, Gaudium et Spes, expresses this 
preeminent position of the human person in the following way: “Sacred Scripture teaches 
that man was created ‘to the image of God,’ is capable of knowing and loving his 	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Creator, and was appointed by Him as master of all earthly creatures, that he might 
subdue them and use them to God’s glory.”370  
From what precedes, we see that the image and likeness of God, which henceforth 
constitute the distinctive characteristic of the person, not only invest the individual with 
the power to rule over all other creatures, but also make of him a reflection of God 
himself. Differently put, because of the image of God whose reflection he is, the person 
becomes God by participation. He becomes co-creator and is invested with the power to 
define the destiny of other created beings. Thus, from creation, the person is endowed 
with the dignity that places him above the created world and raises him up to the rank of 
a god. This elevation clearly appears in psalm 8: “Yet you have made him little less than 
a god, you have crowned him with glory and splendor, made him lord over the work of 
your hands, set all things under his feet.”  
It is worth noting that the expression “little less than a god” is a reference to the 
heavenly court. The author of the psalm thinks of mysterious beings that constitute the 
court of God. The whole structure of the psalm is oriented towards the question of the 
identity of the human person. The individual created in the image of God is not only at 
the center of creation, but he is also superior to other creatures. This reveals both the 
greatness of God and the dignity of the human person. His value and importance come 
from the fact that he is crowned with glory and splendor, which are attributes of divinity. 
In that sense, he bears the divine mark. This divine mark imposes the obligation to 
respect the human person regardless of his or her social status, education, race, etc.  
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Both the creation story and Psalm 8, which highlight the foundation of the dignity 
of the person, are complemented by the mystery of incarnation. The requirement of 
respecting the dignity of the person becomes more compelling through the reading of the 
mystery of the incarnation, which is an important element, from the Christian 
perspective, in understanding the dignity of the person. Through his incarnation, the Son 
of God, not only “fully reveals man to man himself and makes his supreme calling clear,” 
but also raises him up and makes him participate in the glory of God. In other words, by 
the mystery of incarnation, the human being is henceforth united to the divinity of he who 
took his humanity. This clearly appears in Gaudium et Spes, #22: “He Who is ‘the image 
of the invisible God,’ is Himself the perfect man. To the sons of Adam He restores the 
divine likeness, which had been disfigured from the first sin onward. Since human nature 
as He assumed it was not annulled, by that very fact it has been raised up to a divine 
dignity in our respect too.”371  
Central to the Catholic Social Thought’s conception of human dignity is this idea 
of man created in the image of God:  
Of all visible creatures only man is able to know and love his creator. He is the 
only creature on earth that God has willed for its own sake, and he alone is called 
to share, by knowledge and love, in God's own life. It was for this end that he was 
created, and this is the fundamental reason for his dignity […] Being in the image 
of God the human individual possesses the dignity of a person, who is not just 
something, but someone. He is capable of self-knowledge, of self-possession and 
of freely giving himself and entering into communion with other persons. And he 
is called by grace to a covenant with his Creator, to offer him a response of faith 
and love that no other creature can give in his stead.372   
 
One can argue that this religious-based justification of human dignity is 
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compelling only to those who share and believe in the Christian faith. But it is challenged 
in a secularized world where the number of non-believers is considerably increasing. 
Doris Schroeder, for example, supports such a viewpoint. In her article, “Human Rights 
and Human Dignity: An Appeal to Separate the Conjoined Twins,”373 she argues in favor 
of the separation of human rights and human dignity. She puts forward three reasons for 
such a separation. First, the concept of human dignity, she argues, does not solve the 
justification problem for human rights but rather aggravates it in secular societies. 
Second, if human rights were based on Kant’s concept of dignity rather than theist 
grounds, such rights would lose their universal validity. Third, human dignity is 
nowadays more controversial than the concept of human rights, especially given 
unresolved tensions between aspirational dignity and inviolable dignity.374  
I will come back to the last two reasons in the next section. For the moment, I 
would like to focus on the first reason related to the religious-based justification of 
human dignity. For Schroeder, a religious argument cannot be used to justify human 
dignity as the foundation of human rights in a secular society. Her contention is that the 
concept of human dignity does not solve the justification problem for human rights but 
rather makes it worse in contemporary secular societies. Without reference to religious 
authority, she argues, it is much more difficult to justify the claim that all human beings 
have inherent dignity than to justify the claim that all human beings have human rights.375 
This is because in the context of the religious justification of human dignity, having 
dignity is tied to being created in the image of God. She contends that reference to the 	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words of God will not close the justification circle. Dignity is no longer an axiom that 
does not require justification itself. Thus, Schroeder concludes, proponents of human 
rights should not rely on human dignity to justify human rights in a secular society.376 
She appeals for the separation of human rights and human dignity because they are 
“uncomfortable bedfellows.”   
Schroeder’s concern about the religious-based justification of human dignity in a 
secular society may be understandable to some extent, but her argument is less 
convincing when it comes to the separation of human rights and human dignity. Let us 
consider two things. First, there should be a clear distinction between resorting to 
religious beliefs in order to justify human dignity in a secular society and convincing 
non-believers of the relevance of a religious justificatory basis of human dignity in a 
secular society. A religious-based notion of dignity may not convince non-believers in a 
secular society, but the secularization of society does not negate the normative character 
of the religious justificatory basis of human dignity. Second, the religious-based 
justification is not the only justification of human dignity. The fact that non-believers 
would not be convinced by the religious-based justification of dignity is not a reason to 
reject dignity as a justificatory basis of human rights or reject religion as a justificatory 
basis of dignity.   
There is another language that can be used in order to include everyone and fit the 
requirements of the so-called secularized society. Notions such as autonomy and 
freedom, which express the self-determination of the human being and are regarded as 
the manifestation of the person’s dignity, are not necessarily religious notions. They 	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apply to both religious and non-religious individuals. In virtue of their autonomy – their 
freedom and their capacity to set goals for themselves – human beings can claim to be 
endowed with dignity, and because of that dignity they can make rights claims before 
others. This way of reasoning is found in what one could call the secular justification of 
human dignity. It is well expressed by Immanuel Kant, thanks to whom we can still 
maintain the relationship between human rights and human dignity, despite Schroeder’s 
appeal for their separation.    
3.1.2.	  Secular	  Justification	  of	  Human	  Dignity:	  Kantian	  Approach	  	  	  	  
In human rights literature, the secular justification of human dignity is associated 
with Kant. His Categorical Imperative, according to which everyone must be treated with 
respect, is the best-known non-religiously-based conception of dignity. This reference to 
Kant as the “provider” of a secular approach to human dignity is rooted in two influential 
passages from the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. The first passage refers to 
the distinction that Kant establishes between price and dignity: “In the realm of ends 
everything has either a price or a dignity. Whatever has a price can be replaced by 
something else as its equivalent; on the other hand, whatever is above all price and 
therefore admits of no equivalent, has dignity.” (Gr. 4:435) A similar distinction between 
price and dignity appears in The Metaphysics of Morals:  
But a human being regarded as a person, that is, as the subject of a morally 
practical reason, is exalted above any price; for as a person (homo noumenon) he 
is not to be valued merely as a means to the ends of others or even to his own 
ends, but as an end in himself, that is, he possesses a dignity (an absolute inner 
worth) by which he exacts respect for himself from all other rational beings in the 
world. He can measure himself with every other being of this kind and value 
himself on a footing of equality with them. Humanity in his person is the object of 
the respect which he can demand from every other human being, but which he 
	   152	  
must also not forfeit. (MM. 6:435) 
 
The second passage refers to rational beings as ends in themselves and the 
requirement to treat them not merely as means but as ends in themselves: “Act so that 
you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end 
and never as a means only.” (Gr. 4:429) Kant relates these two passages to morality, 
which he describes as “the condition under which alone a rational being can be an end in 
himself, because only through it is it possible to be a lawgiving member in the realm of 
ends. Thus morality, and humanity so far as it is capable of morality, alone have dignity.” 
(Gr. 4:435).  
This second passage, which is frequently used as the justificatory basis of human 
dignity in a secular society, is known as the second formula of the Categorical 
Imperative. Here Kant “stresses that the subjective foundation of human morality consists 
of the dispositions of self-respect and respect for others.”377 This second formulation of 
the Categorical Imperative is interpreted as an explicit expression of the notion of human 
dignity. As I have already mentioned, the formula states that humanity, whether in our 
own person or in that of another, must always be treated as an end and never as a means 
only. By humanity Kant means “that functional complex of abilities and characteristics 
that enables us to set ends and make rational choices.”378 Or, as Oliver Sensen puts it, in 
the Formula of Humanity “Kant conceives of humanity as freedom. As freedom brings 
with it moral law, what should be respected is freedom or the capacity to be morally good 
[…] Humanity in one’s person is therefore what Kant elsewhere calls personality, or the 
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capacity for freedom under the moral law.”379  
Thus, making rational choices implies that we should act in such a way that our 
actions do not contradict our will so that we can ourselves accept the maxim on which 
our actions are based without letting the will be in contradiction with itself. As Kant 
would put it, we should “act according to the maxim which can at the same time make 
itself a universal law.” (Gr. 4:437) This means that if the same maxim is applied to 
ourselves, we should embrace it without any problem or reluctance. If we act in this way, 
we will be able to respect everybody as worthy of dignity. In this sense, the first and the 
second formulas of the Categorical Imperative are the same. Sensen explains the 
sameness of these two formulas as follows: “Kant says that the requirement not to treat 
others as mere means is already contained in the main formulation of the Categorical 
Imperative. The Formula of Humanity is ‘at bottom the same’ as the Formula of 
Universal Law. That is, the requirement to respect others is ‘tantamount’ to the 
requirement to universalize one’s maxims.”380 Following the same line of thought, Roger 
Sullivan notes that “the imperative that we should act only on maxims capable of being 
universal laws […] inevitably ‘will lead to’ our recognizing that we must respect every 
human person as having objective and intrinsic worth or dignity.”381  
When Kant explains the second formula of the Categorical Imperative, he makes 
a clear distinction between human beings and things. On the one hand, things have value 
as long as someone likes them, desires them, or regards them as valuable. In that sense, 
their value is conditional and subjective. Therefore, they are only relatively good. They 
do not have an intrinsic worth and can be replaced by other things more valuable. On the 	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other hand, human beings “are self-existent, having intrinsic and objective worth simply 
by the fact that they exist, apart from any and all subjective prudential considerations.”382 
Each person is unique and cannot be replaced by anyone else. This distinction between 
dignity and price shows that a human person cannot be replaced, for the person has a 
unique status: humanity. As Sullivan puts it,  
Unlike mere things, persons have humanity in the sense of a moral personality… 
[which] refers to a rational agent’s ability to act freely, that is, independently of 
the mechanisms of nature. Such agents are regarded as ‘persons’ rather than as 
‘things’ because they are by nature free and rational, able and obligated to set 
goals, to recognize the existence of objective ends, to make genuine choices, and 
to enact and act on genuinely universal laws of conduct for themselves and all 
others. It is because of being under the moral law that each and every person has 
an intrinsic, inalienable, unconditional, objective worth or dignity as a person.”383  
 
From the above passage, it clearly appears that our dignity as human beings does 
not depend upon our usefulness or our appreciation from others. Rather, it depends upon 
our being under the moral law by virtue of which “we are elevated above being merely 
part of the natural world […] We have an absolute and irreplaceable worth, for our value 
is not dependent on our usefulness or desirability. It has no price or no equivalent for 
which the object of esteem could be exchanged.”384 Such an irreplaceable worth requires 
respect both for ourselves and for others. The respect required by our worth as moral 
agents is to be distinguished from honor. As Sullivan notes it, respect is radically 
different from the notion of honor. Whereas honor rests only on societal roles and 
prudential distinctions, respect is an attitude due equally to every person, simply because 
each is a person, a rational being capable of moral self-determination, regardless of social 
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position, occupational role, learning, wealth, or any other special qualities or talents he or 
she may or may not possess.385  
It is important at this point to note that Kant introduces dignity in the context of 
respect. The respect that I owe other people and the respect that they owe me are 
recognition of dignity in other human beings. This leads Kant to equate dignity with 
humanity. For him, “humanity itself is a dignity.” (MM. 6:462) Because of that, “every 
human being has a legitimate claim to respect; for a human being cannot be used merely 
as a means by any human being (either by others or even by himself) but must always be 
used at the same time as an end. It is just in this that his dignity (personality) consists.” 
(MM. 6: 462)  
This Kantian justification of dignity, which is often used as the secular foundation 
of human rights, allows me to address the second reason put forward by Schroeder in her 
argument for the separation between human rights and human dignity. Schroeder argues 
that if human rights were based on Kant’s concept of dignity, such rights would lose their 
universal validity because they would exclude some human beings from the realm of 
human rights. She writes:  
Why could Kant’s concept of dignity not lead to human rights for all? The strict 
answer would be because only those human beings who are morally self-
legislative, who can distinguish what is morally right from what is morally wrong, 
have dignity, and therefore indirectly human rights. This reasoning would exclude 
huge numbers of human beings from the relevant realm, small children to begin 
with, but at an extreme, everybody who is asleep.386  
 
She continues arguing that the exclusion of some people from the realm of ends, and by 
implication from human rights, leads us into the Kantian cul-de-sac. That is, only subjects 	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capable of a morally practical use of reason are exalted above any price and possess an 
absolute inner worth, i.e. dignity. As a result, they have rights.387 For Schroeder, any 
attempt to use Kantian dignity to claim human rights for all fails. It excludes at least 
small groups from the realm of dignity. She writes again:  
Immanuel Kant argued that human dignity derives from the human capacity for 
moral self-legislation [...] Universal human rights cannot be bestowed through 
Kantian dignity, which must exclude those who will never (re)gain rational 
faculties […] The capacity for moral self-legislation cannot be the grounds for 
human dignity if an ad-hoc addition is required so that dignity also applies to 
those to whom the criterion itself will never apply.388  
 
In order to respond to Schroeder, I look to Oliver Sensen’s works, especially his 
book entitled, Kant on Human Dignity389 and his article on “Kant’s Conception of Human 
Dignity.”390 Before exploring Sensen’s reading of dignity in Kant, it is important to note 
that the weakness of Schroeder’s argument comes from the fact that she rejects Kant’s 
understanding of dignity from the perspective of a contemporary paradigm of dignity. As 
Sensen puts it, “if one wants to justify the contemporary paradigm of dignity (as a value 
that grounds respect), one cannot just refer to Kant for a justification. One would have to 
look elsewhere.”391  Besides, when Schroeder argues that Kant’s notion of dignity 
excludes certain people from the realm of human rights, especially everybody who is 
asleep, she seems to overlook the fact that Kant’s view on dignity does not imply that 
only those who actually exercise their rational capacities have dignity. Those who are 
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asleep still have the capacity for moral self-determination.392 Capacity for moral self-
determination is what is needed for one to have dignity. Failure to exercise that capacity 
does not prevent a person from being a being with dignity. That is why for Kant, no one 
should treat morally bad people, including criminals and brutes like ISIS (Islamic State of 
Iraq and Syria), in an inhumane way. This does not imply that the individual is exempted 
from acting morally. Each rational being is expected and obligated to act freely and 
autonomously. Having said that, I now turn to Sensen who offers a more comprehensive 
understanding of Kant’s use of dignity.  
3.1.3.	  Sensen	  on	  Kant’s	  Conception	  of	  Dignity	  	  	  
 Both in his book, Kant on Human Dignity and his article, “Kant’s Conception of 
Human Dignity,” Sensen argues that Kant adheres to a traditional conception of dignity 
according to which all human beings are elevated over the rest of nature in virtue of 
freedom. Being free, human beings are subject to the Categorical Imperative that 
demands that one fulfills one’s initial dignity (in making a proper use of one’s freedom), 
and respect others. 393  He notes that Kant’s conception of dignity is commonly 
misunderstood because on the basis of a few passages in the Groundwork scholars often 
attribute to Kant a view of dignity as an absolute inner value all human beings possess. A 
different picture, he continues, emerges if one takes into account all the passages in 
which Kant uses ‘dignity.’ Sensen concludes that Kant’s conception of dignity is a more 
Stoic one.394 That is, Kant conceives of dignity as sublimity or the elevation of something 
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over something else. This idea of elevation clearly appears when Kant speaks of the 
dignity of humanity and dignity in connection to morality. Sensen expresses it in the 
following way: “When Kant talks about the ‘Würde der Menschheit’ (dignity of 
humanity) he is expressing the view that human beings are elevated over the rest of 
nature in virtue of being free. When [Kant] talks about dignity in connection with 
morality he is saying that morality is raised above all else in that morality alone should be 
valued unconditionally.”395  
This understanding of dignity can be confusing for someone who uses an ordinary 
language in order to define dignity. In fact, in our ordinary language dignity refers either 
to a rank that someone has or to a way of behaving. When, for example, we call a person 
“a dignitary” of the regime, we refer to his or her rank, the position he or she holds within 
that regime, and which is higher than that of ordinary people. When we ask someone to 
fight with dignity we are actually asking him or her to behave with honor when he or she 
is confronted with difficulties. These two examples show that there are different 
conceptions of dignity in ordinary language. Dignity can be referred to as rank or as 
behavior. It can also be referred to as a higher social status.  
Sensen illustrates the different conceptions of dignity by using two paradigms of 
dignity: the contemporary paradigm and the traditional paradigm. The contemporary 
paradigm of dignity is expressed through the common view about dignity, according to 
which dignity is conceived as an inherent value of human beings. Such a value 
commands respect for every human being. In that sense, “human dignity is understood to 
be [both] a concept with strong moral implications”396 and an ontologically distinct value 	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property of the human being, which elevates him above the rest of nature and from which 
he or she can demand rights from others. In other words, in virtue of his dignity the 
person is entitled to demand rights from others. This contemporary paradigm of dignity is 
reflected in most of the documents on human rights where the notion of human dignity 
frequently appears.  
Talking about the traditional paradigm, Sensen notes that human dignity, in the 
traditional conception, is in the first place the answer to the theoretical question of the 
place of human beings in the universe. According to this paradigm, he states, human 
beings are distinguished from the rest of nature in virtue of certain capacities they have, 
particularly reason and freedom. 397  He argues that from the traditional paradigm 
perspective, dignity has two levels. First, all human beings are said to be elevated over 
the rest of nature in virtue of possessing a capacity for freedom or reason (initial dignity). 
Second, morality is tied to a duty to realize fully one’s initial dignity.398 From this, it 
follows that the capacity for freedom and reason must be accompanied by the duty to 
make a proper use of that freedom and reason in order for human beings to fully enjoy 
their dignity. As Sensen puts it, “in Kant’s view human beings are ennobled or elevated 
over the rest of nature in virtue of being free (i.e. not necessarily being determined by 
one’s inclinations). This freedom is said to be connected to a duty to use one’s freedom in 
a proper way, especially to realize and preserve one’s initial dignity.”399  
According to Sensen, Kant’s conception of dignity is better viewed in light of the 
traditional rather than the contemporary paradigm. This is because for Kant human 
beings are distinguished in nature in virtue of having freedom. Being free, human beings 	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are subject to the Categorical Imperative, which imposes the duty to oneself to 
universalize one’s maxims and thereby to respect others.400 From this, Sensen outlines 
four elements that one can find in the traditional conception of dignity and which are 
contained in Kant’s conception of dignity: (i) human beings are seen as elevated over the 
rest of nature in virtue of having freedom, (ii) dignity is a two-fold notion that refers to 
the initial elevation of human beings, as well as to the realized elevation of each 
individual, (iii) one’s initial dignity is said to be connected to a duty to make a proper use 
of one’s freedom (to realize one’s dignity), and (iv) the duty is in the first instance a duty 
to oneself.401  
As it appears from what has been said so far, the notion of freedom is a key 
element in understanding Kant’s conception of dignity. Kant equates freedom with the 
capacity to act morally. Therefore, “Kant uses ‘dignity’ in the realized sense especially to 
express the claim that morality should be valued above all else.”402 For him, the dignity 
of humanity consists in the capacity to act morally. This brings to light the Kantian 
meaning of “the absolute inner value of a person.” As Sensen puts it, “for Kant the 
absolute inner value is not a metaphysical property. It is a prescription of what one should 
value independently of inclinations […] To say that something has inner value is to say 
that it should be valued unconditionally.”403  
The Kantian notion of freedom is a key element not only in understanding Kant’s 
conception of dignity, but also in grasping the meaning of the expression “end in itself,” 
which explains the reason why humanity in our own person or that of others should 	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always be treated with respect. In his reading of Kant, Sensen argues that the expression 
“end in itself” “is foremost a descriptive not a normative term for Kant […] It describes 
human being as free, i.e., not a mere plaything of nature or the means to the will of 
another.”404 He notes that in order to find the descriptive component of the concept “end 
in itself,” one has to go beyond the Groundwork. Kant, continues Sensen, gives a clear 
description of “end in itself” in the lectures “Naturrecht Feyerabend” (NF 27:1319-22). 
The lectures suggest that Kant uses the expression “end in itself” to describe one aspect 
of free will. In virtue of freedom human beings are not mere playthings of nature, or the 
means to the end of another (e.g.’ natures’ ends). Rather it is only in virtue of freedom 
that one is not merely a means to another’s end, but in oneself an end.405  
Sensen then lists a few passages of “Naturrecht Feyerabend” where Kant 
explicitly describes freedom as the justification of human beings as ends in themselves: 
“If only rational beings can be an end in themselves, they can be such an end not because 
they have reason, but because they have freedom. Reason is a mere means” (NF 
27:1321.41-3).406  “Freedom, only freedom alone, makes it that we are an end in 
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ourselves” (NF 27:1322.12).407 The same freedom that justifies our being an end in 
ourselves is the same that obligates us to act according to maxims that can be adopted by 
others. In this sense, “the requirement to respect others is already contained in the main 
formulation of the Categorical Imperative, which is ‘the principle of equality’ (TL 
6:451.15).”408 Such a principle of equality, in the context of dignity, contributes to the 
promotion of a treatment of human beings that enables them to maintain their own 
dignity. As Rachel Bayefsky puts it, “the notion that dignity is not only about being 
treated in a certain way by others, but also about one’s own conduct, can help to support 
models of human rights promotion that treat people not as passive beneficiaries of outside 
assistance, but as individuals who should be enabled to maintain their own dignity.”409 
That is, as individuals who are free. Thus, without freedom there are no human rights. 
Therefore, the separation between human dignity and human rights that Schroeder 
suggests cannot be justified.  
Some might argue that the above view does not seem to cover people who have 
lost their capacity for freedom. Such an argument becomes irrelevant when we make a 
clear distinction between losing one’s freedom and losing one’s capacity for freedom. A 
person can lose his or her freedom because he or she is being forced into a state because 
of constraints imposed by others or because of some limitations imposed by events. This 
is a loss of the actual freedom a person has to achieve what he or she values and wants. 
Let us say, for example, that Steve is capable of killing his neighbor and stealing his 	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money. But he does not have the freedom to do so either because the law forbids such 
actions or because he fears to be reprimanded and rejected by other neighbors. This 
example shows that deficiencies in freedom due to restraints or external constraints do 
not imply the negation of the capacity for freedom. A person can lose his or her freedom 
without losing his or her capacity for freedom.  
3.1.4.	  Experiential	  Justification	  of	  Human	  Dignity	  	  	  	  
From both the religious-based and the secular justification of human dignity, it 
becomes obvious that the notion of human dignity can have various understandings. This 
raises the question of its relevance as the foundation of human rights. Does dignity add 
anything to the discussion about the foundation of human rights? How useful is the 
concept of human dignity in discussions on the foundation of human rights? Some people 
might argue that dignity can only be the foundation of some rights and not of all the 
rights. As an example, they might consider the right to property. How does a person who 
tramples on another person’s property right hurt his or her dignity? The answer to this 
question might be that a person’s dignity is not violated when his property right is 
trampled on. Answering this way reveals a limited understanding of the concept of 
human dignity. When I trample on someone’s right to property, I deny his or her capacity 
to be free to dispose of and be responsible for what belongs to him or to her. And denying 
a person’s capacity to be free is nothing other than denying his or her dignity. In that 
sense, not respecting another person’s property is an offense to his or her dignity. 
Therefore, I violate his dignity by refusing to respect his right to property.  
The above example can be referred to as an experiential justification of human 
dignity. There are many other concrete human experiences that can be considered in 
	   164	  
order to grasp the deep meaning of human dignity and the necessity to protect and 
promote it. For example, the need to protect people from atrocities, cruel and inhuman 
treatment is not necessarily inspired by talks on human dignity nor by the reading of 
documents and treaties on human rights. Rather, it is triggered by the fact of witnessing 
the suffering of fellow humans and the experience of individual powerlessness to stop 
such atrocities. In that regard, the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
was the product or the result of the awareness of the value of human life raised by the 
atrocities of World War II and horrors perpetrated by the Nazis: the Holocaust. Such 
awareness led to the famous “Never again.” Never again must human beings allow the 
humiliation of their own humanity. As Johannes Morsink notes, “the Universal 
Declaration was adopted to avoid another Holocaust or similar abomination. Hearing 
about and experiencing the horrors of the war convinced the drafters of the rightness of 
what they were doing. The moral outrage thus created gave them a common platform 
from which to operate and do the drafting.”410  
In a recent past, other experiences of atrocities in Africa have revealed not only 
the experiential meaning of human dignity but also the urgency of the need for a serious 
commitment to the “Never again.” Nicholas Donabet Kristof, an American journalist, 
speaks of what he saw in Darfur as a reminder of why people say that genocide is the 
worst evil of which human beings are capable. He describes it in the following way:  
On one of the first of my five visits to Darfur, I came across an oasis along the 
Chad border where several tens of thousands of people were sheltering under trees 
after being driven from their home villages by the Arab Janjaweed militia, which 
has been supported by the Sudan government in Khartoum. Under the first tree, I 
found a man who had been shot in the neck and the jaw; his brother, shot only in 	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the foot, had carried him for forty-nine days to get to this oasis. Under the next 
tree was a widow whose parents had been killed and stuffed in the village well to 
poison the local water supply; then the Janjaweed had tracked down the rest of her 
family and killed her husband. Under the third tree was a four-year-old orphan 
girl carrying her one-year-old baby sister on her back; their parents had been 
killed. Under the fourth tree was a woman whose husband and children had been 
killed in front of her, and then she was gang-raped and left naked and mutilated in 
the desert.411  
 
Similar atrocities are taking place in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic 
of Congo where the conflict, which is regarded as the deadliest conflict since World War 
II, has left more than five million deaths, countless orphans, and broken families on all 
sides. More and more people are referring to the killing in the DR Congo as the 
Holocaust of shame or a silent genocide, which is overlooked because of the selfish 
interests of some Western countries. The population continues to deplore targeted youth 
and human rights activists’ extermination and systematic rapes perpetrated against 
women as a weapon of war. More than two hundred thousand women and girls have been 
raped in the past twelve years. This tally is far from complete. In this regard, human 
dignity is to be respected in order to avoid such atrocities. If the religious-based and the 
Kantian justificatory approaches to the importance of respecting and promoting human 
dignity do not convince people like Schroeder, at least the experiential justification of 
why human dignity must be respected should move every human being.  
From what has been said so far, it comes out that one of the reasons put forward 
by those who reject human dignity as the foundation of human rights is that dignity has 
various understandings. This is true not only for dignity but also for any normative and 	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descriptive concept. Let us consider justice for example. Justice has various 
understandings. It can mean fairness, equity, equality, and respect for persons. These 
various understandings of justice are not a reason to dismiss justice from discussions 
about promoting a safe environment for human beings or to abandon any effort to 
establish and to advance a just society. Then why should dignity be rejected as the 
foundation of human rights simply because of its various understandings? Instead of 
advocating the separation of human rights and human dignity, as suggested by Schroeder, 
we should rather appeal to the understanding of dignity that provides an adequate 
justification for human rights. The fact that dignity can be engaged in many areas should 
be seen as a tribute instead of being understood as a limitation and lack of clarity. Human 
dignity is a basic moral concept. Its utility is to be seen more in the functions that it 
fulfills rather than in different meanings it might have.  
The utility of human dignity related to the functions that it fulfills is well 
expressed by the African concept of “Ubuntu,” which is linked to the concept of human 
dignity itself. As Mokgoro rightly describes it,  
Generally, ubuntu translates as humaneness. In its most fundamental sense, it 
translates as personhood and morality. Metaphorically, it expresses itself in 
umuntu, ngumuntu, ngabantu, describing the significance of group solidarity on 
survival issues so central to the survival of communities. While it envelops the 
key values of group solidarity, compassion, respect, human dignity, conformity to 
basic norms and collective unity, in its fundamental sense it denotes humanity and 
morality. Its spirit emphasizes respect for human dignity, marking a shift from 
confrontation to conciliation.412  
 
The different elements of the concept of Ubuntu contained in this passage (solidarity, 
compassion, respect, and collective unity) show that human dignity is more a living 	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reality rather than a mere description of a concept. From the perspective of Ubuntu, 
human dignity and human rights are foremost understood in terms of the kind of society 
we would like to live in as human beings. A similar understanding of human dignity is 
found in Habermas, especially when he conceives morality as based on equal respect for 
everybody and on the universal solidarity and responsibility of each for all, and when he 
describes human dignity as “the kind of ‘inviolability’ which comes to have a 
significance only in interpersonal relations of mutual respect, in the egalitarian dealings 
among persons.”413 In the following section, I will look at Habermas’s account of the 
relationship between human dignity and human rights.  
3.2.	  Habermas	  on	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Human	  Dignity	  	  	  
Habermas contends that the modern concept of human rights can be traced to the 
Virginia Bill of Rights, the American Declaration of Independence of 1776, and the 
Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen of 1789. He notes that these declarations 
were inspired by the political philosophy of modern natural law, especially that of Locke 
and Rousseau.414 As Habermas acknowledges, the natural law tradition has been very 
instrumental in framing and formulating the human rights discourse. The substance of all 
major documents on human rights can be retraced to the natural law tradition. For 
Habermas, “human rights first take on a concrete form in the context of these first 
constitutions, specifically as basic rights that are guaranteed within the frame of a 
national legal order.”415 They have a double character: they are understood both as 
constitutional norms and as rights possessed by each person. As constitutional norms, 	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says Habermas, human rights enjoy positive validity, but as rights possessed by each 
person qua human being they are also accorded a suprapositive validity.  
This double character has raised concerns in the philosophical discussion of 
human rights. On one conception, Habermas writes, human rights are supposed to have a 
status somewhere between moral and positive law; on the other conception, they can 
assume either the form of moral or of juridical rights, though their content remains 
identical – that is, they constitute a law valid prior to any state, though not for that reason 
already in force 416  For Habermas, these formulas reflect a certain philosophical 
embarrassment and suggest that the constitutional legislator merely dresses up moral 
norms, however they are justified, in the form of positive law. He contends that “the 
concept of human rights does not have its origins in morality, but rather bears the imprint 
of the modern concept of individual liberties, hence of a specifically juridical concept. 
Human rights are juridical by their very nature.”417 Thus for Habermas, “what lends 
[human rights] the appearance of moral rights is not their content, and most especially not 
their structure, but rather their mode of validity, which points beyond the legal orders of 
nation-states.”418 In his opinion, the solemn form of “declarations” that the texts of 
historical constitutions have and their appeal to “innate” rights are supposed to dissuade 
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us from a positivist misunderstanding and express the fact that human rights are not at the 
disposal of the legislator.419  
Habermas’s understanding of human rights as legal rights strongly comes out 
when he compares their fate to that of all positive law. He writes:   
But this rhetorical proviso cannot preserve human rights from the fate of all 
positive law; they, too, can be changed or be suspended, for example, following a 
change of regimes. Of course, as a component of a democratic legal order like the 
other legal norms, they enjoy “validity” in the dual sense that they are not only 
valid de facto, and hence are enforced by the sanctioning power of the state, but 
can also claim normative legitimacy, that is, they should be capable of being 
rationally justified.420  
This legal approach to human rights, as I mentioned in chapter one, has led to 
objections that accuse Habermas of entirely neglecting the moral significance of human 
rights. In response to those objections, Habermas complements his account of human 
rights by resorting to the concept of human dignity, which is a basic moral concept and 
functions both as a ground for human rights and for the critique of human rights. In his 
essay entitled, “The Concept of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of Human 
Rights,” Habermas develops the moral dimension of his approach to human rights. He 
brings in the concept of human dignity as the bridge between the legal and the moral 
aspects of human rights.  
3.2.1.	  Human	  Dignity:	  A	  Bridge	  Between	  Law	  and	  Morality	  	  	  
In “The Concept of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of Human Rights,” 
Habermas argues that human rights “developed in response to specific violations of 
human dignity, and can therefore be conceived as specifications of human dignity, their 	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moral source.”421 This internal relationship, he writes, explains the moral content and 
moreover the distinguishing feature of human rights: they are designed for an effective 
implementation of the core moral values of an egalitarian universalism in terms of 
coercive law.422 Here, Habermas’s aim is to “explain [the] moral-legal Janus face of 
human rights through the mediating role of the concept of human dignity.”423 He 
contends that only membership in a constitutional political community can protect the 
equal human dignity of everybody.424 Such a conclusion helps us understand why, for 
Habermas, human rights are not simply “moral rights but are Janus-faced with one side 
related to law and the other to morality.”425 It now becomes clear that even though 
Habermas opted for a law-oriented approach to human rights in Between Facts and 
Norms, he does not deny the moral dimension of human rights.  
Habermas rejects the assumption according to which the concept of human rights 
became morally charged by that of human dignity only in retrospect. For him, a close 
conceptual connection existed from the very beginning between human rights and human 
dignity, if at first only implicitly. The origin of human rights, he notes, has always been 
resistance to despotism, oppression, and humiliation. Thus, the appeal to human rights 
feeds off the outrage of the humiliated at the violation of their human dignity.426 If this 
forms the historical starting point, argues Habermas, traces of a conceptual connection 
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between human dignity and human rights should be evident from early on in the 
development of law itself.427  
From this, Habermas raises the question of whether human dignity signifies a 
substantive normative basic concept from which human rights can be deduced by 
specifying the conditions under which they are violated, or whether, on the contrary, the 
expression is merely an empty formula which summarizes a catalogue of individual, 
disparate, and unrelated human rights.428 In order to answer this question, Habermas 
presents some legal reasons in support of the claim that “human dignity is not merely a 
classificatory expression, an empty placeholder, as it were, that lumps a multiplicity of 
different phenomena together, but the moral source from which all of the basic rights 
derive their sustenance.”429 The first reason is the appeal to human dignity when judges 
and lawmakers are confronted with the problem of cultural differences of interpretation in 
the regulation of controversial ethical issues such as abortion, assisted suicide, and 
genetic enhancement. Judges and lawmakers resort to the concept of human dignity 
because it facilitates negotiated compromises and makes it easier to reach an overlapping 
consensus. Such recourse to the concept of human dignity was successful “at the 
founding of the United Nations and more generally when negotiating human rights 
agreements and international legal conventions.”430  
In line with this idea of appealing to the concept of human dignity in order to 
reach an overlapping consensus, Christopher McCrudden, talking about the drafting of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, notes that “human dignity was included in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
427 Habermas, “The Concept of Human Dignity,” 466.  
428 Ibid.  
429 Ibid.  
430 Ibid., 467.  
	   172	  
that part of any discussion or text where the absence of a theory of human rights would 
have been embarrassing. Its utility was to enable those participating in the debate to insert 
their own theory. Everyone could agree that human dignity was central, but not why or 
how.”431  
The second reason put forward by Habermas in support of human dignity as the 
moral source from which all of the basic rights derive their sustenance is the introduction 
of some new laws. For example, “judges appeal to the protection of human dignity when 
the unforeseen risks of new invasive technologies lead them to introduce a new law, such 
as a right to informational self-determination.”432 The third reason is the role of human 
dignity in the administration of justice: “a justified decision in hard cases often becomes 
possible only by appealing to a violation of human dignity whose absolute validity 
grounds a claim to priority.”433  
From these reasons, Habermas argues that the concept of human dignity has 
played a catalytic role in the construction of human rights out of rational morality and the 
form of law. Here he traces the origin of human rights to the moral notion of human 
dignity. In so doing, he challenges the argument of some critics of the concept of human 
dignity who maintain that human dignity is a vague and useless concept, and its role has 
always been to disguise more profound differences. Oscar Schachter and Ruth Macklin 
can be counted among those who hold that the concept of human dignity remains 
hopelessly vague because it means different things in different contexts. Such a statement 
points to the challenges concerning the foundational use of the concept of human dignity. 	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Jeremy Waldron lists three important challenges: (i) foundational pluralism, (ii) 
definition difficulties, and (iii) the relevance of a foundation for human rights.  
In an article entitled, “Is Dignity the Foundation of Human Rights,”434 Waldron 
explores some difficulties that might seem to stand in the way of a claim that rights are 
derived from dignity or that human dignity is the foundation of human rights. He does so 
“not with a view to refuting the claim [that human rights are based on human dignity], 
but in order to see what obstacles the claim might face.”435 The first obstacle is what he 
calls “foundational pluralism.” The main argument of this obstacle is that dignity is not 
the only foundation of human rights. There are other foundational values for human 
rights, such as liberty or autonomy, equality, social justice, and utility. From a textual 
analysis of some articles from major human rights documents – such as the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) – where the concept “dignity” appears, Waldron raises the 
question of whether these different claims about dignity436 are consistent with the view 
that dignity is the general foundation of all human rights.  
With regard to this question, some scholars have argued that dignity means 
different things in different contexts. Therefore, it cannot be the foundation of human 
rights. Waldron thinks that they are wrong. He acknowledges that the claim that “human 	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dignity is the foundation of human rights” is true and helpful. But he notes that we should 
not “neglect the possibility that dignity might turn out to be foundational for some rights 
and not others, [because] human rights, notoriously, present themselves to us in the form 
of a list rather than as a unified theory, and a list encourages us to think pluralistically 
about rights.” 437  Waldron continues arguing that “dignity’s importance does not 
necessarily make it into a master-value, overshadowing every other value that might 
occupy a foundational role. Some rights may be based directly on liberty or autonomy 
[…] Some might be based on equality and social justice. Some might be even based 
indirectly on utility.”438 But he does not specify which specific rights are to be founded 
on human dignity.  
The second obstacle to the claim that “human dignity is the foundation of human 
rights” is what Waldron calls “definition difficulties.” He expresses it in the following 
way: “perhaps the phrase ‘human dignity’ is too vague to be of any foundational use.”439 
Oscar Schachter uses this obstacle to argue that there is no explicit definition of human 
dignity in any of the charters that invoke it. He writes:  
We do not find an explicit definition of the expression ‘dignity of the human 
person’ in international instruments or (as far as I know) in national law. Its 
intrinsic meaning has been left to intuitive understanding, conditioned in large 
measure by cultural factors. When it has been invoked in concrete situations, it 
has been generally assumed that a violation of human dignity can be recognized 
even if the abstract term cannot be defined.440  
In Schachter’s view, the intrinsic meaning of human dignity has been left to intuitive 
understanding. He argues that without a reasonably clear general idea of its meaning, we 
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cannot easily draw specific implications for relevant conduct.441 In a similar vein, Ruth 
Macklin claims that the concept [of dignity] remains hopelessly vague… To invoke the 
concept of dignity without clarifying its meaning is to use a mere slogan.442 In 2008 the 
Canadian Supreme Court used a similar argument in its decision not to use “dignity” in 
anti-discrimination cases given that the term was confusing and difficult to apply. The 
Court states, “Human dignity is an abstract and subjective notion that […] cannot only 
become confusing and difficult to apply; it has also proven to be an additional burden on 
equality claimants, rather than the philosophical enhancement it was intended to be.”443  
This perception of dignity leads to raise the question of whether it would be 
justified to affirm that the understanding of the meaning of dignity is a work-in-progress. 
If so, then the obvious question is: can human dignity be a solid foundation upon which 
rights should be built, given the lack of clarity of the concept? Neomi Rao would answer 
negatively to such a question. For her, if we treat dignity as the foundation of rights, we 
are likely to end up with different concepts of rights matching different conceptions of 
dignity. 444  Rao’s position is echoed by Schachter’s argument, especially when he 
maintains that we should not suppose that human rights grew out of the discourse of 
dignity. Regarding “The Helsinki Final Acts,” which declares in Principle VII that all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms “derive from the inherent dignity of the human 
person,” Schachter argues that this “statement should be understood in a philosophical 
rather than historical sense. As history, it would be probably more correct to say the 
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opposite: namely, that the idea of dignity reflects sociohistorical conceptions of basic 
rights and freedoms, not that it generated them.”445  
3.2.2.	  Habermas’s	  Response	  to	  the	  Foundational	  Challenge	  to	  Human	  Dignity	  	  	  	  
Habermas reacts to the idea that human dignity is a vague concept and serves to 
disguise profound differences by contending that the meaning of “human dignity is not 
exhausted by its function as a smokescreen for disguising more profound differences.”446 
For him, the role played by human dignity in facilitating “compromises when specifying 
and extending human rights by neutralizing unbridgeable differences cannot explain its 
belated emergence as a legal concept.”447 He wants to show that we have become more 
aware of the normative substance of the equal dignity of every human being that was 
inscribed in human rights through the changing historical conditions. And only human 
rights can spell out that normative substance of the equal dignity of every human being. 
Human dignity is understood as the explanation of the raison d’être of a particular right. 
That is, no right can be justified if it does not aim at enhancing and protecting the dignity 
of the human person.  
A similar argument is found in Habermas’s article entitled, “An Argument against 
Human Cloning.”448 Here Habermas argues that the problem with human cloning is about 
presumptuousness and servitude. This problem is a violation of the person’s dignity 
because it creates a logic that is in contradiction with human rights and human dignity: 
the person is being used as a means for other purposes, such as research purposes. Thus, 
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cloning technology constructs a new “decision-competence” that is comparable with the 
historical example of slavery. Slavery, Habermas writes, “is a legal relationship 
signifying that one person disposes over another as property. It therefore cannot be 
harmonized with the currently valid concepts of constitutional law: human rights and 
human dignity.”449 According to the same moral criteria, then, and not merely on 
religious grounds, Habermas argues, the copying of the genetic material of a human 
being must be condemned.450 It follows that for Habermas, both slavery and human 
cloning violate an essential principle: “No person may so dispose over another person, 
may so control his possibilities for acting, in such a way that the dependent person is 
deprived of an essential part of his freedom. This condition is violated if one person 
decides the genetic makeup of another.”451  
Habermas’s counter-contention against the vagueness objection to human dignity 
as the foundation of human rights is echoed by George Kateb, for whom the idea of 
human dignity encompasses more than a role in the defense of rights. In Kateb’s view, 
“there is place in [the idea of dignity] for the dignity not only of individuals but also of 
the human species as one species among all the others.”452 He pinpoints four contentions 
that support the thought that all theoretical discussion about human dignity is irrelevant to 
the cause of promoting the establishment of human rights, or may even be a distraction. 
The first contention is that, despite the efforts of Kant, the idea of human dignity adds 
nothing but a phrase to the theory of human rights; it surely does not provide, or help to 
provide, an indispensable foundation. The second is that the historical records show such 	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human savagery toward human beings that to speak of human dignity is to mock human 
suffering by refusing to make paramount the moral difference between victims and 
victimizers; we must grant dignity only to those persons who have acted morally. The 
third contention is that the affirmation of human dignity is dangerous because, when 
extended to the human species over above other species, it leads to monstrous human 
pride, which drives people to exploit nature for human purposes. The fourth contention is 
that human species-pride is not only dangerous but false: there is no basis for thinking 
that the human species is anything special.453  
 Kateb’s counter-contention is that we should not repudiate the various attempts 
that have been made to defend the idea of human dignity, and that additional conceptual 
work is not necessarily wasted.454 He contends that the idea of individual dignity applies 
to persons in relation to one another, and moves ideally in a progression from an 
individual’s self-conception to a claim that other persons have no less than equal 
status.455 Thus, for Kateb, the notion of equal status deepens the idea of human dignity. It 
prescribes the imperative that role and function should not define any person, essentially 
or exhaustively. He conceives of dignity as an existential value. Value or worthiness is 
imputed to the identity of the person or the species. He argues that when the truth of 
identity is at stake, existence is at stake. For him, the idea of human dignity insists on 
recognizing the proper identity of individual or species; that is, recognizing what a person 
is in relation to all other persons and what the species is in relation to all other species.456   
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Kateb describes existential values in the following way: “the category of 
existential values, values of identity, includes such cherished aspirations and attainments 
as developed or distinctive selfhood, autonomy, authenticity, freedom, equality, power 
for its own sake, virtues for their own sake, perfectionism of character or style of life, 
honor, glory, and fame.”457 He clarifies that when he says that human dignity is an 
existential value he does not deny its close relation to morality. This explains his 
contention that the violation of dignity has existential weight that is independent of the 
suffering in itself. Part of the intention of inflicting suffering, he argues, is to re-identify 
groups of people as subhuman and to do so through the kinds of suffering that degrade.458 
Thus, for Kateb, dignity serves as a reminder that the harm sustained by a human being 
subjected to inhuman treatment is more than the experience of pain. It is about the 
person’s identity.  
3.2.3.	  Human	  Dignity	  as	  a	  Reminder	  to	  Defend	  and	  Protect	  Human	  Rights	  	  	  
From what has been said thus far, it can be argued that despite the historical facts 
that have contradicted the relevance of the idea of human dignity, such as crimes against 
humanity, genocide, ethnic cleansing, and war crimes, human dignity still functions as 
the reminder that helps us defend and protect human rights. In addition, the concept of 
dignity might mean different things in different contexts, but certain motivating features 
of concern for human dignity remain the same for every context. Andrew Clapham lists 
four aspects that can be helpful in understanding the raison d’être of the concern for 
human dignity and, by implication, for human rights. He writes:  
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Concern for human dignity has at least four aspects: (1) the prohibition of all 
types of inhuman treatment, humiliation, or degradation by one person over 
another; (2) the assurance of the possibility for individual choice and the 
conditions for ‘each individual’s self-fulfillment’, autonomy, or self-realization; 
(3) the recognition that the protection of group identity and culture may be 
essential for the protection of personal dignity; (4) the creation of the necessary 
conditions for each individual to have their essential needs satisfied.459  
 
The experience of violations of human dignity in a variety of cases – such as the 
poor living conditions of some people, brutal expulsion of immigrants, racial 
discrimination – has raised awareness of the necessity of establishing structures that 
legally protect every individual. This experience is not a spontaneous event that occurred 
once, but rather happened, and is happening, repeatedly in different parts of the world. 
Such recurrence becomes a historical challenge that compels every human society to act 
in favor of dignified conditions of life. Thus, as Habermas nicely puts it, “in the light of 
historical challenges, different aspects of the meaning of human dignity acquire urgency 
and relevance in each case. These features of human dignity specified and actualized on 
different occasions can then lead both to a more complete exhaustion of the normative 
substance of existing civil rights and to the discovery and construction of new ones.”460  
The above paragraph sheds light on the fact that the experience of humiliation and 
human suffering is the door through which the concept of human dignity enters into 
human consciousness and then “into the legal texts, where it finds conceptual articulation 
and elaboration.”461 As McCrudden rightly notes, in juridical domains, human dignity 
plays the role of “providing a language in which judges can appear to justify how they 
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deal with issues such as the weight of rights, the domestication and contextualization of 
rights, and the generation of new or more extensive rights.”462 More and more legal 
scholars and many legal documents highlight the central role of human dignity in 
guaranteeing adequate living conditions and in protecting individuals or groups’ feelings 
of self-respect and self-worth. For example, Iacobucci, writing for a unanimous Canadian 
Court, says:  
[Human dignity] is enhanced by laws, which are sensitive to the needs, capacities, 
and merits of different individuals, taking into account the context underlying 
their differences. Human dignity is harmed when individuals and groups are 
marginalized, ignored, or devalued, and is enhanced when laws recognize the full 
place of all individuals and groups within society.463  
 
The central role of human dignity also appears in legal documents, declarations, 
and international treaties. As I have already pointed out, the preamble of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights opens with a statement that underlines the recognition of 
the inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human 
family as the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world. Article 22 of the 
Declaration emphasizes the importance of economic, social and cultural rights in 
guaranteeing conditions that are “indispensable for the dignity of the person and the free 
development of his personality.”464  
It is important at this point to consider the question of enforcement of the concept 
of dignity and difficulties in the legal realization of this concept. From a legal point of 
view, the importance accorded to dignity varies from one jurisdiction to another. The de 	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facto recognition of social rights, for example, can be based on the notion of dignity in 
one jurisdiction and not in another. A government that fails to provide decent living 
conditions for its citizens can be accused of violating their dignity because human dignity 
requires, among other things, that citizens of a country be decently housed, clothed, and 
educated. Such a requirement might be relevant and legally binding in one jurisdiction 
and not necessarily in another. Thus, though the judicial consideration of human dignity 
is becoming more and more visible, the question of legitimating certain rights remains a 
major challenge, especially for social and economic rights. Varun Gauri and Daniel M. 
Brinks, for example, are of the opinion that social and economic rights are difficult to 
enforce because the duties associated with them are indeterminate.465 They argue that  
Moving to an understanding of social and economic entitlements as human rights 
complicates the enforcement question in two ways. First, it generates coordination 
problems. This occurs because a human rights conception increases the number of 
agents who are bearers or potential bearers of the duties correlative to the social 
and economic rights of any given rights holder. Not only citizens’ own states, but 
foreign governments, compatriots, foreign citizens, NGOs, and other foreign and 
domestic private actors become potentially responsible for fulfilling human rights. 
At the same time, the human rights conception also means that, from the 
perspective of the duty bearer, potential claimants to whom duties are owed 
include not only citizens and others nearby but every human being. These two 
changes make enforcement more challenging because the duties to fulfill human 
rights are then widespread but unallocated. Rights holders are uncertain to which 
duty bearer they should address their claims. For duty bearers, incentives to free 
rides on the contributions of others increase. Second, it leads to disputes about 
what is a fair allocation of the duties to respond to human rights problems. Duty 
bearers reasonably argue that the responsibilities for responding to human rights 
problems should be fairly allocated; but the procedures, standards, and authority 
for allocating those responsibilities are entirely unclear.466  
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I have quoted these authors in length because their argument expresses well many 
people’s concern regarding the enforcement of certain rights. I argue that the enforcement 
question should not be a problem if a clear distinction is established between respecting 
human rights and protecting and promoting them. The responsibility to respect human 
rights reposes on everyone’s shoulders. But the primary responsibility to protect and 
promote human rights reposes on each individual state’s administration. Therefore, the 
question of the uncertainty – raised by Gauri and Brinks – regarding the fulfillment and 
enforcement of human rights is less challenging than it may appear at first sight.  
Respect for human rights, be it political, social, or economic, by everyone, and 
their enforcement by individual states, are effective when rights are understood as an 
interconnected whole and when their respect and enforcement are motivated by the 
requirement of enhancing people’s dignity. As Habermas rightly observes, “The heuristic 
function of human dignity… provides the key to the logical interconnections between 
[different] categories of rights. Only in collaboration with each other can basic rights 
fulfill the moral promise to respect the human dignity of every person equally.”467 Here 
appears the importance of understanding human rights as a whole. All the rights 
presuppose one another in order to fulfill their task of addressing the historical challenges 
of humiliation and human suffering. In other words, the interdependence of different 
categories of rights is the necessary condition to achieve the implementation of human 
rights. It sheds light on the internal relationship between democratic and social rights, and 
between private and public autonomy: the very internal relation between private and 
public autonomy – private autonomy consisting of all the human rights, and public 
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autonomy consisting of all the democratic rights – allows us to understand that without a 
sufficient private autonomy one cannot have the actual means to participate in the 
political process.  
This interdependence of different human rights in guaranteeing better living 
conditions for every human being is well expressed by Habermas when he describes the 
two components of classical civil rights. He distinguishes between classical civil rights, 
liberal rights and democratic rights of participation. “Liberal rights crystallize around the 
inviolability and security of the person, around free commerce and the unhindered 
exercise of religion. [They] are designed to prevent the intrusion of the state into the 
private sphere.”468 Both liberal rights and democratic rights of participation are necessary 
for citizens to have equal opportunities to make use of their autonomy. A good use of 
these rights is possible “only when [citizens] simultaneously enjoy guarantees of a 
sufficient level of independence in their private and economic lives and when they are 
able to form their personal identities in the cultural environment of their choice.”469  
Though these rights are necessary for the enjoyment of private and public 
autonomy, they are not, however, sufficient to acquire equal value if social and cultural 
rights do not supplement them. That is why, given certain historical conditions, social and 
cultural rights are necessary complements for having the other categories of rights 
implemented. Cultural rights here are to be understood as rights that grant a person access 
to a social group and cultural traditions that are necessary for maintaining the person’s 
personal identity.  
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From what has been said, it can be argued that social-economic rights cannot 
operate apart from the other rights. Their implementation must take into account the 
context within which the individual lives his private and public autonomy. In that sense, 
securing the autonomous life of citizens solely and primarily through economic rights 
destroys “the balance between the different categories of basic rights.”470 In Habermas’s 
view, only human dignity helps us maintain that balance because it “grounds the 
individuality of all categories of rights.”471 Thus, through human dignity both the 
importance of every particular right and the interdependence between different rights 
become evident. Differently put, human dignity allows members of a democratic legal 
order to grant themselves rights that are necessary for members of a political community 
to live in mutual respect as free and equal citizens. Only these rights can grant citizens 
the status of legal subjects who are to be respected because of their human dignity and 
nothing else. The preceding argument is similar to what Seyla Benhabib calls the right to 
have rights. She borrows this expression from Hannah Arendt and expands it. She writes,  
First and foremost as a moral being capable of communicative freedom you have 
a fundamental right to have rights. While Hannah Arendt herself identified this 
right narrowly with the “right of political belonging,” I expand it in the following 
ways: In order to exercise communicative freedom, your capacity for embedded 
agency needs to be respected. You need to be recognized as a member of an 
organized human community in which your words and your acts situate you 
within a social space of interaction and communication. You have a right, in the 
sense of a moral claim, to be recognized by others as a “rights-bearing person,” 
entitled to a legally instituted schedule of rights […] The right to have rights 
further involves the acknowledgment of your identity as a generalized as well as 
concrete other.472  
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From the above considerations we can affirm that human dignity has largely 
contributed to the establishment of political systems that take seriously the rights of every 
human person. It is the channel through which human rights have been contextualized 
and legitimated. Because of human dignity, legal systems have taken into account moral 
considerations in the enactment of laws. As Habermas expresses it, “human dignity forms 
the portal through which the egalitarian and universalistic substance of morality is 
imported into law.”473 This metaphor of the portal is similar to a second metaphor that 
Habermas uses: the hinge. The idea of human dignity, he writes, is the conceptual hinge 
which connects the morality of equal respect for everyone with positive law and 
democratic lawmaking in such a way that their interplay could give rise to a political 
order founded upon human rights, given suitable historical conditions.474  
3.2.4.	  Human	  Dignity	  as	  Portal	  and	  Hinge	  	  	  
Habermas uses two metaphors (portal and hinge) to describe the relationship 
between morality and law, on the one hand, and the relationship between human dignity 
and human rights, on the other hand. These metaphors may be unclear to some people. 
Given that Habermas himself does not say more about their connection to the idea of 
human dignity, I would like to resort to the common understanding of the role of both the 
portal and the hinge so as to offer an interpretation that might clarify their association 
with the concept of human dignity. Such an interpretation might not be what Habermas 
intended to say, but it helps understand how law and morality are reconciled in human 
rights discourse. As Habermas himself acknowledges, “what an author has actually said 
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in and with a book, is up to interpretation. An intelligent reader will almost know better 
then the author himself. The author only knows what he intended to say.”475  
In common language, portal means a doorway, a passage through which people 
have access to a building or exit it. The Oxford dictionary defines portal as a rigid 
structural frame consisting of two uprights connected at the top by a third member. In 
computer science language, portal refers to an Internet site, which provides access or 
links to other sites. A hinge links the door to the frame. It connects two objects. The main 
aspects that emerge from the common use of both portal and hinge are the idea of 
connection and the idea of passage or access. These two ideas (metaphors) should be 
conceived as one combined unit (portal-with-hinge) that plays two complementary roles, 
rather than as two separate realities. In the same way that a hinge links the door to the 
frame, human dignity connects law to morality. It brings to light the internal connection 
between law and morality. Thus, as a conceptual hinge, human dignity connects law and 
morality and plays the mediating role of reunifying law and morality so that they can act 
as one structural unit. In other words, as Habermas would put it, the concept of human 
dignity reestablishes the connection between two elements that were separated in the 
course of the disintegration of Christian natural law: (i) the internalized, rationally 
justified morality anchored in the individual conscience, and (ii) the coercive, positive, 
enacted law.476  
As a portal (doorway, passage, or access), human dignity allows the consideration 
of moral elements into judicial system. It lets morality enter into legal discourse. 
Differently put, human dignity allows the judicial system to have access to moral 	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discourse. In this sense, human dignity becomes the passage or the door through which 
morality enters into law. Thus, for Habermas, human dignity establishes the 
interconnection between law and morality and allows the adjudication of human rights.   
In order to promote better conditions of life and offer equal opportunities to every 
human being, human rights need to be specified and implemented within an established 
political community. This process, which has a legal connotation, does not deny the 
moral aspect of human rights. Rather, it aims at guaranteeing the commitment to respect 
the moral dimension of human rights, which is expressed through equal respect for 
everybody. This equal respect for everyone can be more effective only if there are legal 
mechanisms that support it. Differently put, the translation of some human rights into 
positive law will give rise to legal duties that enable people to reduce the gap between 
norms and actual behavior with regard to the respect of citizens’ dignity.  
To fully understand the importance of legal mechanisms that guarantee equal 
respect for all, one has to consider the dysfunctional judicial systems and precarious 
living conditions of some people from developing countries. The lack of infrastructures 
and a reliable judiciary system often leads to chaos that demeans the dignity of the 
individual and suppresses his feelings of self-respect and self-worth. That is why it 
becomes imperative to argue for an understanding of some human rights as rights that 
have “a moral content that can take the form of positive, enforceable subjective rights, 
which guarantee specific liberties and claims.”477 As Habermas would argue, these rights 
are designed to be spelled out in concrete terms through democratic legislation, to be 
specified from case to case in adjudication, and to be enforced with public sanctions.478  	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From what precedes, one can contend that the chance for human rights to be 
effective passes through the process of legalization or the institutionalization of certain 
rights. Such a process must be motivated by the consideration of the inherent dignity of 
every human being who lives in a political community. Therefore, the process of 
institutionalization of human rights cannot be in contradiction with the duty of treating 
every person as an end in himself. The inviolability of human dignity forbids the process 
of legalization or legitimation to dispose of anyone as a mere means. The example of the 
decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court against the Aviation Security Act 
sheds light both on the inviolability of human dignity in any circumstance and on the 
necessity of treating every human being as an end in himself.  
As Habermas reports, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States of 
America, the German parliament enacted a bill, the Aviation Security Act, which 
authorized the armed forces to shoot down a passenger aircraft that had been transformed 
into a living missile in order to avert the threat to an indeterminately large number of 
people on the ground. For the Court, notes Habermas, such a bill was unconstitutional 
because the duty of the state to protect the lives of the potential victims of a terrorist 
attack is secondary to the duty to respect the human dignity of the passengers. As he 
rightly observes, “the words of the bill re-echo Kant’s categorical imperative. The respect 
for the dignity of every person forbids the state to dispose over any individual merely as a 
means to another end, even if that end be to save the lives of many other people. 479 In 
line with Habermas, McCrudden comments on the decision of the German Court in the 
following way:  
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In cases dealing with the use of force by the security forces, the German 
Constitutional Court has emphasized the importance of reading the protection of 
the right to life and the protection of dignity as mutually reinforcing. The Court 
held that provisions of the Aviation Security Act which authorized the armed 
forces to shoot down aircraft that were intended to be used as weapons in crimes 
against human lives was incompatible with the Basic Law, and hence void. These 
provisions were incompatible with the fundamental right to life and with the 
guarantee of human dignity to the extent that the use of armed force affected 
persons on board the aircraft who were not participants in the crime. By the 
state’s using their killing as a means to save others, they were treated as mere 
objects, which denied them the value that was due to a human being for his or her 
own sake.480  
 
The point of the reference to the Aviation Security Act is that respect for the 
moral aspect of human rights, which is expressed through the idea of human dignity, 
must be the primary motivation of any process of legalization. However, this is not to say 
that human rights should be reduced to moral rights, though some scholars, like Amartya 
Sen, argue that human rights are essentially moral rights. Moral and human rights are 
conceptually different, but functionally interdependent. As Habermas describes it, 
“human rights differ from moral rights, among other things, in virtue of the fact that they 
are geared to being institutionalized, and thus to be produced, for which purpose they 
require a shared democratic process, whereas people who act morally regard themselves 
without further qualification as subjects who are inherently embedded in a network of 
moral duties and rights.”481  
Habermas’s constant reference to the concept of human dignity in his article, 
“The Concept of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of Human Rights,” clearly 
shows that he has not denied the moral aspect of human rights. Although in Between 
Facts and Norms he had a legalistic approach to human rights, here he brings in its moral 	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dimension. This might be interpreted as a revision or a contradiction of Habermas’s 
development of the system of rights in Between Facts and Norms, which was the topic of 
the first chapter of this work. Two reasons can explain this move, which seems to be a 
total departure from his first account of human rights. The first reason is the historical 
challenges of the humiliation and violations of human dignity and the second reason is 
the social recognition of the dignity of the other. He expresses it as follows:  
I did not originally take into account two things. First, the cumulative experiences 
of violated dignity constitute a source of moral motivations for entering into 
historically unprecedented constitution-making practices that arose at the end of 
the eighteenth century. Second, the status-generating notion of social recognition 
of the dignity of others provides a conceptual bridge between the moral idea of 
the equal respect for all and the legal form of human rights.482  
Human dignity has played a significant role in shifting from morality to law, or, 
as Habermas would put it, from moral duties to legal claims. This is what he calls the 
mediating function of human dignity. We then understand why he refers to human dignity 
as the conceptual hinge between law and morality. That role is best grasped if we 
consider the difference between a moral relation and a legal relation. This difference is 
important in order to understand the necessity of reconciling law and morality in human 
rights discourse. In a moral relation the person is concerned about what he should do for 
the other regardless of social obligations, whereas in a legal relation the person is 
concerned about the claims he can make on the other or expect from the other. This is the 
same as saying that in a moral relation the person is reasonable while in a legal relation 
he is rational. A reasonable person is one who is concerned about the common good and 
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a rational person is one who is concerned about his own good.483 Given that in a moral 
relation the person can be vulnerable because of the lack of a legal obligation, there must 
be a legal recognition that enables him to become a self-determined subject who not only 
acts in accordance with his own judgment, but also takes into consideration the good of 
others because he recognizes in them bearers of rights. Such recognition is equated to the 
respect that every human being demands and deserves in virtue of his or her dignity.  
From what precedes, we see that human dignity also requires social recognition. 
That is, its abstract content must be concretized through actionable rights of every citizen, 
which imply equal respect for all. The concretization of human dignity through 
actionable rights of every citizen helps us understand that “human rights articulate moral 
principles such as dignity, equality, and the recognition of personality, which then 
assume justiciable Gestalt by being anchored in legal orders in the form of the civil rights 
of all persons resident upon a territory.”484 In order to guarantee the equal respect for all, 
there must be a constitutional framework that establishes and maintains a political order 
based on human rights. The existence of such a framework enables the individual to be 
regarded as a person who is entitled to have “the right to have rights” and as a person 
who is not isolated but rather lives his or her individuality within a social context made of 
social relations. This is precisely the meaning of the “human” in the expression “human 
rights.” Benhabib expresses it as follows: “the human in the phrase ‘human rights’ can 
never be an individual considered in isolation from social relations and social context. To 
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be a person, that is to be entitled to the right to have rights, is to be recognized by others 
as a being worthy of equal moral respect.”485  
The establishment of a constitutional framework that is necessary to maintain a 
political order based on human rights does not emerge by itself. It must be put in place by 
citizens themselves, who want to regulate their life in common and guarantee mutual 
respect for their dignity. Habermas expresses the requirement of creating a framework 
that protects human dignity in the following way:  
This framework must be created by the citizens themselves using the means of 
positive law and must be protected and developed under historically changing 
conditions […] As addressees, citizens can come to enjoy the rights that protect 
their human dignity only by first uniting as authors of the democratic undertaking 
of establishing and maintaining a political order based on human rights.486  
 
It follows that the relationship of citizens who regard themselves as individuals worthy of 
dignity should be “determined by the reciprocal recognition of the legislating will of each 
person […] The infinite dignity of each person consists in his claim that all others should 
respect the inviolability of this domain of free will.”487 Without a reliable juridical order 
that protects the rights of every individual, such a respect cannot be fostered and the gap 
between the theory of human rights and the practice of human rights will remain widely 
open. In addition to this, any attempt to dismiss human dignity or moral considerations 
from state policies will leave room for an arbitrary implementation and enforcement of 
laws. As Paolo G. Carozza rightly notes, “positive law, alone and without deeper ethical 
source within a society, is insufficient to sustain the relationships of justice and solidarity 
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and commitments to the common good to which we aspire.”488 That is why it becomes 
imperative to have an approach to human rights that reconciles the moral and legal 
aspects of human rights. In other words, human rights should be seen as both moral and 
legal rights.  
3.3.	  Conclusion	  	  	  
Human rights and human dignity are two important notions or, better, realities 
upon which a humanized and humanizing society is founded. Given that human rights are 
more about the kind of world we would like to live in, they must be conceived as moral 
claims that require embodiment in legal form. This conception of human rights as the 
kind of world we would like to live in appears in Kant’s understanding of right, which he 
describes as “every action which by itself or by its maxim enables the freedom of each 
individual’s will to co-exist with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a 
universal law.” (MM 6:231) Thus, from a Kantian perspective it can be argued that rights 
are about asking whether “our lives together within, outside and betwixt polities ought 
not to be guided by mutually and reciprocally guaranteed immunities, constraints upon 
actions, and by legitimate access to certain good and resources.”489 Kant’s description of 
right – in his moral theory – seems to emphasize a monological process, which consists in 
presenting what each individual can will to be valid and gain the approval of others. The 
risk associated with such a process is the possibility of leaving room to bargaining, 
cajoling, or coercive manipulation.  
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Habermas’s discourse-theoretic account of human rights overcomes this limitation 
by presenting an approach that promotes a process through which individuals engage in 
dialogue and reasonably convince one another of the validity of certain action norms. 
Thus, a discourse-theoretic approach appears to be a reasonable and effective way of 
approaching human rights so as to avoid the tendency to make them look like an 
imposition of Western culture on the rest of the world or a strategy used in order to “sell 
war.” Such an approach implies going beyond one’s geographical, cultural, and political 
context in order to recognize every human being as bearer of rights.  
If human rights are to be understood in terms of the kind of world we would like 
to live in, rather than simply in terms of legal entitlements, then the recognition of every 
individual as a bearer of rights should not be limited to those who are like us. Otherwise, 
we deny their individuality or their right to be different. As Benhabib rightly puts it, “if I 
recognize you as a being entitled to rights only because you are like me, then I deny your 
fundamental individuality that makes you different. If I refuse to recognize you as being 
entitled to rights because you are so other than me, then I deny our common 
humanity.”490  
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Chapter	  4	  
The	  Moral-­‐Legal	  Janus	  Face	  of	  Human	  Rights	  
 
I concluded chapter three by suggesting that human rights should be conceived 
both as moral and legal rights because human rights are more about the kind of society 
and world we would like to live in than simply about legal entitlements. Therefore, to 
approach human rights merely as legal rights or moral rights fails to capture their full 
meaning and scope, and weakens the effectiveness of their implementation. Thus, they 
remain simple ideals without any concrete materialization in real life. As Clark Butler 
rightly notes, “human rights without their possible exercise are not true rights.”491 The 
possible exercise of human rights that makes them true rights requires social recognition, 
which is to be enforced by legal mechanisms. Without such recognition people have only 
claims and not rights because “moral rights are actual and not merely ideal rights only if 
they exist socially […] Our successful effort to obtain recognition of the legitimacy of 
our claims ought to precede our insistence that others respect them as our rights.”492  
We might sum up the previous observations by saying that the legal aspect of 
human rights materializes and protects its moral aspect. Differently put, the moral aspect 
of human rights consists of general norms and rights that constitute the standard on which 
life in society should be built, while the legal aspect constitutes the concretization of 
moral norms and rights. Thus, the legal aspect of human rights has the moral aspect of 
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human rights as its core, for there can never be a productive and effective legitimation or 
institutionalization of human rights when their moral foundation is violated. Here then 
appears the relevance of the complementarity between law and morality I dealt with in 
the second chapter. Such complementarity is also to be applied to the understanding of 
human rights as both moral and legal rights. The legal aspect compensates for the 
weaknesses of the moral aspect of human rights in the process of building a world where 
the dignity of every human being is not only respected but also protected and supported. 
To put the point in a somewhat different way: legal rights constitute a shield against any 
threat to equal basic moral status.  
Building such a world requires an approach to human rights that takes into 
account the diversity of cultural and political views. Otherwise, human rights will be 
perceived as an imposition of Western culture on the rest of the world. This is the 
position of some non-Western critics who challenge the universality of the current corpus 
of human rights. Makau Mutua, for example, argues that “the official human rights 
corpus, which issues from European predicates, seeks to supplant all other traditions, 
while rejecting them. It claims to be the only genius of the good society.”493 He advocates 
a multicultural approach to human rights that makes the participation of all societies and 
cultural milieus a requirement, if the current corpus of human rights is to claim genuine 
universality.  
In this chapter, I will first discuss the importance of distinguishing between the 
discourse and the substance of human rights by presenting Mutua’s argument against the 
current corpus of human rights and by assessing his position. Second, I will advocate 	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consensus as an inclusive approach to human rights. I will contend that communicative 
freedom is an effective way of enabling different discourses on human rights to have a 
more inclusive approach to human rights. Third, I will argue for an approach that 
conceives human rights as both moral and legal rights. The advantage of such an 
approach is its capacity to understand human rights not only as the protection of 
individual liberties, but also as the enhancement of conditions of life that enable every 
individual to live a dignified life. In addition to this advantage, the moral-legal approach 
to human rights allows the legal aspect of human rights to compensate for the weaknesses 
of a moralistic approach. Fourth, I will discuss the importance of a strong and well-
organized civil society in promoting, respecting, and protecting human rights. Here I will 
read the specific experience of civil society in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the 
light of Habermas’s discussion of civil society.  
4.1.	  Human	  Rights	  –	  Discourse	  versus	  Substance	  	  	  	  
Some non-Western critics of human rights argue that the current corpus of human 
rights is not only exclusive but also an imposition of Western culture and values on the 
rest of the world. Such a criticism seems to be backed up by the way human rights are 
utilized in regulating relationships among nations. As an example, powerful nations 
invoke human rights in order to justify wars and military interventions in other countries, 
especially in developing countries. Financial aid is conditioned by the observance of 
human rights. In most cases, recourse to human rights is intended both to preserve the 
interests of powerful countries and target unruly non-Western countries and leaders who 
refuse to comply with the Western worldview. The intervention in Libya on March 19, 
2011, two days after the adoption of the UN Resolution 1973 imposing a no-fly zone, 
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under the pretext of protecting Libyan people from Kadhafi’s brutal violations of human 
rights, is one of the many examples of the Western use of human rights in order to justify 
war.  
The same human rights standard was not used in Syria where Bashar al-Assad 
was brutally crushing his own people. Instead, the delay of any military intervention was 
justified as the international community’s willingness to give preference to diplomacy. 
This double standard in dealing with the so-called violations of human rights has been 
interpreted by some non-Western critics of human rights discourse as a clear expression 
of international hypocrisy and self-deception. Joseph Raz echoes such a criticism when 
he observes that “human rights rhetoric is rife with hollow hypocrisy; it is infected by 
self-serving cynicism and by self-deception […] The hypocrite and self-deceived 
themselves pay homage to the standards they distort by acknowledging through their very 
hypocritical and deceitful invocation that these are the appropriate standards by which to 
judge their conduct.”494 Jean L. Cohen expresses a similar view in the following way: 
“since 1989, human rights discourse acquired a new function: the justification of 
sanctions, military invasions, and transformative occupation administrations by outsiders, 
framed as enforcement of international law against violators.”495  
This “new function” of human rights is seen as the main cause of the reluctance 
expressed by those who argue that human rights discourse has become an instrument of 
oppression and destruction of the very rights that human rights are supposed to protect. 
As Habermas notes, “the most radical critics [of human rights] maintain that the universal 	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validity claimed for human rights merely hides a perfidious claim to power on the part of 
the West.”496 Mutua is one of the non-Western critics of human rights who challenge the 
universality of the current human rights corpus and question “the mythical elevation of 
the human rights corpus beyond politics and political ideology.”497 For him, “human 
rights are part of the cultural package of the West, complete with an idiom of expression, 
a system of government, and certain basic assumptions about the individual and his 
relationship to society.”498 He describes human rights as an ideology that is used to 
expand or universalize Western culture. He maintains that in order to avoid such an 
expansion, there must be a multiculturalization of human rights, which consists in 
including all cultural milieus in the reformulation and reconstruction of human rights. 
Without the participation of all societies and cultural milieus, argues Mutua, the current 
human rights corpus cannot claim genuine universality.499 In the following sections, I will 
discuss Mutua’s critique of the exclusiveness of the current human rights corpus.  
4.1.1.	  Mutua	  on	  Human	  Rights	  as	  a	  Metaphor	  and	  an	  Ideology	  	  	  
In his book, Human rights: A Political and Cultural Critique, Mutua describes 
human rights as a metaphor. He uses the metaphor of the “savages-victims-savior” in 
order to challenge the current corpus of human rights. He argues that the main authors of 
the human rights discourse, including the United Nations, Western states, international 
nongovernmental organizations, and senior Western academics, constructed this three-
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dimensional prism in order to impose Western culture and values on non-Western 
countries.  
The first dimension of the prism, writes Mutua, depicts a savage and evokes 
images of barbarism. The abominations of the savage are presented as so cruel and 
unimaginable as to represent their state as a negation of humanity.500 He notes that the 
real savage is not the state but the cultural deviation from human rights. The state itself is 
a neutral, passive instrumentality that conveys a savagery by implementing the project of 
the savage culture. Thus, he argues, when human rights norms target a deviant state, they 
are really attacking the normative cultural fabric or variant expressed by that state. The 
culture, and not the state, is the actual savage. From this perspective, he continues, human 
rights violations represent a clash between the culture of human rights and the savage 
culture.501 This clash can be explained by the fact that savage cultures and peoples “are 
seen as lying outside the human rights orbit and, by implication, outside the regime of 
political democracy.”502  
The second dimension of the prism is the metaphor of the victim. The victim is a 
human being whose “dignity and worth” have been violated by the savage. In the human 
rights literature, argues Mutua, the victim is usually presented as a helpless innocent who 
has been abused directly by the state, its agents, or pursuant to an offensive cultural or 
political practice. A basic character of the victim, he continues, is powerlessness, lacking 
an ability for self-defense against the state or the culture in question.503 Most often, the 
victim is nameless. In brief, the main characteristics of the victim are innocence, 	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namelessness, powerlessness, and helplessness. For Mutua, though the victim does not 
have a name, he or she has a face. The most enduring faces of human rights victims, he 
writes, have been black, brown, or yellow.504  
Given that the victim is powerless and helpless, he or she needs assistance from 
another. That “other” is the savior, depicted by the third dimension of the metaphor. The 
savior promises the victim “freedom from the tyrannies of the state, tradition, and culture. 
But it is also the freedom to create a better society based on particular values.”505 In the 
human rights story, notes Mutua, the savior is the human rights corpus itself, with the 
United Nations and Western charities as the actual rescuers who save a benighted world. 
According to Mutua, the savior metaphor is deeply embedded in the Enlightenment’s 
universalist pretentions, which constructed Europe as superior and as center of the 
universe.506 That is why, in Mutua’s view, in the human rights narrative, savages and 
victims are generally nonwhite and non-Western, while the saviors are white.507  
For Mutua, human rights are not only a metaphor but also an ideology. As an 
ideology, they are used to expand and universalize Western culture. He distinguishes 
different groups of theorists whose theories tend either to further Western culture or to 
advocate a balanced approach to human rights: doctrinalists, political strategists or 
instrumentalists, and cultural pluralists. Doctrinalists stress the primacy of civil and 
political rights over all other classes of rights. For them, only a small number of 
“traditional” civil and political rights comprise the heart of the human rights regime. In 
addition, notes Mutua, doctrinalists seek immediate and “blind” application of these 	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rights without regard to historical, cultural, or developmental differences among states 
and societies. Political strategists or instrumentalists use human rights discourse for 
strategic and political ends. They use human rights as a tool of policies against other 
states. The position of these first two groups of theorists is balanced by a third group of 
theorists, cultural pluralists, who criticize the existing human rights corpus as culturally 
exclusive in some respects and therefore view parts of it as illegitimate or, at the very 
least, irrelevant in non-Western societies. They call for a multicultural approach to reform 
the human rights regime so as to make it more universal.508  
From these different theories, Mutua argues that the main focus of human rights 
law has been on those rights and programs that seek to strengthen, legitimize, and export 
political or liberal democracy. He notes that a closer examination of the rights listed in 
both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) leaves no doubt that both documents – which are 
regarded as the two most important human rights instruments – are attempts to 
universalize those civil and political rights that are accepted or aspired to in Western 
liberal democracies. He shows that many articles in the Universal Declaration echo or 
reproduce provisions of the U.S. Constitution and the jurisprudence of Western European 
states such as France and the United Kingdom. In that sense the human rights movement 
is the proxy for political ideology of the West.509 Thus, for human rights to be more 
inclusive, there must be genuine universality, which is possible only if there is 
multiculturalization of human rights.  
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4.1.2.	  Assessing	  Mutua’s	  Approach	  	  	  
Mutua’s approach to human rights raises some important issues related to both the 
conception and discourse of human rights. He describes the conception of human rights, 
especially by Westerners, through the metaphor of the “savages-victims-saviors.” This 
metaphor is a clear example of a social constructivism that dictates the way we define 
those who are not “like us.” The state of the savage is represented as a negation of 
humanity because of the savage’s cruel and unimaginable abominations, and his culture 
is perceived as the real savage because of the cultural deviation from human rights. 
Recourse to some historical facts can challenge this perception of the so-called savage. A 
look back at history reveals that Western culture can be seen as the real savage. The one-
sided narrative of some human rights academics has failed to acknowledge the cruel and 
unimaginable abominations committed by “Western culture.” As Jack Donnelly notes, 
“the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, [for example], ignored colonialism, which 
involved the brutal and systematic denial of most human rights to most Africans, many 
Asians, and a large number of Latin Americans.”510  
There are many examples of the atrocities committed by the “savior.” But I would 
like to mention just one: the atrocities committed by the colonial power in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (then the Congo Free State). As I wrote elsewhere,511 King Leopold II 
of Belgium, who was the “owner” of the Congo Free State – though he himself had never 
been to Congo – never intended to make the Congo an independent state. He wanted “his 
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colony” to be a reservoir of natural resources for his personal interests and the 
aggrandizement of Belgium. In order to achieve his goal, Leopold conducted his 
operation under the pretext of bringing civilization and the Gospel to the “uncivilized 
people” of the Congo. He urged missionaries to teach the Congolese people poverty, 
humility, obedience, and submission because that was an effective tool of control. As a 
result, Congolese were treated as non-humans, forced labor was their daily bread, and 
they became instruments of production. As Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja rightly observes:  
King Leopold had to judge the success of his colonial enterprise in strictly 
business terms, that is, in terms of whether or not it was profitable. Given the low 
level of the development of productive forces in the Congo, the king and his 
agents, who included quite a lot of Italians and Scandinavians (Danes, 
Norwegians and Swedes), had to resort to primitive accumulation. This meant the 
use of torture, murder and other inhumane methods to compel the Congolese to 
abandon their way of life to produce or do whatever the colonial state required of 
them.512  
In a similar vain, Adam Hochschild writes that Leopold once declared to an 
American reporter: “In dealing with a race composed of cannibals for thousands of years 
it is necessary to use methods which will best shake their idleness and make them realize 
the sanctity of work.”513 Methods that Leopold was referring to were nothing other than 
murder, starvation, exhaustion, and exposure. He forced Congolese to work hard and to 
accept extremely low prices. Those who refused had both arms amputated or were shot. 
Such a mistreatment “resulted in a death toll of holocaust proportions that is estimated to 
be as high as 10 million people. … A population that was estimated to be between 20 and 
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30 million people at the beginning of the colonial era, was reduced to 8.5 million in 
1911.”514  
The second issue I would like to consider is the discourse of human rights. Here I 
agree with Mutua on the claim that human rights are sometimes used to impose Western 
culture. But I disagree with him when he poses the rejection of the current human rights 
corpus as the condition for the multiculturalization of human rights. For most non-
Westerners, human rights are an attempt to export Western values and a political system 
to non-Western countries. Such a feeling is triggered by the belief that human rights are 
an exclusive expression of Western culture because the idea of human rights originated in 
the West. The West might have been the first to formulate the idea of human rights, but it 
does not mean that human rights are a monopoly of Western culture. The emergence of 
human rights in the West is not a result of a special cultural talent but rather a 
consequence of historical circumstances. As Donnelly acknowledges, “Westerners had no 
special cultural proclivity that led them to human rights. Rather, the West had the (good 
or bad) fortune to suffer the indignities of modern markets and states before other 
regions. By necessity rather than superior virtue they got a jump on the rest of the world 
in developing the response of human rights.”515  
 From this, it appears that the emergence of human rights in the West was out of 
necessity rather than because Western culture is the essence of human rights. When 
Mutua endorses the criticim of cultural pluralists who contend that the existing human 
rights corpus is culturally exclusive in some respects and therefore view parts of it as 
illegitimate and irrelevant in non-Western societies, he seems to confirm the very pre-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
514 Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo from Leopold to Kabila, 22.  
515 Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 78.  
	   207	  
conceived idea of human rights that he challenges: that human rights are a heritage of 
Western culture. Pace Mutua – and the commonly accepted literature on human rights 
and the popular view that human rights are a package of Western values – I argue that 
there must be a clear distinction between the substance of human rights (which is 
universal) and the discourse on human rights, which is historically contingent. Without 
such a distinction, the debate takes a false turn. The reduction of human rights to Western 
values and culture by both Western and non-Western academics is a result of the failure 
to make such a distinction.  
The Western discourse of human rights does not empty human rights of their 
substance to the extent that they would become irrelevant to non-Western countries. 
Equating the substance of human rights with Western culture is denying the possibility 
for other cultures to have the very rights we want to defend and promote, and affirming 
that those who are not part of Western culture are excluded from the radar of human 
rights. The fact that the idea of human rights originated from and was developed by 
Western culture does not mean that non-Westerners lacked knowledge of human rights 
before the codification of human rights in official documents and treaties.  
The difference between Western and non-Western cultures, as far as human rights 
are concerned, may be the discourse on the content of human rights. Western culture, for 
example, emphasizes individuality. That is, the language of individual rights is given 
precedence in Western discourse of human rights. But non-Western cultures, especially 
African culture, put an emphasis on the communal dimension of human rights. Such a 
communal dimension of human rights implies both rights and duties toward others. The 
individual is understood as a social being whose life is shaped by a spirit of solidarity. As 
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Obinna Okere notes, the “African conception of man is not that of an isolated and 
abstract individual, but an integrated member of a group animated by a spirit of 
solidarity.”516 This conception of the individual is echoed by a well-known African 
expression: “I am because we are, and because we are therefore I am.”  
4.1.3.	  Individual	  Freedom	  and	  The	  Good	  of	  the	  Community	  	  	  
It is important at this point to note that the emphasis on the communal dimension 
of human rights does not imply the subordination of the freedom of the individual to the 
good of the community. The good of the community is possible only through the 
participation of individuals. In order for that participation to be effective, individuals 
must have personal skills and enjoy individual rights that enable them to make a 
significant contribution to the good of the community. The individual can contribute to 
the good of the community only from the perspective of his or her private conduct of life. 
Thus, an effective contribution requires that private conduct of life be rooted in a 
conscientious pursuit of an ethical life-project. In its turn, conscientious pursuit of an 
ethical life-project must be protected by structures that support equal basic rights for all. 
In this sense, “individual rights provide a kind of protective belt for the individual’s 
private conduct of life, and in two ways: rights protect the conscientious pursuit of an 
ethical life-project just as much as they secure an orientation toward personal preferences 
free of moral scrutiny.”517 Thus, individual rights and the good of the community are not 
mutually exclusive. No government should justify the violations of individual rights, such 
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as the right to political participation, under the pretext of giving priority to the right to 
social development or promoting social and cultural rights.  
This strategy is often used by some authoritarian regimes in order to justify the 
oppression of individual rights of their populations. Habermas evokes the example of the 
governments of Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan, and China whose officials “appeal to a 
‘priority’ of social and cultural basic rights in an effort to justify the violations against 
basic legal and political rights of which the West accuses them.”518 In Habermas’s view, 
these governments – which he qualifies as dictatorships – use the “right of social 
development” as an excuse “to postpone the realization of liberal rights and rights of 
political participation until their countries have attained a level of economic development 
that allows them to satisfy the basic material needs of the population equally. For a 
population in misery, they claim, legal equality and freedom of opinion are not so 
relevant as the prospect of better living conditions.”519  
The argument put forward by these governments to justify the priority of the right 
to social development over legal and political rights seems to undermine the fact that 
human rights are effective and meaningful for people only when they are conceived as a 
complementary system of rights. For example, individuals can equally and effectively 
enjoy their social and cultural rights only if they have legal rights that give them a legal 
status of bearers of rights. Thus, individual rights should not be subordinated to the good 
of the community. At the same time, the good of the community should not be 
undermined for the sake of protecting individual rights. There must be an approach that 
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gives equal weight to both individual rights and the good of the community, or what 
Habermas calls “the dialectical unity of individuation and socialization processes.”520 
Habermas argues in favor of this approach as a response to both “individualist” 
and “collectivist” approaches to human rights. From a principled reading of the criticism 
according to which “a legal order that equips persons with actionable individual rights is 
set up for conflict and thus at odds with the orientation of the indigenous culture toward 
consensus”521 he argues that  
The reservations about the individualistic style of European human rights are 
backed by the justified critique of an understanding of rights that stems from the 
Lockean tradition and that has been revised today by neo-liberalism. This 
possessive individualism fails to recognize that legally protected individual rights 
can only be derived from the pre-existing, indeed intersubjectively recognized 
norms of a legal community. It is true that individual rights are parts of the 
equipment of legal persons; but the status of legal persons as rights-bearers 
develops only in the context of a legal community which is premised on the 
mutual recognition of its freely associated members. Consequently, the 
understanding of human rights must jettison the metaphysical assumption of an 
individual who exists prior to all socialization and, as it were, comes into the 
world already equipped with innate rights.522  
 
Habermas notes that if we drop the Western thesis, according to which individual 
legal claims have priority over the claims of the legal community, then its Eastern 
antithesis – according to which the claims of the legal community have priority over 
individual legal claims – becomes unnecessary. Therefore, “the choice between 
“individualist” and “collectivist” approaches disappears once we approach fundamental 
legal concepts with an eye toward the dialectical unity of individuation and socialization 
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processes.”523 He continues to assert that because “even legal persons are individuated 
only on the path to socialization, the integrity of individual persons can be protected only 
together with the free access to those interpersonal relationships and cultural traditions in 
which they can maintain their identities. Without this kind of “communitarianism,” a 
properly understood individualism remains incomplete.”524  
4.1.4.	  The	  Discourse	  on	  the	  Content	  of	  Human	  Rights	  	  	  
From what has been written thus far, I argue that the real debate on human rights 
should not be about their origin, but rather about the origin of the discourse on the 
content of human rights and their codification in official documents, such as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, etc. In fact, the widespread use of the expression “human rights”525 is to be traced 
to the awareness raised by the atrocities of World War II and the drafting of the UDHR. 	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525 It is important here to consider Allan Buchanan’s clarifications about the expression “human rights.” In 
his book, The Heart of Human Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013) Buchanan notes that the 
phrase “human rights” is used both to refer to moral human rights and to refer to international legal human 
rights. By “the international legal human rights system” (or the system of international legal rights) he 
means UN-based human rights law and the institutions that support it (p. 6). He highlights two approaches 
to human rights: Political or practical theorists who argue that human rights are rights that serve to limit 
sovereignty in the context of the state system and presuppose a state, and Orthodox or Moral theorists who 
argue that human rights are rights that people have simply by virtue of their humanity and do not 
presuppose a state system (p. 10). Buchanan challenges the idea that international legal human rights, when 
they are justified, mirror moral human rights (p. 15). For him, the mere fact that the phrase “human rights” 
is used both to refer to moral human rights and to refer to international legal human rights is clearly not a 
sufficient reason to believe that international legal human rights are simply moral rights in legal dress. Nor 
is it a sufficient reason to assume that an international legal human rights is justifiable only if there is a 
corresponding moral rights (19). Buchanan’s fundamental and general point is that legal rights, whether 
domestic or international, do not presuppose corresponding moral rights. For him, individual legal human 
rights are instruments that can serve a number of purposes, including moral ones of various types. 
Therefore, the moral justification of a legal right does not imply the existence of a corresponding moral 
right that it serves to realize (p. 55). He rejects the assumption that international legal human rights are 
simply embodiment of moral rights (p. 82).  
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This does not mean that before these events human beings did not have any rights. That is 
to say, human beings did not wait for the codification of these rights in documents for 
them to actually have rights. People did have rights, which were later codified, using a 
specific language and made known through a certain discourse. Thus, if there is any 
challenge against human rights, it should focus on Western discourse on the content of 
human rights and not on their substance.  
Consider, for example, the right to life. This right is relevant and applicable to 
everyone regardless of the person’s cultural identity, political ideology, sexual 
orientation, skin color, or geographical location. Rejecting such a right on the basis that 
the current human rights corpus is embedded in Western culture is denying the right to 
life of some people. Here John Rawls’ approach to human rights can be useful in 
supporting the argument against those who reject human rights on the basis that they are 
the heritage of Western culture. Rawls writes:  
Among the human rights are the right to life (to the means of subsistence and 
security); to liberty (to freedom from slavery, serfdom, and forced occupation, 
and to a sufficient measure of liberty of conscience to ensure freedom of religion 
and thought); to property (personal property); and to formal equality as expressed 
by the rules of natural justice (that is, that similar cases be treated similarly). 
Human rights, as thus understood, cannot be rejected as peculiarly liberal or 
special to the Western tradition.526  
 
That said, I argue that Mutua’s challenge against human rights should focus more 
on limitations of the discourse on human rights than on the substance of human rights. It 
is obvious that each thinker is a son or daughter of his or her culture and time. He or she 
frames his or her discourse from categories that are shaped by his or her social, cultural, 
religious, political, or geographical context. A Westerner will speak of human rights from 	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a Western perspective and a non-Westerner will do so from his or her own cultural 
heritage. Thus, the inclusive way of approaching human rights would be to take into 
account the “otherness” of the other and find a common ground that would result in the 
mutual enrichment of different cultures. No single culture alone can provide “the right 
answer.” As Habermas rightly observes,  
The current debate [on human rights] provides us with an opportunity to become 
aware of our own blind spots […] Independently of their cultural backgrounds all 
the participants intuitively know quite well that a consensus based on conviction 
cannot come about as long as symmetrical relations do not exist among them – 
relations of mutual recognition, mutual role-taking, a shared willingness to 
consider one’s own tradition with the eyes of the stranger and to learn from one 
another, and so forth.527  
 
This openness to learn from one another provides the basis to criticize not only “selective 
readings, tendentious interpretations, and narrow-minded applications of human rights, 
but also that shameless instrumentalization of human rights that conceals particular 
interests behind a universalistic mask – a deception that leads one to the false assumption 
that the meaning of human rights is exhausted by their misuse.”528  
The “multiculturalization” of human rights that Mutua is advocating would be 
effective only if it is grounded in what Habermas and Benhabib call communicative 
freedom. According to Benhabib, communicative freedom states, “in order to be able to 
justify to you why you and I ought to act in certain ways, I must respect your capacity to 
agree or disagree with me on the basis of reasons the validity of which you accept or 
reject. But to respect your capacity to accept or reject reasons the validity of which you 
may accept or dispute means for me to respect your capacity for communicative 
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freedom.”529 This communicative freedom will enable different discourses on human 
rights to have a more inclusive approach to human rights.  
4.2.	  Consensus	  as	  an	  Inclusive	  Approach	  to	  Human	  Rights	  	  	  
The idea of consensus seems to be an effective way to have an inclusive approach 
to human rights. The question then might be about the focal point of such a consensus. 
Charles Taylor attempts an inclusive approach to human rights by using Rawls’s idea of 
an overlapping consensus.530 In an article entitled, “Conditions of an Unforced Consensus 
on Human Rights,”531 he compares the unforced international consensus on human rights 
with Rawls’s idea of an overlapping consensus. He writes, “What would it mean to come 
to a genuine, unforced international consensus on human rights? I suppose it would be 
something like what Rawls describes in his Political Liberalism as an overlapping 
consensus.”532 For Taylor, such a consensus means that “different groups, countries, 
religious communities, civilizations, while holding incompatible fundamental views on 
theology, metaphysics, human nature, etc., would come to an agreement on certain norms 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
529 Benhabib, “Reason-Giving and Rights-Bearing,” 39.  
530 For those who are not familiar with Rawls’s work, he introduces the idea of an overlapping consensus in 
order to address the question of stability and unity in a pluralistic society. This question of stability is well 
expressed in the main question that serves as a guideline to the project of Political Liberalism and upon 
which depends the rest of Rawls’s reflection in this project: “how is it possible that there may exist over 
time a stable and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though 
incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?” (PL, xviii) In dealing with this question, 
Rawls aims at showing that people holding different comprehensive doctrines can still agree on a certain 
conception of justice without necessarily giving up their own identities or belief systems. He conceives of 
that conception of justice as being political and not metaphysical. He names it justice as fairness.  
531 Charles Taylor, “Conditions of an Unforced Consensus on Human Rights,” in Obrad Savić, ed., The 
Politics of Human Rights (London: Verso, 1999).  
532 Ibid., 101.  
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that ought to govern human behavior. Each would have its own way of justifying this 
from out of its profound background conception.”533  
Here the question arises regarding the content of such consensus. The answer 
would be: on human rights. This answer, observes Taylor, raises a first obstacle related to 
the Western origin of human rights. Human rights, which have “roots in Western 
culture,”534 might not be endorsed by some non-Western cultures. Therefore, “we can’t 
assume straight off, without further examination, that a future unforced world consensus 
could be formulated to the satisfaction of everyone in the language of rights.”535 For 
Taylor, “consensus requires that the extreme distance [between cultures] be closed, that 
we come better to understand each other in our differences, that we learn to recognize 
what is great and admirable in our different spiritual traditions.”536 In Taylor’s view, such 
an undertaking might be difficult, though not impossible, because “in some cases, this 
kind of mutual understanding can come after convergence, but in others it seems almost 
to be a condition of it.”537  
An obstacle in the path to this mutual understanding, notes Taylor, comes from 
the inability of many Westerners to see their culture as one among many. He explains 
such inability by the fact that “many Westerners see their human rights doctrine as arising 
simply out of the falling away of previous countervailing ideas […] which have now been 
discredited, and leave the field free for the preoccupations with human life, freedom, the 
avoidance of suffering.”538 Thus, they tend to “think that the path to convergence requires 	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that others too cast off their traditional ideas, that they even reject their religious heritage, 
and become ‘unmarked’ moderns like us.”539 This tendency is the cause of the reluctance 
of non-Western traditions to admit the relevance of human rights for non-Western 
countries. For Taylor, “contrary to what many people think, world convergence will not 
come through a loss or denial of traditions all around, but rather by creative re-
immersions of different groups, each in their own spiritual heritage, travelling different 
routes to the same goal.”540   
In response to the obstacle raised by Taylor, I argue that such a difficulty can be 
resolved by considering the content of human rights rather than looking at the origin of 
the discourse on the content of human rights. As I have already argued in the previous 
section, the so-called “Western origin” of human rights does not “falsify” the validity of 
their content. As Michael G. Barnhart rightly observes, “the language of human rights, 
though Western in origin, need not be viewed as exclusively so, and the communitarian 
complaint that any society that adopts human rights norms is also adopting the 
civilizational trapping of Western culture may be met. Human rights, in other words, may 
be given alternative foundations to the ones they grew up on.”541  
In a similar vein, Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im argues that there is no “need for 
any single foundation of human rights for all human beings everywhere, whatever that 
foundation may be.”542 For him, “Self-determination, including the right to decide the 
foundation of human rights one finds acceptable, is integral to the ‘human’ in human 	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540 Ibid.  
541 Michael G. Barnhart, “An Overlapping Consensus: A Critique of Two Approaches,” The Review of 
Politics, 66, no. 2 (Spring 2004), 275.  
542 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, “An Inclusive Approach to the Mediation of Competing Human Rights 
Claims,” in Constellations, vol. 20, no. 1 (2013): 7.  
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rights. The foundation of human rights we accept are specific to who we are, in our own 
context, which need not be, and unlikely to be, accepted by all other beings who share a 
commitment to these rights.”543 Thus, to accept alternative foundations to human rights 
requires respect for differences because if “we can only acknowledge agreement with 
people who share the whole package [of human rights], and are moved by the same 
heroes, the consensus will either never come or must be forced.” 544  Without the 
acceptance and respect of differences, any approach to human rights will never be 
inclusive.  
Though Taylor initiates a reflection that leads to an inclusive discourse of human 
rights, he does not provide a concrete example that brings together liberal and non-liberal 
comprehensive doctrines. From this, I maintain that the right to equal concern and respect 
and mutual recognition would be a concrete example that could lead to an inclusive 
approach to human rights. This right is not tied to any specific cultural group. It applies to 
everyone regardless of his or her comprehensive doctrine. The argument of those who 
challenge the Western discourse of human rights is precisely based on this idea of mutual 
recognition and equal concern and respect. People deserve equal concern and respect by 
virtue of having human dignity. Equal concern and respect motivated protests in Arab 
countries in North Africa (Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya) where the political power became 
abusive.  
From what precedes, it can be argued that mutual recognition and equal concern 
and respect are the focus of the consensus that constitutes the inclusive approach to 
human rights. Such an approach not only addresses the question of the Western origin of 	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the discourse of human rights, but also provides justification for endorsing such an idea. 
Most people would agree that the human person should be treated with equal concern and 
respect both within his or her own social, religious, or political context and outside that 
context. Whether the system of belief of a given society or its cultural values system is or 
is not in disagreement with other systems in their understanding of human rights, at least 
equal concern and respect can be accepted by everyone. In this sense, it is the 
responsibility of each cultural, economic, or political system to ensure equal concern and 
respect of their members within their own systems of values and enable them to open 
themselves to the dynamic of respect for differences. Such openness requires an 
understanding of human rights that emphasizes both their moral and legal aspects.  
4.3.	  Human	  Rights:	  Moral	  and	  Legal	  	  	  
The complexity of our contemporary world requires a new approach to human 
rights. Human rights should no longer be conceived as a mere protection of human 
liberties and dignity. They must include the promotion and enhancement of conditions of 
life that give every person opportunities to pursue and achieve his or her happiness. As 
Allan Buchanan puts it, human rights must serve the purposes of “affirming and 
promoting the equal basic status of all people […] and helping to ensure that all have the 
opportunity to lead a minimally good or decent life by providing protections and 
resources that are generally needed for such a life.”545 Such a goal can be achieved only if 
there are institutions that can provide a stable basis for social integration. Thus, instead of 
understanding human rights only as moral rights – as the majority of human rights 
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academics describe them – we should give equal emphasis to their legal aspects. As 
Habermas notes, “human rights are Janus-faced, looking simultaneously toward morality 
and the law […] Like moral norms, they refer to every creature ‘that bears a human face,’ 
but as legal norms they protect individual persons only insofar as the latter belong to a 
particular community – normally the citizens of a nation-state.”546  
I contend that the traditional understanding of human rights simply as moral 
norms or moral claims has become ineffective. The traditional conception made more 
sense after the atrocities of the Second World War, perhaps because it appealed more to 
human conscience then than it does now. The traditional understanding of human rights 
has become questionable in a globalized world where human rights are used as the 
justification of military invasions and interference in the internal affairs of some 
countries, especially developing countries. This raises the question of how to approach 
human rights given this new context. Here appears the importance of reconciling law and 
morality in human rights discourse.  
If human rights are conceived only as moral rights, they lack the enforcement 
power that obligates everyone to comply with the requirement of respecting individuals 
as bearers of rights. Such a limitation of the moral approach to human rights can be 
explained by the fact that the observation of moral rights is dependent upon the 
conscience of the individual. Differently put, respect for moral rights is left to the free 
will of the individual who decides either to conform his behavior to the requirements of 
moral rights or to reject them. In addition to the dependence on the conscience of the 
individual, moral rights seem to make it easier for individual nations to take it upon 	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themselves to intervene to correct injustices they identify independently of any legal 
framework.  
In order to avoid any moral relativism, we should also avoid the moralism of the 
traditional approach to human rights. For, conceiving human rights merely as moral 
rights can be reduced to understanding human rights as the framing of moral claims 
against injustices. That is why it becomes important to compensate the weaknesses of 
moral rights with legal rights, which compel every individual to comply with the 
requirements of respect for each person as bearers of rights. Moral rights need to be 
protected by legal processes in order for them to be effective human rights. Otherwise, 
they remain mere declarations without any significant impact on people’s life. To put the 
point in a somewhat different way: legal human rights provide a legal framework that 
compensates for the deficiencies in the implementation of moral human rights. In this 
sense, legal rights constitute a shield against any threat to equal basic moral status.  
For a better understanding of the importance of conceiving human rights as both 
moral and legal rights, one has to consider the distinction that some legal scholars 
establish between pre-institutional rights and institutional rights. Frank Michelman, for 
example, describes a right as an institutional right when the ground of its recognition as a 
right is an observable action or declaration by some established authority. And a right is a 
pre-institutional right when the ground of its recognition as a right is not any observable 
action or declaration by an institution. 547  Human rights as moral rights are pre-
institutional rights. That is, they are neither decreed nor controlled by political power as 
legislator and master of positive law. Thus, as pre-institutional rights, human rights do 	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not have any legal binding force. However, they have a binding force that lies in each 
agent’s conscience – each agent has the responsibility to act according to his or her 
conscience. In order to acquire legal binding force, human rights must be enshrined in the 
legal system of a country. In other words, materialization of human rights requires their 
translation into the language of legal rights. This process is also referred to as the 
constitutionalization of human rights.  
Different arguments may be expressed with regard to the constitutionalization of 
human rights. On the one hand, it can be argued that a constitution should not contain any 
declaration of rights at all. This argument is based on the conviction that enshrining 
human rights in a constitution or translating them into the language of legal rights 
inevitably gives judges or state officials the power to decide on the rights to grant to their 
citizens. On the other hand, it can be argued that for a country to be a democracy, its 
political regime must be committed to the equal rights of its citizens both as legal persons 
and as bearers of human dignity. Such rights are required to ensure the independence of 
citizens and their pursuit of happiness.  
The problem of the power of judges that might arise as a result of the 
constitutionalization of human rights can be overcome by laying down requirements that 
obligate judges and other state officials to comply with respect for the dignity of the 
person without necessarily making new laws. Similarly, the objection according to which 
the translation of human rights into legal rights will lead to the loss of their moral content 
can be addressed by distinguishing two kinds of legal rights: legal rights that are created 
by the law and legal rights that are recognized by the law. When I argue that human 
rights should also be conceived as legal rights, I understand their legality as a legal 
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recognition by the legally established authority. That is, they are rights recognized by the 
law and not rights created by the law. Thus, when the law recognizes human rights 
(which are moral claims), they acquire a legal status.  
The acquisition of a legal status does not empty the moral content of human 
rights. Rather, it enhances their effectiveness. The reluctance of defenders of the 
traditional conception of human rights – as moral rights – to accept the legal aspect of 
human rights may be explained by the reduction of legal rights to rights created by the 
law. Therefore, seen from this perspective, understanding human rights as legal rights 
would imply grounding them in values that are determined and defined by legal authority. 
That is why for proponents of human rights as moral rights, human rights are self-evident 
and do not need any legal and social recognition. John Hospers, for example, among 
others, argues that moral rights “require no social recognition of their validity. They are 
justified claims which we each justify by individual insight without generating a social 
consensus.”548  
Instead of conceiving moral and legal aspects of human rights in an antagonistic 
relationship, we should rather understand those aspects as complementary. The legal 
aspect compensates for the limitations of the moral aspect by empowering human rights 
with coercive, but legally accountable force, and the moral aspect prevents the legal 
aspect from reducing human rights to legal-positivist norms. With the reconciliation of 
moral and legal aspects of human rights, human rights can effectively contribute to the 
building of a society where every human being is respected as bearer of rights, whose 
dignity is protected and promoted in view of achieving human flourishing. The 
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achievement of such a goal requires structures that facilitate social integration. Here 
appears the importance of a strong civil society that can stimulate discussion in the public 
sphere and promote a vigilant citizenry that is committed to the building of a society 
grounded in the respect and promotion of human rights, so as to materialize the kind of 
world everyone would like to live in. As Thomas Pogge rightly notes, “what is needed to 
make the object of rights truly secure is a vigilant citizenry that is deeply committed to 
these rights and disposed to work for its political realization.”549  
From what precedes, it can rightly be argued that the realization of human rights 
depends on the people who are the ultimate guardian of rights. Without their involvement 
the risk of official disrespect – to use Pogge’s expression – is high. Thus, “enduring 
respect of human rights is sustained not just by the country’s constitution, its legal and 
political system, and the attitudes of its politicians, judges, and police. It is sustained 
more deeply by the attitudes of its people.”550 Such attitudes are not possible without the 
crucial role of a civil society that is capable of both mobilizing people and challenging 
government officials so that they can be responsive to the people.  
In the following section, I will discuss the role that civil society has played in 
promoting human rights and respect for human dignity. I will use Habermas’s theory of 
civil society in order to discuss the role of civil society in the promotion of human rights 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  
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4.4.	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Civil	  Society	  	  	  
A serious analysis of the violations of human rights and disrespect for human 
dignity in various parts of the world reveals that there is an increasing need for a proper 
political context that enables the realization of human rights. Becoming more and more 
aware of such a need, people, especially in developing countries, are fighting against 
repressive regimes in order to establish the rule of law and promote political regimes that 
respect and protect the rights of their citizens and of all those who reside within their 
territories. This fight is conducted in an organized way under the guidance of both 
opposition political parties and associations known as civil society organizations.  
Here I will focus only on civil society organizations. If these organizations are to 
be effective in their effort to enthrone a just society, based on democratic principles and 
respect for human rights, they have to be strengthened. As Naomi Chazan rightly 
observes, “the road to a democratic and just order must pass through the coalescence of 
civil society.”551 In the same line of thought, Nelson Kasfir argues that “civil society is an 
important, and probably necessary, support for democracy. The existence of an active 
civil society is crucial to the vitality of political democracy.”552 The obvious question 
here is: what do people have in mind when they consider civil society to be a determinant 
factor in building pressure for the respect and promotion of human rights?  
In order to answer this question, I will first consider different understandings of 
the expression “civil society” so as to grasp its essence. The focus will be on the context 
of emergence and evolution of the concept in general. I will then look to Habermas’s 
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understanding of civil society and public sphere in order to discuss the role of civil 
society in the Democratic Republic of Congo in promoting human rights. I will focus on 
the context of emergence of civil society in the Congo, its role, and its weaknesses. I will 
finally suggest conditions of efficiency.  
4.4.1.	  The	  Concept	  of	  Civil	  Society:	  Its	  Context	  of	  Emergence	  and	  Its	  Evolution	  	  	  
The majority of scholars are of the opinion that “the concept of civil society is a 
difficult one to employ not just because it is taken to mean so many different things by 
different people, but also because it can often obscure more than it reveals.”553 Thus, it is 
not rare to find groups that aim at achieving their own interests and political power 
defining themselves as civil society associations. This complexity of the concept requires 
a consideration of its origin.  
The expression “civil society” was introduced into our political vocabulary by 
Hegel. In the third part of his Philosophy of Rights – ethical life554 – Hegel distinguishes 
three moments of the ethical life: the family, civil society, and the state. He understands 
civil society as the stage between the family and the state. For Hegel, civil society 
contains three moments: (i) system of needs (the mediation of needs and one man’s 
satisfaction through his work and the satisfaction of the needs of all others), (ii) the 
administration of justice, which aims at protecting people and their freedom and property, 
(iii) the police and the corporation, which care for particular interests as a common 	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interest. (PR, 188) From these three moments, Hegel describes civil society as “an 
association of members as self-subsistent individuals in a universality which, because of 
their self-subsistence, is only abstract. Their association is brought about by their needs, 
by the legal system – the means to security of person and property – and by an external 
organization for attaining their particular and common interests.” (PR, 157) From this 
description it can be argued that Hegel’s use of civil society is similar to what we would 
now normally call state.  
The concept of civil society has evolved in history and has acquired different 
meanings. Mikael Karlström, for example, notes that the term civil society first gained 
popularity in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, during the period of 
modern European state formation, when it was employed and elaborated by, among 
others, Ferguson, Kant, Hegel, Marx, and Tocqueville.555 For Karlström, the emergence 
of civil society is related to the democratic opposition movements in communist Eastern 
Europe. He writes:  
The revival of civil society arose out of the democratic opposition movements in 
communist Eastern Europe, where it was used to articulate the prospects for a 
domain of social and political activity and organisation independent of the 
totalitarian state. The conception has also been employed in the struggle against 
Latin American dictatorships and occasionally in efforts to formulate a left 
alternative to the welfare state in Western Europe.556  
From the above considerations it can be argued that “civil society was regarded as 
an accomplishment born out of an awareness of what was required, politically, to secure a 
distinctively societal and human life […] to separate order and freedom from chaos and 	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compulsion.”557 In a similar vein, John Keane attributes the rise of the early modern 
discourse of civil society to the fear of state despotism.  
4.4.2.	  Habermas	  on	  Civil	  Society	  	  	  
Jürgen Habermas deals with the relationship between civil society, public opinion, 
and communicative power in the third section of chapter eight of Between Facts and 
Norms. It is important to maintain such a relationship so as to establish the rule of law. In 
order to understand the importance and the implications of such a relationship, it is 
crucial to closely examine the concepts of public sphere and civil society.  
4.4.2.1.	  Public	  Sphere	  	  	  
Habermas describes the public sphere as “a communicative structure rooted in the 
lifeworld through the associational network of civil society.”558 As such, the public 
sphere is neither an institution nor an organization. Rather, it is to be understood as a 
social phenomenon, which is not “a framework of norms with differentiated competences 
and roles, membership regulations, and so on.”559 This description of the public sphere 
already appeared – though expressed differently – in an article published in 1974 by 
Jürgen Habermas, Sara Lennox, and Frank Lennox entitled “The Public Sphere: An 
Encyclopedia Article (1964).” “By the public sphere,” they wrote, “we mean first of all a 
realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed. 
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Access is guaranteed to all citizens. A portion of the public sphere comes into being in 
every conversation in which private individuals assemble to form a public body.”560    
The emphasis on the free access to the public sphere and non-membership 
regulations implies that the public sphere does not have decision-making powers given its 
lack of juridical status. This is what Habermas refers to as the public sphere’s being 
relieved of the burden of decision-making: “the communication structures of the public 
sphere relieve the public of the burden of decision making; the postponed decisions are 
reserved for the institutionalized political process.”561 In other words, the public sphere 
has a very limited capacity with regard to problem solving. That is why it must “amplify 
the pressure of problems, that is, not only detect and identify problems but also 
convincingly and influentially thematize them, furnish them with possible solutions, and 
dramatize them in such a way that they are taken up and dealt with by parliamentary 
complexities.”562  
In order to achieve such a goal, there should be an effective sharing and 
communication of information among those participating in the detection, identification, 
and thematization of problems to be dealt with by parliamentary complexes. Here the 
rationale behind Habermas’s exploration of the concept of public sphere is revealed. 
According to Craig Calhoun, “the basic question guiding Habermas’ exploration of the 
public sphere was: to what extent can the wills or opinions guiding political action be 
formed on the basis of rational-critical discourse?”563 Differently put, Habermas’ concern 	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is to found public opinion on the public use of reason. This brings to light the main 
characteristic of the public sphere: communicative action.  
Habermas defines communicative action as that mode of social action in which 
“actors coordinate their plans of action with one another by means of processes of 
reaching understanding, that is, in such a way that they draw on the illocutionary binding 
and bounding powers of speech acts.”564 He distinguished communicative action from 
strategic action, which involves successful management of obstacles and opportunities 
for realization of the individual’s plans. For Habermas, “the public sphere can best be 
described as a network for communicating information and points of view (i.e., opinions 
expressing affirmative or negative attitudes).”565 It is through this communicative activity 
that the public sphere is reproduced. There is an interrelation between the public sphere 
and communicative action. On the one hand, the public sphere generates and promotes 
communicative action, and, on the other hand, communicative action reproduces the 
public sphere.  
Communication in the public sphere is not specialized for a particular validity 
dimension (in contrast to science or law), nor does it directly serve to reproduce the 
lifeworld. Habermas correctly expresses it as follows:  
Systems like science, morality, and art take up different validity aspects of 
everyday communicative action (truth, rightness, or veracity). The public sphere, 
however, is specialized in neither of these two ways; to the extent that it extends 
to politically relevant questions, it leaves their specialized treatment to the 
political system. Rather, the public sphere distinguishes itself through a 
communicative structure that is related to a third feature of communicative action: 
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it refers neither to the functions nor to the contents of everyday communication 
but to the social space generated in communicative action.566  
In pointing out this aspect of communicative action, Habermas intends to show that the 
aim of communication in the public sphere is not a success-oriented pursuit of individual 
goals, but open exchange of opinion, in which participants take “positions on mutual 
speech-offers and [assume] illocutionary obligations.”567 This leads to the disclosure of 
the intersubjectively shared space of a speech situation.  
It is important, at this point, to note that communicative action in the public 
sphere does not necessarily exclude success as some might misinterpret from the previous 
paragraph. Here, success is to be understood in terms of the transformation of individual 
opinions into public opinion, which, notes Habermas, “is not representative in the 
statistical sense.”568 That is to say, public opinion is not determined by the number of 
people who approve an opinion, though it be through irrational ways. For an opinion to 
qualify as public opinion, it should be the outcome of a focused public debate and a 
corresponding opinion-formation in a mobilized public sphere. In this sense, the success 
of public communication is measured by “the formal criteria governing how a qualified 
public opinion comes about.”569  
The quality of public opinion has a tremendous influence on the political system 
and decision-making. In some cases it “represents political potentials that can be used for 
influencing the voting behavior of citizens or the will-formation in parliamentary bodies, 
administrative agencies, and courts.”570 However, for political influence to be converted 	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into political power it must “affect the beliefs and decisions of authorized members of the 
political system and determine the behavior of voters, legislators, and officials.”571 Such a 
conversion or transformation takes place through institutionalized procedures.  
Prior to institutionalized procedures that will lead to a potential for rendering 
binding decisions, there are personal experiences of those who will be affected by such 
decisions. It is from their personal life experiences that problems voiced in the public 
sphere first become visible. These experiences are linked to what Habermas calls private 
spheres, and which include “the thick networks of interaction found in families and 
circles of friends as well as the looser contacts with neighbors, work colleagues, 
acquaintances, and so on.”572 As it can be noticed, the public sphere draws its impulses 
from the way social problems are handled in the private sphere, in view of the public 
good, as distinct from private interests.  
The search for public good constitutes a point of similarity between public sphere 
and civil society. This similarity is well expressed by Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato 
who present their complex model of civil society in terms of a variety of institutionalized 
discourses and procedures of democratic decision-making, discourses and procedures 
which not only are communicatively structured but which allow for the critical discussion 
of norms and values and can be understood as providing the differentiated network of 
practices behind the lifeworld processes of socialization, societal integration, and cultural 
reproduction.573   
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4.4.2.2.	  Civil	  Society	  	  	  
As I mentioned earlier, the expression “civil society” was introduced in our 
political vocabulary by Hegel. Its meaning was related to the “bourgeois society” of the 
liberal tradition, “which Hegel conceptualized as a system of needs, that is, as a market 
system involving social labor and commodity exchange.”574 Contemporary civil society 
is understood differently. T. Smith, for example, describes the institutional core of civil 
society as comprising nongovernmental and noneconomic connections and voluntary 
associations that anchor the communication structures of the public sphere in the society 
component of lifeworld. For him,  
Civil society is composed of those more or less spontaneously emergent 
associations, organizations, and movements that, attuned to how societal problems 
resonate in the private life spheres, distill and transmit such reactions in amplified 
form to the public sphere. The core of civil society comprises a network of 
associations that institutionalizes problem-solving discourses on questions of 
general interest inside the framework of organized public spheres.575  
Jodi Dean gives a similar description of civil society when she writes of it, “as a location, 
civil society designates the network of institutions, movements, associations, and 
discourses in which democratic action is situated.”576  
From these two descriptions, we can argue with Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato 
– whose work on civil society is a great contribution to political theory – that civil society 
is a “normative model of a societal realm different from the state and the economy.”577 
As a societal realm, civil society is distinguished from other areas of society by the 
following features:  	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(1)Plurality: families, informal groups, and voluntary associations whose plurality 
and autonomy allow for a variety of forms of life; (2) Publicity: institutions of 
culture and communication; (3) Privacy: a domain of individual self-development 
and moral choice; and (4) Legality: structures of general laws and basic rights 
needed to demarcate plurality, privacy, and publicity from at least the state and, 
tendentially, the economy. Together, these structures secure the institutional 
existence of a modern differentiated civil society.578  
These features show the importance of having an organized structure, different from the 
state apparatus, capable of guaranteeing and keeping intact the dynamic of the 
communication structures of the public sphere. If such a dynamic is maintained, public 
opinion can exert influence over parliaments, courts, and administrations in favor of 
specific policies, though that influence is not a political power. As Habermas rightly 
notes, “public influence is transformed into communicative power only after it passes 
through the filters of the institutionalized procedures of democratic opinion-and will-
formation and enters through parliamentary debates into legitimate lawmaking.”579  
In order to reach legitimate lawmaking, there should be materials to be dealt with 
by parliamentary debates. Those materials are drawn from different sources. They have 
more chance to influence public opinion if they are well publicized. But they can make 
significant changes if, in addition to publicity, they come from the real concern of 
citizens; that is, if they come from the periphery of the apparatus of the government. Here 
appears the key role of the media. “As long as in the public sphere the mass media prefer 
[…] to draw their material from powerful, well-organized information producers and as 
long as they prefer media strategies that lower rather than raise the discursive level of 
public communication, issues will tend to start in, and be managed from, the center, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
578 Cohen and Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory, 346.  
579 BFN, 371. 
	   234	  
rather than follow a spontaneous course originating in the periphery.”580 When issues 
start and are managed from the center, there is less chance of leading to significant 
political changes. But, when they start from the periphery there is more chance of 
changes because “the civil-social periphery, in contrast to the political center, [has] the 
advantage of greater sensitivity in detecting and identifying new problem situations.”581  
Having considered the concepts of the public sphere and civil society, the main 
question is: what is the relationship between the public sphere and civil society? For 
Habermas, “the public sphere refers to a communicatively generated space, while civil 
society is the institutional location, which permits the creation of this space.”582 Can this 
understanding of civil society be applied to other contexts? In what follows, I will 
critically examine the role of civil society in promoting human rights in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo from a Habermasian perspective.  
4.4.3.	  Emergence	  and	  Role	  of	  Civil	  Society	  in	  Promoting	  Human	  Rights	  in	  	  
the	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  Congo	  	  
 
4.4.3.1.	  Context	  of	  Emergence	  of	  Civil	  Society	  in	  the	  DR	  Congo	  	  	  
In the Democratic Republic of Congo the expression “civil society” was used in 
ordinary political discourse in 1989. It became well known and abundantly used from 
1990-1991, the beginning of the democratization process, which officially started on 
April 24, 1990 when, in a televised speech, Mobutu announced that the country was 
moving from a single-party system that had been in place since 1967 to a multiparty 	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government. A twelve-month transitional period was to lead to elections in April 1991. 
Unfortunately, in another speech, delivered to the National Assembly on May 3, 1990, 
Mobutu retracted all the essential elements of his promise to the nation of democratizing 
the country.  
Previous to the speech of April 24, 1990 Mobutu conducted “popular 
consultations” in order to collect opinions regarding the past, present, and future role of 
state institutions. As a result of these consultations, Mobutu announced in his speech of 
April 24 that the Zairean people (now Congolese) had asked him to continue presiding 
over the destiny of the country. Therefore, he had to remain the chief of state and his 
office would be above all political parties and state institutions. This implied that he 
would be subject to no legislative controls. Given this new understanding of his office, 
Mobutu resigned from MPR (Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution: Popular Movement 
of Revolution), the political party of which he was both president and founder. In so 
doing, Mobutu did not realize that his office as president of the country was tied to his 
function as founder of MPR. In resigning from his office as president of MPR, he was at 
the same time resigning from his office as president of the country. This juridical 
contradiction was brought to his attention and led Mobutu to deliver the speech of May 3, 
1990 in which, as I previously mentioned, he retracted all the essential elements of his 
promise of democratization of the country.  
As Floribert Chebeya rightly notes, “this clarification speech abruptly halted the 
popular rejoicing. The populace launched protest movements to signal its disapproval. 
Students staged demonstrations at Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, and other cities in Zaire. 
During the night of May 12, 1990, the government struck back [...] Students from the 
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University of Lubumbashi in Shaba (Katanga) were brutally massacred.”583 The attack on 
students and other restrictions in the country were perfect examples of repression, 
understood as “restrictions on the rights of citizens to criticize the government, 
restrictions on the freedom of the press, restrictions on the rights of opposition parties to 
campaign against the government, or, as is common in a totalitarian dictatorship, the 
outright prohibition of groups, associations, or political parties opposed to the 
government.”584 In such a political context, the government controls the judiciary and the 
national assembly without checks and balances.  
Despite the increasing threat and repression from Mobutu’s government the 
population continued fighting for the respect of human rights, political change, and 
decided to resist peacefully. One of the expressions of that peaceful resistance was the 
persistent request for a National Sovereign Conference. Mobutu yielded. But he refused 
to open himself to the requirements of the process of democratization. Thus, he did not 
recognize the authority of the National Sovereign Conference (CNS) and rejected its 
recommendations, especially the constitutional provisions that placed a two-year limit on 
the duration of the transition to democracy. As a result, the country experienced the 
longest transition to democracy in African history.  
The CNS was perceived by the population as the concretization of the fight for 
human rights and political changes in the country. It started on August 7, 1991. In his 
speech, Prime Minister Crispin Mulumba Lukoji, who presided over the opening 
ceremony, presented a negative evaluation of Mobutu’s regime. On January 19, 1992, the 	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CNS was suspended by Nguz-a-Karl-i-Bond who then became the Prime Minister. In a 
message on national television and radio he announced the suspension of the CNS and 
gave three reasons to justify his decision: cost of the conference, over-representation of 
delegates from Kasai Oriental province, and non-respect, by delegates, of the limits of the 
CNS competences.  
On February 16, 1992, the Catholic Church and other Christian denominations 
organized a demonstration against the decision that suspended the CNS. It was a way of 
protesting against Mobutu’s repressive regime. Many people demonstrated. The huge 
mobilization could be explained by the expectations of the population from the CNS. For 
the majority of Congolese, the CNS was a determining force in the history of their 
country that could bring about the change they had been longing for. There was a strong 
and organized leadership with a clear message: la marche de l’espoir (the march of hope) 
was a way of reviving the process of democratization started by the CNS. Therefore, the 
fight was not against Mobutu as an individual, but against a system, against a repressive 
system of governing. The march was the expression of the awareness of a people who 
wanted to free itself from fear in order to be responsible for its own destiny. Mobutu 
reacted to the demonstration by sending the army to open fire on people. Because of 
increasing pressure from both within and outside the country, Mobutu’s government 
agreed to re-open the CNS. On April 1992, delegates started their meetings. The CNS 
closed its session on December 6, 1992.  
During the political transition, civil society became a remarkable, conscientious 
and well-organized institution, and played a key role at the National Sovereign 
Conference. It distinguished itself by electing its candidate, Mgr. Laurent Monsengwo, as 
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the president of the National Sovereign Conference. Unfortunately, after the National 
Sovereign Conference, the credibility of civil society was questioned, mainly in 
Kinshasa, but it re-emerged and played an important role in the downfall of Mobutu’s 
authoritarian regime.  
It should be noted that before 1990, which marked the “emergence” of a well-
organized civil society with structures of coordination, there were many organizations, 
which could be called civil society organizations. These peripheral organizations 
efficiently acted to echo the population’s concerns, to protect citizens from the abuses of 
the state, to create a space of communication among people, and to alleviate misery and 
poverty in rural areas. They enhanced the living standard of the population through 
promotion of agriculture, provision of good health-care systems, provision of clean water, 
and civic education of the populace. These actions correctly reflect what Habermas 
describes as the greater sensitivity of the civil-social periphery in detecting and 
identifying new problems. In addition to detecting and identifying problems, civil society 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo changed people’s living conditions.  
The great sensitivity of the civil-society periphery in the Congo has brought to 
light additional features in understanding civil society. These features complement those 
described by Cohen and Arato. Civil society is seen as an ensemble of organizations, 
independent from the state, whose aim is to promote human rights and the rule of law by 
controlling the abuses of the state so as to hold it accountable to the people it represents. 
In other words, civil society can be understood as “an institutional domain that mediates 
between the state and society.”585 In a similar vein, Philippe Schmitter defines civil 
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society as “the set of self-organized intermediary groups characterised by (1) autonomy 
from both social interests and state, (2) capacity for collective action promoting interests 
or passions, (3) absence of an intention to govern the polity, and (4) agreement to act 
within civil rules conveying mutual respect.” 586  These features are related to 
Cohen/Arato’s view in many respects: both views highlight the autonomy of civil society 
from the state, the capacity for collective action that allows different structures of civil 
society to secure institutional existence of a modern civil society, and the 
acknowledgment of the necessity for acting in accordance with general laws.  
From these considerations it can be argued that the concept of civil society in the 
Congo has been shaped to serve the goal of better governance by promoting democratic 
values such as accountability, transparency, and liberty. Unlike the broader idea of civil 
society that I introduced earlier – which left specific problems unspecified – civil society 
in the Congo has a specific agenda: promoting human rights and democratic governance. 
The rationale behind such a promotion of democratic values is to create better living 
conditions for people, and to empower them to participate in shaping their destiny. This 
responsibility towards one’s destiny clearly appears in the Agenda for Peace in which 
civil society in the Democratic Republic of Congo defines itself as the echo of the 
population’s preoccupations, anguishes, and frustrations. It reads:  
We are Congolese citizens, aware of our rights and obligations, patriots in love 
with peace and freedom, and who fight so that our people can become responsible 
for their destiny. We are those who, at this moment where there is neither a 
parliament nor representative structures of the population, make it our mission to 
amplify the preoccupations, anguishes and frustrations, and hopes of the 	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population with which we work everyday. We are civil society, the voice of many 
voiceless who can no longer stop expressing themselves […] We are Congolese 
who refuse to be victims of history, and who want to assume their destiny with all 
other Congolese without any exclusion.587  
This content of the Agenda for Peace highlights the commitment of civil society in 
ensuring a responsible citizen participation in the improvement of social and political 
conditions and in identifying challenges and issues of a genuine re-foundation of the 
Congolese society. Such a re-foundation will lead to the reconstruction of the country’s 
social, economic, and cultural fabric.  
4.4.3.2.	  The	  Role	  of	  Civil	  Society	  in	  the	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  Congo	  	  	  
The role of civil society in the Democratic Republic of Congo is best understood 
in relation to its context of emergence. During the National Sovereign Conference, there 
were two main opposing political groups. The first group, known as l’Union Sacrée de 
l’Opposition (Sacred Union of Opposition), consisted of political parties that were 
supporting Etienne Tshisekedi, the leader of UDPS (Union pour la Démocratie et le 
Progrès Social: Union for Democracy and Social Progress) and the second group, known 
as la Mouvance Présidentielle was supporting Mobutu. Both groups had contradictory 
visions, ambitions, and interests. Civil society, therefore, presented itself as the 
intermediate group between l’Union Sacrée de l’Opposition and la Mouvance 
Présidentielle. Its mission was to defend the interest of the population.  
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Seen from this angle, civil society in the Democratic Republic of Congo appeared 
as the intermediate institution between the individual, on the one hand, and the state and 
political parties, on the other hand. It aimed at achieving a double mission: working for 
the promotion of better conditions of life and raising awareness with regard to the state’s 
responsibility for its citizens and promotion and respect for human rights. In order to 
achieve these goals, the Congolese civil society worked for the promotion of basic human 
rights. As a result, people are becoming more conscious not only of their responsibility in 
promoting human rights, but also of their participation in the decision-making process. In 
a letter, transmitted to the High Commission for Human Rights, on October 18, 2001, 
Robert Garreton588 acknowledged the role played by civil society in awakening people’s 
conscience about Human Rights. He wrote: 
Human Rights are at the top of the agenda in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
It is a great experience, a great achievement, which, I believe, cannot be denied. 
This achievement is first of all the work of civil society […] Civil society has 
succeeded in making the future of the Congo something to be decided not solely 
by politicians. And the proof is the fact that the representatives of civil society are 
active parties in the inter-Congolese dialogue. I believe and I am convinced that 
the future, a pacified future of the Congo, cannot be done without civil society. 
The role of civil society remains central.589  
 
That role covers two main and important areas: promotion of democratic values and 
creation of a public space that enables people to express their needs and expectations.  
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a.	  Promotion	  of	  Democratic	  Values	  	  	  
The existence of an active civil society is a determinant factor for the vitality of 
democracy and promotion of human rights. As Havel rightly observes, a strong civil 
society is a crucial condition of strong democracy.590 In teaching democratic skills and 
promoting interests that governments might otherwise overlook, civil society 
organizations contribute to stopping a “kind of political decay that undermined new 
African governments a generation ago.”591 In a similar vein, Gerald Rolland notes, “civil 
society is the depository of what can be named culture, which must be replaced at the 
center of politics as condition of access to the public sphere.”592  
It is important to note that the “culture” that Rolland refers to is to be understood 
as an ensemble of values, such as justice, equality, freedom, and participation by 
everybody in problem solving of issues related to the well being of the whole society. 
Most of these values must be inculcated in people, internalized, and practiced by 
everyone so as to build and sustain a democratic society based on respect for human 
rights. It is only through these practices that citizens come to a better understanding of 
some concept. Freedom, for example, should be understood not as a license to do 
whatever one wants, but as an intellectual and moral practice, a constant search for 
responsible self-consciousness and self-determination. Such responsible self-
consciousness and self-determination imply the capacity to bring together rationality and 
morality.  
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This interconnection of rationality and morality remains a very important factor in 
promoting respect for human rights and human dignity. As Ngoma-binda notes, “If 
freedom inspires choices, institutes diversity of opinions, only rationality can indicate, 
beyond feelings and personal interests, necessary and genuine choices. Therefore, 
rationality is the foundation of any democratic formation. But rationality alone is helpless 
if it is not supported by morality.”593 This complementary relationship of rationality and 
morality highlights both the importance of reconciling law and morality in human rights 
discourse and the importance of approaching human rights in terms of the kind of world 
we would like to live in, rather than simply in terms of what the individual is legally 
entitled to.  
Let me be clear here. My emphasis on the fact that human rights should be more 
about the kind of world we would like to live in does not deny the idea of entitlement. As 
Buchanan rightly notes, “all human beings are morally entitled to being provided with the 
opportunity to lead a minimally good or decent life and the public affirmation and 
protection of their basic moral status.”594 Such protection is materialized through legal 
mechanisms.  
Civil society in the Democratic Republic of Congo has greatly contributed to 
providing opportunity to lead a decent life by teaching democratic values through 
seminars, conferences, and other forms of civic education. It has created what Habermas 
would call the public sphere, which Seyla Benhabib would see as one of “mutually 
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interlocking and overlapping networks and associations of deliberation, contestation, and 
argumentation.”595  
b.	  Creation	  of	  a	  Public	  Space	  	  	  
Politics is not the monopoly of a particular group of people. Every citizen has the 
duty and the right to be involved in the process of decision-making that leads to the 
establishment of the rule of law, protection of human rights, and improvement of humane 
living conditions. In other words, participation in the governance of a country is a key 
element to the establishment of the rule of law, and a response to the demands of 
democracy. However, from a practical point of view, it is impossible to have the entire 
nation in parliament or other governmental institutions to discuss issues related to the 
governance of the nation. In order to solve this problem, the concept of the public space 
is brought in.  
By “public space,” I mean a space where people can meet and discuss issues 
related to the common good. In such a space, each citizen is free to formulate his or her 
opinion on the social or political life of the state, free to express his or her approval or 
disapproval on a particular issue. Afterwards, those who represent the popular base will 
make known the result of those discussions to authorized institutions, which are directly 
involved in decision-making. Insofar as such representation functions well, we can say 
that the public space is a forum from which people participate in the life of the state. In a 
similar vein, François Perroux defines public space as “a place where people can easily 
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meet, know each other, have a certain idea of the complexity in which they live. It is a 
‘lieu par excellence’ of freeing elites and of collective pedagogy.”596  
One of the roles of civil society in the Democratic Republic of Congo has been to 
create a public space in order to facilitate discussions on political issues. It is through 
various forms of discussions and public demonstrations that many Congolese have 
learned not only how to express their opinion on some political issues, but also how to 
live according to democratic rules. Here we see the relevance of Habermas’s observation 
that discussion is the new paradigm on which any democratic society should be founded. 
Each participant in the discussion must respect the ethics of discussion, which consists in 
respecting the opponent, especially in the effort to grasp the truth to be found in his 
opinion. To grasp that truth, we must enter into his argumentation. This presupposes 
careful listening so as to avoid the tendency quickly to reject the opinions of opponents to 
our own judgment. It is only by opening ourselves to discussion that we will realize that 
the certitudes of our world are sometimes ridiculous; and then, our argument will take the 
form of a dialogue. Nelson Kasfir emphasizes this point as follows: “democracy, 
particularly liberal democracy, certainly functions more effectively if individuals tolerate 
the view of those with whom they deeply disagree.”597  
Despite its role of promoting democratic values and creating a public space, civil 
society in the Democratic Republic of Congo is confronted with challenges that affect its 
capacity to mobilize people and its influence to bring about change. The following 
section will examine some of the weaknesses of civil society.  
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4.4.4.	  Weaknesses	  of	  Civil	  Society	  in	  the	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  Congo	  	  
4.4.4.1.	  Limited	  Financial	  Resources	  	  	  
Financial problems are one of the biggest challenges that civil society 
organizations in the Democratic Republic of Congo face. These organizations do not 
have a stable source of income. They rely on donors who “have no expectations of 
helping them forever. Therefore, they will die on the vine as soon as their foreign patrons 
depart or lose interest.”598 This weakens their ability to influence change within society. 
In order to continue their activities, these organizations are willing to accept offers from 
the government. Such a situation of dependence has led to political instrumentalization of 
civil society organizations. This explains why their plans and activities are sometimes 
designed according to the interests of their sponsors, who alienate their freedom, 
manipulate their actions, and limit their efficacy.  
It should be noted that reliance on the support of donors is not unique to civil 
society in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Many civil society organizations around 
the world are confronted with the same problem. As Habermas notes, “naturally, the 
actors who are more firmly anchored in civil society and participate in the reproduction 
of the public sphere also depend on the support of ‘sponsors’ who supply the necessary 
resources of money, organization, knowledge, and social capital. But patrons or ‘like-
minded’ sponsors do not necessarily reduce the authenticity of the public authors they 
support.”599  
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It is obvious that there is a close link between financial resources and the capacity 
for civil society to influence change. John Comaroff acknowledges this link by arguing 
that “when provided with sufficient resources, these civil society organizations will have 
a substantial impact and can even make a dictator falter or give up.”600 Along the same 
line of thought, Ronald Kassimir notes, “the socio-political role of civil society 
organizations depends in large part on their internal organizational resources and 
capacities […] The power resources and internal dynamics of organisations making up 
civil society influence their effectiveness, more systematic attention needs to be paid to 
such factors.”601  
4.4.4.2.	  Aspiration	  to	  Political	  Power	  	  	  
The relationship between political power and civil society in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo is characterized by tensions and ambiguities. There is either a mutual 
attraction or a mutual repulsion. Some leaders of civil society organizations aspire to 
public office for their personal interests. They explain their participation in governmental 
institutions as a way of being more efficient in making known people’s concerns. Thus, 
the neutrality of civil society is questioned, and members are divided because of 
divergent interests. The lack of political ethics which characterizes Congolese politicians 
is also felt within civil society organizations. Aspiration to public office was manifested 
in the fight among different groups of civil society to be selected for the inter-Congolese 
dialogue in Sun City (South Africa). Because of this aspiration to public office, civil 	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society in the Democratic Republic of Congo is perceived as a stepping-stone towards 
political power or a tree nursery of political leaders, and nobody wants to miss this 
opportunity. Ngoma-binda expresses this aspiration to political power in the following 
way:  
Joining a civil society organization is strategically seen as a bridge, a way to get 
into politics, a place of privileges and of honours. The policy of civil society is, in 
an open or in a hidden way, a strategy for entering politics. Actors choose the 
most visible means of action: repeated expression of one’s opinions in 
newspapers, radios or on television, in a style which is unpleasant or favourable to 
the ruling power, according to the effects one wants to obtain; but always strategic 
and profitable to personal ambitions.602  
 
This idea of civil society as an easy way to have access to political power is another 
factor that not only weakens civil society in the Democratic Republic of Congo and limits 
its power to influence political changes, but also separates it from the popular base.  
4.4.4.3.	  Separation	  from	  the	  Popular	  Base	  	  	  
One of the criticisms against civil society in the Democratic Republic of Congo is 
“separation” from the popular base. This weakness is a consequence of the aspiration to 
political power. Members of civil society present themselves as representatives or 
spokesmen of the population when they need support from the population. But once in 
power they forget the same population from whom they got initial support, and fight for 
their own interests. Therefore, they lack connections that enable them to feel the people’s 
aspirations and act accordingly. What they defend is nothing but their own understanding 
of the situation, which most of the time does not reflect the true needs of the people 
whose interests they are supposed to promote. Separated from the popular base, they 	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constitute a class of elites, and lose a people-centered approach to leadership. As a result, 
dedication to the common good becomes an abstract concept without any impact on 
people’s lives. In order to be more efficient, civil society in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo must be independent from the government, its members must transcend their self-
interests, and it should maintain its identity of civil-social-location at the periphery of 
political power.  
4.4.5.	  Conditions	  of	  Efficacy	  	  	  
Civil society must be well organized in order to be effective and fulfil some of its 
missions, which include promoting a stable and legitimate system of democratic 
governance, consolidating progress in matters of justice, security, protection of civilians, 
and respect for human rights, mobilizing people, and bringing about change in the 
country. Two important aspects are required to achieve such an organization: autonomy 
from the state and transcendence of self-interests.  
4.4.5.1.	  Autonomy	  from	  the	  State	  	  	  
Autonomy from the state is an important element for the capacity to effect 
change. In order to be effective in its role of promoting human rights and democratic 
values, civil society must be independent from the ruling power. This independence 
includes neutrality, objectivity, and impartiality in judgements. Autonomy from the state 
allows civil society to function as an agent of awareness vis-à-vis the demands of the 
fight against dictatorship and political corruption. This can be possible only if civil 
society organizations respect the line of demarcation between their mission and the 
political ambitions of their members. Familiarity with the ruling power reduces the ability 
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to challenge, criticize, and correct abuses. What is expected of civil society is to be 
involved in the opinion-formation process without being used by politicians who seek 
political and economic power. As René Beeckmans notes, “civil society, without being 
appropriated by leaders who are looking for their own political and economic advantages, 
must be actively interested in problems of society and be involved in their solutions.”603 
The US Catholic bishops affirm the same thing by stating that civil society is to be 
principled without being ideological, to be political without being partisan, to be civil 
without being soft, to be involved without being used.604  
4.4.5.2.	  Transcendence	  of	  Self-­‐interests	  	  	  
Civil society in the Democratic Republic of Congo is in crisis. The truth of such a 
statement can be justified by both the number of groups labelled as civil societies:  free 
and independent civil society, coalition of independent social forces, civil society of 
youth, etc., and the contradictory ways these different groups deal with issues related to 
the promotion of human rights and democratic values in the country. This crisis is related 
more to personal ambitions of the members of civil society than to divergences of 
principles, values, or means to be used in consolidating democratic values.  
It has become obvious that members of civil society in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo are no longer able to act beyond their immediate interests. Their commitment is 
dictated by advantages they expect from the political situation of the moment. A close 
look at this crisis of identity shows that civil society is moving away from its objectives 
and its essence, which is common action taken on behalf of the good of the community. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
603 R., Beeckmans, Editorial, in Congo-Afrique, n.359, Novembre 2001, 515-516.  
604 This passage is from an article entitled: “What is the Church’s role in politics today”, written by Mark 
Chopko, General counsel, United States Catholic Conference.  
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Therefore, there is an urgent need for reinforcing cohesion within civil society and for 
insisting on transcending self-interests for the sake of an effective participation in 
promoting human rights, democratic values, and the establishment of the rule of law. It is 
important for civil society to distinguish itself from the state apparatus. Civil society must 
be well organized in order to have an impact on will-formation that can influence 
decision-making. The capacity of civil society organizations to act varies with the density 
of organizational complexity. The better a civil society organization is organized the 
more it influences and facilitates will-formation.  
4.5.	  Conclusion	  	  	  
The commonly accepted understanding of human rights conceives them as moral 
standards from which we can claim certain rights from others. This conception has led to 
an individualistic understanding of human rights resulting in “the tendency to interpret 
[human rights] exclusively in terms of negative duties of omission, non-interference and 
restraint rather than in terms of duties of action and commission.”605 The conception of 
human rights merely as moral standards has also led to discuss and interpret them either 
in terms of their ethical foundation, which justifies their respect by resorting to the notion 
of common humanity shared by all human beings, or in terms of their legal formulation. 
These separate discussions of human rights do not leave enough room for the 
consideration of the environment that conditions respect for such rights. Relevant 
concerns, such as world poverty and the freedom to enjoy adequate living conditions are 
not given enough attention.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
605 Polly Vizard, “The Contribution of Professor Amartya Sen in the Field of Human Rights,” published by 
the Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion, Case paper 91, January 2005.  
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That is why it becomes important to conceive human rights as both moral and 
legal rights. They are a system of complementary rights. As moral rights, they need 
contextualization and specification in the form of legal norms. The moral-legal approach 
to human rights not only challenges the exclusively negative approach to fundamental 
liberties but also enables us to understand that human rights are not only about individual 
entitlements, but also about the kind of world we would like to live in: a world with legal 
structures that allows every human being to have the opportunity to live a dignified life, 
and to respect and promote the rights and well-being of others. We respect the rights and 
well-being of others by refraining from acting in such a way as to harm them. We 
promote them by acting in such a way as to further them. Such a promotion implies the 
involvement of the entire human community in acting in favor of initiatives that aim at 
fostering human rights understood as the combination of availability of and accessibility 
to opportunities.  
No single state can achieve this goal in isolation but requires an international 
effort. Though the protection and promotion of human rights are the primary 
responsibility of every individual state, there is a moral obligation for international 
assistance to support states to fulfill their primary responsibility to secure human rights 
for their citizens. As Buchanan rightly notes, “the international legal human rights system 
expresses a commitment to affirming equal basic status for all; that is, affirming and 
protecting the equal basic status of all individuals is one of its chief functions.”606 The 
obligation to support states in fulfilling their responsibility to secure human rights 
highlights the fact that violations of human rights anywhere is a threat to respect for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
606 Buchanan, The Heart of Human Rights, 64.  
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human rights everywhere. In the next chapter, I will discuss the importance of a 
cosmopolitan human rights regime.  
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Chapter	  5	  
A	  Cosmopolitan	  Human	  Rights	  Regime	  
 
In order to grasp the meaning and relevance of a cosmopolitan human rights 
regime it is important to consider the distinction between international law and 
cosmopolitan law. In a general sense, international law can be defined as a body of laws 
that regulates relationships between and among states. Cosmopolitan law refers to law 
that is beyond the jurisdiction of particular states. As the Center on Law and 
Globalization puts it, “cosmopolitan law creates and appeals to universal rights and duties 
beyond the claims of any one state. It is qualitatively different than the laws of states or 
the law made between one state and another. Cosmopolitan law creates a larger 
community of states by providing a common vision and set of values.”607  
In the light of this distinction, I argue that the idea of a cosmopolitan human rights 
regime enables human beings to create a community of states that understands the 
promotion and protection of human rights worldwide as a common and shared 
responsibility. Such a community is based on the conviction that all human beings are 
members of a community of fate and they share common human values that transcend the 
limits of nation-states. These values cannot be limited by any political power. In this 
sense, a cosmopolitan human rights regime provides standards and sets of values that no 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
607 The Center on Law and Globalization is a partnership between the University of Illinois College of Law 
and the American Bar Foundation. The Center focuses on international human and legal rights issues, 
notably justice and security, the international economy and marketplace, and health. The Center aims 
explicitly to help international legal agencies, such as the UN Commission on International Trade Law, the 
Hague Courts, and the International Monetary Fund, to advance the research and scholarly frames available 
to global leaders, to enable national legal professions to catch a vision of the contributions they can make to 
advance participatory democracy and to help global and local leaders better understand the constraints, 
ideologies, and difficulties of advancing global agendas in a world of nation-states.  
http://www.lexglobal.org/?q=node/1&tid=1 
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state can deliberately ignore. Thus, from the perspective of a cosmopolitan human rights 
regime, we, as human beings, are part of a global community of nations, rather than part 
of a mere system of states. In such a community, human rights protect individuals as 
persons and not as citizens of particular states.  
The importance of a cosmopolitan human rights regime is more and more felt in 
our world today. The complexity of the world today, accentuated by an increasing 
interdependence of nations, the revolution of modernity, technological advancements, 
and the uncontrollable acceleration and proliferation of social media, has transformed the 
world into a planetary village. Everyone is, in one way or another, affected by events that 
occur in different geographical locations. No country is safe as long as there are conflicts 
or privation in other parts of the world. As Habermas notes, “nation-states can no longer 
secure the boundaries of their own territories, the vital necessities of their populations, 
and the material preconditions for the reproduction of their society by their own 
efforts.”608 For Habermas, notes Ciaran Cronin, “nation-states are becoming integrated at 
a variety of levels – economic, political, cultural, and environmental – into an 
increasingly interdependent world society.”609  
The truth of the above statement can be demonstrated by looking at what is 
happening in the world today. Armed conflicts, political oppression, instability, and 
poverty in Africa, Asia, and Latin America affect the immigration policy of the United 
States of America and Europe. War in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan increases the number 
of refugees seeking asylum in Europe. Each year Italy is confronted with the issue of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
608 DW, 176.  
609 Ciaran Cronin, “Cosmopolitan Democracy,” in Barbara Fultner, ed., Jürgen Habermas: Key Concepts 
(Durham: Acumen Publishing Limited, 2011), 198.  
	   256	  
borders security and migrants coming from North Africa and entering illegally into its 
territory in search for better living conditions. Brutal attacks by the Islamic State of Iraq 
and Syria (ISIS) and by the extremist Muslim group, Boko Haram in Africa threaten the 
security of the whole world.  
The eradication of the irrational violence promoted by these groups requires a 
global response. No country can ignore these problems under the pretext of not being 
directly affected. Thus, addressing these issues so as to promote international order and 
respect for human rights requires a combined effort and shared responsibility. As H.S. 
Reiss rightly observes, “right cannot possibly prevail among men within a state if their 
freedom is threatened by the action of other states. The law can prevail only if the rule of 
law prevails in all states and in international relations. Only then are all individuals free; 
only then does right prevail everywhere.”610  
In this chapter, I will first present Habermas’s model of cosmopolitan democracy. 
Habermas proposes a global governance without world government – a supranational 
power – that would equip the international community with the executive and sanctioning 
power required to implement and enforce its decisions and rules so as to promote 
international order and respect for human rights. Second, I will discuss the complexity of 
humanitarian intervention, which is used as a means of protecting human rights and 
which sometimes requires intervening in another sovereign country. Such complexity 
brings to light the dilemma of relating the idea of a responsibility to protect human rights 
to the longstanding norms of non-intervention and state sovereignty. Third, I will 
consider the shift from the language of humanitarian intervention to the language of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
610 H.S. Reiss, ed., Kant: Political Writings (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 33.  
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responsibility to protect. Here I will highlight the most significant arguments in favor of 
implementing the doctrine of a “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) and the most telling 
objections to the promotion of such a doctrine. Fourth, I will advocate solidarity and the 
politics of compassion as an effective way of establishing a cosmopolitan human rights 
regime.   
5.1.	  Habermas’s	  Model	  of	  Cosmopolitan	  Democracy	  	  	  
Habermas conceives of a cosmopolitan democracy as a response to globalization, 
which is affecting the internal dynamic of sovereign states. In contrast to state-centered 
system of international law, which recognizes only “one type of player – the nation-states 
– and two playing fields – domestic and foreign policy or internal affairs and 
international relations,”611 Habermas proposes a new structure of world society with three 
kinds of collective actors and three levels of organization in order to protect and promote 
human rights and international order: supranational level, transnational level, and national 
level.  
5.1.1.	  The	  Supranational	  Level	  	  	  
The supranational level is conceived as a world organization that will obligate 
nation-states “to coexist peacefully and authorize them – i.e. confers on them the 
sovereignty – to guarantee the basic rights of their citizens within their territories.”612 
This world organization will oversee the performance of the functions conferred on 
nation-states and, if necessary, will take measures against individual governments that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
611 BNR, 322.  
612 Habermas, “The Constitutionalization of International Law and the Legitimation Problems of a 
Constitution for World Society,” in Constellations, vol. 15, no. 4 (2008): 445.  
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violate the rules. The main purpose of the world organization (supranational level) will 
consist in establishing legal structures capable of maintaining international order and 
promoting respect for human rights, without subordinating the sovereignty of nation-
states to a world government. In such a world society or global governance, sovereignty 
of states will be understood as responsibility and not as mere protection of the nation’s 
borders and its territorial integrity. As Ciaran Cronin notes, “although the world would 
remain a world of sovereign nation-states, sovereignty would take on a new meaning in 
both its internal aspects (recognition by the community of states) and its external aspects 
(control over the legitimate means of violence and popular sovereignty).”613 The role of 
the state will not be limited to the defense of national interests, but will be extended to 
participation in the implementation of human rights worldwide.  
For Habermas, this supranational level of the world society will be represented by 
a world organization, which first of all will be specialized in the fundamental functions of 
securing peace and protecting human rights in virtue of its authority to intervene and 
regulate relationships between states, and, second, will represent the unity of the global 
legal system in virtue of its capacity to embody the international community of states and 
citizens as a whole.614 Because of these competences of the supranational level, the world 
governance will equally be responsible for establishing a framework within which the 
system of negotiation would operate. As it can be noticed from the attributions (or 
competences) of the supranational level, the world organization would be “dominated by 
a single actor that has the ability to act in carefully circumscribed policy fields without 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
613 Ciaran Cronin, “Cosmopolitan Democracy,” 210.  
614 See Habermas, “The Constitutionalization of International Law and the Legitimation Problems of a 
Constitution for a World Society,” 449.  
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itself taking on the character of a state.”615 In Habermas’s view, the responsibility for 
global human rights and peacekeeping that the supranational level will guarantee requires 
the constitutionalization of international law, which involves the reform of the existing 
UN institutions. Such reform, notes Habermas, “must focus not only on strengthening 
core institutions but also on detaching them from the extensive web of special UN 
organizations, in particular those networked with independent international 
organizations.”616  
5.1.2.	  The	  Reform	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  	  	  
The current configuration of our world and its complexity require a reorganization 
of the United Nations. Habermas conceives such reorganization in the following way:  
The United Nations should be reorganized as a politically constituted community 
of states and citizens and at the same time should be restricted to the core tasks of 
peacekeeping and of the global implementation of human rights. It should acquire 
the necessary institutional means to fulfill these two tasks effectively and even-
handedly through a corresponding reform of the Security Council and of the 
Courts.617  
 
Given the importance of acquiring the necessary institutional means for an effective 
peacekeeping and implementation of human rights, Habermas proposes to expand the UN 
into a cosmopolitan democracy. The reform proposal will focus on three main points: 
“the establishment of a world parliament, the construction of a global judicial system, and 
the long overdue reorganization of the Security Council.”618 As regards the establishment 
of a world parliament – the legislative branch of the world organization – Habermas 
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616 Ibid.  
617 Habermas, The Crisis of the European Union: A Response (Malden: Polity Press, 2012), 57.  
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contends that it will consist of representatives directly elected by world citizens, 
representatives of national governments, and nongovernmental organizations as 
representatives of oppressed populations in case a country refuses to permit deputies to 
be elected by democratic procedures. This world parliament will “ensure that the 
competing justice perspectives of world citizens, on the one hand, and of national 
citizens, on the other, would be taken into account and brought into balance.”619  
The reformed General Assembly (the world parliament) will be the legislative 
branch and its main mission will consist in the administration of peace and human rights 
policy “in accordance with a constitution based on the UN Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the UN Charter.”620 It will be the body responsible for the legal 
interpretation and development of the UN Charter. In addition to developing further the 
Charter, human rights agreements, and international law, the reformed General Assembly 
would have the task of defining minimum standards which “form the statutory basis for 
the human rights policy and peacekeeping of the Security Council and of the global 
administration of justice, bind the nation states in concretizing the civil rights to be 
accorded their citizens, and impose normative constraints on the robust competition for 
power at the transnational level when it comes to global domestic political decisions.”621  
As regards a global judicial system, Habermas advocates the expansion of the 
competences of the International Court of Justice whose jurisdiction is so far restricted to 
relations between states. As a result, it must restrict itself to arbitration functions without 
making any binding judgments. The function of the reformed International Court of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
619 Habermas, The Crisis of the European Union, 59.  
620 Cronin, “Cosmopolitan Democracy,” 207.  
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Justice will include the arbitration of conflicts between individual persons and between 
individual citizens and their governments, and making binding judgments. The reform of 
the judicial branch of the world society will also focus on the International Criminal 
Court. Both the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court will 
serve as the court of final appeal in cases involving massive violations of human rights.  
With regard to the reorganization of the Security Council, Habermas proposes the 
abolition of the requirement of unanimity between the permanent members in favor of an 
appropriate form of qualified majority rule. The reformed Security Council will be the 
executive branch of the world organization, responsible for implementing policies and 
authorizing military operations in order to protect human rights. For Habermas, the world 
organization will function in an effective way if the United Nations concentrates on the 
global enforcement of human rights and the prohibition of violence. He conceives a 
subdivision of the world organization that will enable it to achieve its fundamental 
ordering functions, such as “the defense of international peace in the sense of a global, 
even-handed and effective enforcement of the prohibition of violence; taking constructive 
measures to protect internal order within failing states; monitoring the domestic 
enforcement of human rights throughout the world, as well as actively protecting 
populations against criminal governments.”622 Such operations will be conducted in 
coordination with the transnational level of the world society.  
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5.1.3.	  The	  Transnational	  Level	  	  	  
The transnational level of the world society will consist in coordinating 
negotiations between regional organizations. For Habermas, a better understanding of the 
competences of this level requires a distinction between the supranational level and the 
transnational level within the political system of the world society. While the 
supranational level, as described above, is specialized in securing peace and 
implementing human rights worldwide, the transnational level deals with negotiation 
systems at the regional level. Issues to be dealt with at the transnational level will 
include, among other things, extreme disparities in wealth, intercultural discourse, and 
collective threats. Habermas expresses this distinction in the following way:  
In a multilevel global system, the classical function of the state as the guarantor of 
security, law, and freedom would be transferred to a supranational world 
organization specialized in securing peace and implementing human rights 
worldwide. However, the world organization would not have to shoulder the 
immense burden of a global domestic policy designed to overcome the extreme 
disparities in wealth within the stratified world society, reverse ecological 
imbalances, and avert collective threats, on the one hand, while endeavoring to 
promote an intercultural discourse on, and recognition of, the equal rights of the 
major world civilizations, on the other. These problems […] call for a different 
kind of treatment within the context of transnational negotiation systems. They 
cannot be solved directly by bringing power and law to bear against unwilling or 
incapable nation-states. They impinge upon the intrinsic logic of functional 
systems that extend across national borders and the inherent meaning of cultures 
and world religions. Politics must engage with these issues in a spirit of 
hermeneutic open-mindedness through the prudent balancing of interests and 
intelligent regulation.623  
 
While the world organization would have a hierarchical structure and its members 
would make binding laws, interactions at the transnational level would be 
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heterarchical.624 As regards the negotiation system (transnational level), Habermas notes 
that it would exercise “competences of a general kind; however, it would combine the 
flexibility of state governments, which are able to keep an eye on the whole, with the 
non-hierarchical constitution of multilateral organization of members with equal 
rights.”625 The workability of transnational institutions depends on regional regimes that 
are both representative and capable of implementing decisions and policies.  
5.1.4.	  The	  National	  Level	  	  	  
The lowest level of the political system of the world society is the national level. 
This level consists of the states that are currently members of the United Nations. Their 
constitutions should conform to transnational principles of the world organization. For 
Habermas, “nation-states represent the most important source of democratic legitimation 
for a legally constituted world society.”626 They are subjects of a global legal order. They 
will learn to “see themselves not only as defending their national interests but also agents 
of the international community in the worldwide implementation of human rights.” This 
new understanding of the status of the nation-state has led to the structural transformation 
of its traditional functions.  
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Habermas identifies four such functions: (i) an administrative state supported 
through taxation, (ii) a sovereign territorial state that maintains law and order internally, 
claims the monopoly of legitimate means of violence, and protects its borders against 
external threats, (iii) a national state that depends on collective and shared identity and on 
the development of national consciousness as the basis for social solidarity, and (iv) a 
constitutional and welfare state that secures conditions for equal opportunities in the 
enjoyment of basic rights.627 These functions are transformed in the way the state 
conceives its sovereignty and its identity as state within an interdependent world society. 
One of the visible areas of such transformation is the ability of the state to guarantee its 
citizens the fair value of their civil rights. This ability is challenged by economic 
globalization. As Cronin nicely puts it, “by eroding the ability of the nation-state to 
guarantee its citizens the ‘fair value’ of their civil rights, economic globalization raises 
the question of whether a genuinely political response is possible at all.”628  
Having described the role of the three levels of the world society, Habermas 
specifies that the world organization (the supranational level) will not assume the 
character of a state. This claim raises the problem of legitimation of the world society, 
given that only nation-states represent the most important source of legitimation. Besides, 
as Habermas himself acknowledges, it is only within the nation-state that the three 
building blocks that are constitutive for every democratic system can congruently overlap 
in social space: the people as the bearer of political will-formation, the state as that 
organization that enables the citizens to act collectively, and the legally constituted 
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community of citizens as voluntary association of free and equal individuals. 629 
Habermas addresses this question of legitimacy of the world society by listing conditions 
under which such a world society could be democratically legitimated without assuming 
the character of a state. He first addresses the issue of legitimation at the supranational 
level. He identifies a twofold need for legitimation: “on the one hand, the negotiations 
and resolutions of the General Assembly must be legitimized, on the other, the 
legislative, executive, and adjudicative practice of the other organs (security council, 
Secretariat, courts) must be legitimized.”630  
For Habermas, though there is a qualitative difference in the need for legitimation 
in the two cases, such a need can be satisfied in both cases only if a functional global 
public sphere emerges.631 The emergence of such a global public sphere implies “vigilant 
civil society actors who are sensitive to relevant issues [and who] would have to generate 
worldwide transparency for corresponding issues and decisions and provide the 
opportunity for cosmopolitan citizens to develop informed opinions and take stances on 
these issues. These stances could produce effects through the elections to the General 
Assembly.”632 The problem with a global sphere is its limited capacity to exercise control 
over the decisions of the world organization. Habermas acknowledges that “diffuse world 
public opinion armed solely with the weak sanctioning of naming and shaming could at 
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best exert a weak form of control over the interpretative, executive, and judicial decisions 
of the world organization.”633  
Second, Habermas addresses the issue of legitimation at the transnational level. 
Legitimation at this level is of a different kind. Given that the transnational level of the 
world society deals with negotiation systems at the regional level,  
The democratic legitimacy of the compromises negotiated here would rest on two 
pillars. As in the case of international treaties, it would depend, on the one hand 
on the legitimacy of the negotiating partners […] On the other hand, the national 
public sphere would have to become responsive to one another to such an extent 
that transparency would be created for transnational policies within regional 
regimes and major powers.634  
 
Though Habermas attempts to address the issue of the legitimation of the global 
governance without a world government by positing the emergence of a functional global 
public sphere, his proposed model of a cosmopolitan democracy is still confronted with 
the problem of the effective implementation of the international law. The reformed 
Security Council, for example, which would be responsible for implementing policies 
and authorizing the use of force, in some cases, in order to protect human rights, will still 
rely on military capacities of member states. This reliance on national governments has 
led and will inevitably continue to lead both to the imposition of the will of superpowers 
with regard to the way peace operations should be conducted and to distrust from parties 
that will be left out of the process of decision-making. This democratic deficit will 
accentuate the legitimacy crisis of the supranational level of the world society. As Cronin 
rightly observes,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
633 Habermas, “The Constitutionalization of International Law and the Legitimation Problems of a 
Constitution for World Society,” 451.  
634 Ibid., 452.  
	   267	  
From the perspective of the members states which would be expected to ‘lend’ 
out their armies, decisions over when and where troops should be deployed and 
over who should bear the human and financial costs, are among the most 
controversial and divisive in contemporary democracies; thus it is not realistic to 
expect that governments, and especially those of the major powers such as the US 
or China, would voluntarily transfer command over their forces to a supranational 
organization.635  
 
From what precedes, it clearly appears that a global governance without a world 
government will probably fail to reach any binding decision and will raise the problem of 
asymmetry that might deepen mistrust among countries, especially those that are affected 
by decisions with which they disagree. This observation seems to be in tune with the 
reluctance, from a realist perspective, to the idea of a political power through law outside 
the confines of a sovereign state. That is why theorists like Cristina Lafont and other 
more ambitious positions challenge Habermas’s architecture of the supranational 
structure that consists in having global governance without a world government. For 
them, “only a world government in a more substantive sense than [Habermas] is willing 
to allow is either normatively required or empirically inevitable in response to 
globalization.”636  
It is important here to note that a possible failure by the global governance 
without a world government to reach any binding decision does not discharge 
governments of the world from their shared responsibility to protect and promote human 
rights around the world. The problem of asymmetry raised by the process of protecting 
human rights worldwide (sometimes referred to as humanitarian intervention) is more 
intensely felt when such protection requires the impingement of the state sovereignty. 	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Here surfaces the problem of relating the responsibility to protect human rights to the 
longstanding norms of non-intervention and sovereignty. In the following section, I will 
discuss the complexity of this problem.  
5.2.	  The	  Complexity	  of	  Humanitarian	  Intervention	  	  	  
The unanimous endorsement of the “Responsibility to Protect (R2P)” doctrine by 
the UN General Assembly in 2005 could be interpreted as an expression of the 
International Community’s commitment to protect human rights worldwide. Such a 
commitment, in a certain way, effectively established a cosmopolitan human rights 
regime. However, the establishment of such a regime raises the question of compatibility 
between the function of international human rights and state sovereignty. The tension 
between the obligation to intervene in order to protect human rights, on the one hand, and 
respect for state sovereignty, on the other, already appears in the UN Charter. While 
article 1.4 of the Charter urges all members of the United Nations to “refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state,” chapter VII of the same Charter allows the use of 
force and military intervention in order to maintain peace and security in the world.  
The question that this tension raises is: how do we harmonize the protection of 
human rights and state sovereignty? Can such a harmonization lead to narrowing down 
the list of human rights? In other words, would the intervention in order to protect human 
rights in another country be limited to grave violations of human rights such as genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing? If so, then the violation of 
other rights, such as the right to education and decent living conditions would become 
less compelling and human rights would no longer fulfill other functions, such as 
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promoting human flourishing. In that sense, as Cristina Lafont observes, “[human rights] 
would become useless as standards for criticism and political struggles against all other 
forms of rights violations that do not involve mass killings: from abuses of power to 
discrimination, to a lack of political representation, freedom of speech, access to essential 
medicines, and so on.”637  
The question of compatibility between the protection of human rights and state 
sovereignty was largely discussed after NATO’s action in Kosovo in 1999. Since that 
intervention, humanitarian intervention in order to protect human rights has become a 
new justification for military action in another state without the agreement of that state. 
The distinctive character of such an intervention is the use of force in another territory by 
foreign armies. As Diana Amnéus describes it, “humanitarian intervention is the use of 
force across state borders by an international governmental organization, a group of 
states, or a single state aimed at preventing or ending widespread and systematic 
violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals […] without the full and valid 
consent of the state within whose territory force is applied.”638  
This understanding of humanitarian intervention raises a series of significant 
questions: how can we protect people against violence that threatens their lives within 
their states without impinging on state sovereignty? Is sovereignty an absolute value? 
How can we prevent the noble intention to bring about aid from becoming perverted by 
strategic and political calculations? How do we reconcile the implementation of 
international laws with interests of individual states? Here is the complexity whose terms 	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will be discussed in the following pages. Since the issue at stake puts us at the core of 
international relations, the solution to the enigma should take into account the will of 
states. However, the will of states remains ineffective if it does not integrate political 
solidarity. To paraphrase Habermas, the lack of political solidarity beyond national 
borders is the major stumbling block on the road to the realization of effective human 
rights protection. As he notes, many political elites avoid issues requiring political 
solidarity.639 That is why I will advocate solidarity and “politics of compassion” as 
significant contributions to the solution of the complexity of humanitarian intervention. I 
will first discuss the notion of state sovereignty and then the ambition of humanitarian 
intervention.  
5.2.1.	  State	  Sovereignty	  	  	  
Over the last half-century, consciousness of human rights has developed and has 
led to their materialization. The war tribunals of Nuremberg640 and of Tokyo,641 the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the international cooperation of nations’ penal 
laws, and the creation of an International Criminal Court for ex-Yugoslavia in 1993, for 
Rwanda in 1994, and for Sierra Leone in 2001, are all expressions not only of a deep 
commitment of our shared responsibility to protect and promote human rights, but also of 
the desire to internationalize them and to treat them with respect. As Habermas expresses 
it, “since the founding of the United Nations, there is an increase in the number of 
international courts, the strengthening of international criminal law, and above all, the 	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rapid proliferation of international organizations in almost every possible policy field.”642 
This process of internationalization of human rights reached its climax with the creation 
of the International Criminal Court (ICC) as the result of the Treaty of Rome, signed on 
July 17, 1998.643  
The consciousness of human rights and the desire to treat them with respect raise 
a very important question: if the protection of human rights is a common and shared 
responsibility, can people be protected from the abuses of their governments, despite the 
principle of nonintervention or the principle of state sovereignty? The commitment to 
address this issue led to the concept of “humanitarian intervention” or “humanitarian 
interference.”644 The first authors of international law talked about the possibility of such 
an intervention. Grotius, for example, mentioned it in his book, Right of War and Peace, 
and Vattel wrote, “Any foreign power has the right to assist an oppressed people who ask 
for assistance.”645  
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The eagerness to intervene in order to protect human rights is often opposed by 
the principle of state sovereignty, which is the attribute that constitutes the essence of the 
state. As J. Bryan Hehir observes, “The principles of the sovereignty of states and, 
therefore, of nonintervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state stand against the 
right or the duty to intervene on behalf of human rights. These two principles – 
sovereignty and nonintervention – have imposed some semblance of order upon an 
international system with no central government.”646 As a result, the doctrine of state 
sovereignty renders regional or international institutions less effective in addressing 
violations of human rights. In the UN Charter the principle of nonintervention in the 
internal affairs of other states is the corollary of sovereignty. 647  Moreover, state 
sovereignty appears as the soul of a people and the warrant of its relations with other 
states. As the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS) puts it, “sovereignty is more than just a functional principle of 
international relations. For many states and peoples, it is also a recognition of their equal 
worth and dignity, a protection of their unique identities and their national freedom, and 
an affirmation of their right to shape and determine their own destiny.”648  
The complexity of the relationship between the protection of human rights and the 
principle of state sovereignty was clearly raised by the former Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, Kofi Annan: “If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable 
assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross 	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and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common 
humanity?”649 Should sovereignty be a justification for nonintervention and violations of 
human rights? What is the reason for sovereignty?  
5.2.1.1.	  Reason	  for	  Sovereignty	  	  	  
Despite their different characteristics, the common denominator between states is 
their status as states. That is why “sovereign states are regarded as equal, regardless of 
comparative size or wealth.”650 The maxim, “The coalman is master in his house,” 
expresses the reality according to which even the poorest state is sovereign in its 
constitution. This maxim finds echo in Christian Wolff’s nonintervention rule: “Since by 
nature no nation has a right to any act which pertains to the exercise of the sovereignty of 
another nation […] no ruler of a state has the right to interfere in the government of 
another, consequently cannot establish anything in this state or do anything, and the 
government of the ruler of one state is not subject to the decision of the ruler of any other 
state.”651   
In the light of the above rule we can highlight some characteristics of a state. A 
state is composed of a territory, a population, and a government. It has two main 
attributes. The first one is the juridical personality, which is the capacity to be a subject of 
law. Juridical personality allows the state to act at the international level, as well as at the 
national level. Juridical personality rests on international recognition. In virtue of this 
attribute, the state possesses the right of legation, which is the right that a state has, 	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because of its international recognition, to send a diplomatic mission to a foreign state. 
The right of legation also covers the right to receive diplomatic missions from other 
states.  
In addition to its juridical personality, the state has sovereignty, which 
distinguishes it from any other international organization. Sovereignty is the original and 
supreme power that exclusively belongs to the state. This exclusiveness is referred to as 
the “reason for sovereignty.” Differently put, the “reason for sovereignty” is the way 
sovereignty is extended within the space of deployment. This extension implies both the 
protection of borders against external threats and maintenance of law and order 
internally. As Habermas expresses it, “the status of state sovereignty is assured by the 
factually established autonomy of state power, and measured by the state’s capacity to 
protect its borders against external threats and to maintain law and order internally.”652 
Maintenance of law and order is achieved by means of administrative power and positive 
law.  
Historically, attention has been focused on the supreme power aspect of 
sovereignty. In an article entitled, “Y a-t-il une crise de la souveraineté?” (Is there a crisis 
of sovereignty?), Simone Goyard-Fabre attempted to highlight the emergence of the idea 
of sovereignty in France. From the independence acquired by the King of France from 
the papacy and the Germanic Roman Empire, emerged the jus plenum or the jus 
potestatis of the King. In virtue of this prerogative, the king exercised legislative power 
and regalia, which consisted in regulating justice, issuing currency, levying taxes, and 
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distributing the monopolies.653 These powers of the king are now called the sovereign 
missions of the state, and are under the jurisdiction of ministerial departments in charge 
of justice, foreign affairs, and economy. The common element among these attributes is 
the law that regulates their different activities.   
Thus, the law is a prominent manifestation of sovereignty. Whether it is 
interpreted broadly as any binding act of political power and its administrative apparatus, 
or in the strict sense as regular deliberation of national representation, the law 
presupposes the effectiveness of a central government, the existence of a recipient 
population, and a territory to which it is applied (including foreigners residing in that 
territory). Sovereignty, absolute and perpetual, Goyard-Fabre argues, is the power to 
make and to give laws to all. That is why thinkers like Charles Loyseau consider 
sovereignty to be the very essence of the state. The state and sovereignty, taken in 
concert, are synonymous.654  
This approach to sovereignty seems to have some limitations because it fails to 
take into account the psychological and affective aspects of sovereignty, which are very 
important in addressing the dilemma of humanitarian inference. A citizen is close to his 
or her state, as to his or her self. The International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS) has highlighted this closeness in the following way:  
In a dangerous world marked by overwhelming inequalities of power and 
resources, sovereignty is for many states their best – and sometimes seemingly 
their only – line of defense. But sovereignty is more than just a functional 
principle of international relations. For many states and peoples, it is also a 
recognition of their equal worth and dignity, a protection of their unique identities 
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and their national freedom, and an affirmation of their right to shape and 
determine their own destiny.655  
 
From what has been said thus far, it can be argued that the state is for its citizens 
more than a mere legal and political entity. It is their nation, in the way Thompson 
defines it: “properly speaking, nation refers to a group of people who believe they share a 
common ancestry, or to the largest human grouping predicated on a myth of common 
ancestry…. Nationalism, then, is the love and loyalty one feels for one’s nation or 
people.”656 This feeling of belonging to and sharing a common ancestry influences, in 
most cases, the way people interact with one another. The choice of people with whom 
they want to build community is generally based on the feeling of having common 
history and shared memories. Thus, when the state is confronted with external threats, 
internal differences are put aside, and the sense of national community is strengthened. 
The nation is then perceived both as a historical community of language, customs, 
religion, and as a “community of dreams,” to use Ernest Renan’s expression. Habermas 
makes a similar point, but in a different way. He writes:  
Many loyalties overlap in the political life of a citizen, loyalties to which 
individuals attach quite different weights. Among them are politically relevant 
ties with one’s region of origin, with the state or province of one’s domicile, with 
country or nation, etc. Only in cases of conflict do the weights attached to these 
loyalties acquire relevance because they have to be balanced against each other. A 
measure of the strength of an identification with one social unit rather than 
another is the willingness to make sacrifices based on longer-term relations of 
reciprocity.657  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
655 “The Responsibility to Protect,” §1.32. This is, more or less, what Pope John XXIII said in Pacem in 
terris no 138: “Even though nations may differ widely in material progress and military strength, they are 
very sensitive as regards their juridical equality and the excellence of their own way of life. They are right, 
therefore, in their reluctance to submit to an authority imposed by force, established without their co-
operation, or not accepted of their own accord.”  
656 J. Milburn Thompson, Justice and peace: A Christian Primer, 116.   
657 Habermas, The Crisis of the European Union, 47.  
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The world in its present configuration is precisely a world of states: one is either a 
stranger or a citizen. One is either in a home state or in a foreign land. Thus, through 
nationality, sovereignty has a particular emotional impact. The gap between law and fact 
appears here. In law, nationality, as it expresses the membership of a person to the 
population of a state, is a formal institution, a mere criterion of state competence in 
managing rights defined by the legislature. It has no a priori or absolute signification. 
However, nationality always has an emotional dimension, and since the whole of life is 
not strictly regulated by civil law, it would not be expedient to exclude sentiments. They 
are constitutive of the state sovereignty.  
Having highlighted the affective/emotional dimension of sovereignty, I would like 
to note that the establishment of an international order is the result of a meticulous 
respect for the sovereignty of each state. That is why the UN Charter supports equal 
rights of nations, large and small, and poses non-interference in the internal affairs of a 
State and prohibition of the use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the 
United Nations.658 The sovereignty of each state determines the current configuration of 
the international society: there is no executive or world parliament, nor universal judge. 
There is no super state. Today, however, absolute sovereignty seems to be challenged by 
the nature of international relations. It becomes imperative to move from the reason for 
sovereignty to the sovereignty of reason.  
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5.2.1.2.	  Sovereignty	  of	  Reason	  	  	  
 Sovereignty of reason refers to the rationalization of sovereignty. It means that 
sovereignty has been reduced to reasonable proportions. Whereas from the perspective of 
a traditional conception of sovereignty “each sovereign state pursues its national interests 
on the international stage of competing co-players without having its scope for action 
normatively restricted in any way by deference to the international community as a 
whole,”659 from the perspective of sovereignty of reason state sovereignty is conceived as 
responsibility. The implication of the shift from reason for sovereignty to sovereignty of 
reason is that “internal state sovereignty is no longer restricted to simply maintaining law 
and order but also includes the effective protection of the civil rights of citizens. 
[Likewise], external sovereignty today calls for the ability to cooperate with partners as 
much as the capacity to defend oneself against external enemies.”660  
The rationalization of sovereignty has been motivated by the requirement of 
international cooperation among states. In this sense, we can say that sovereignty of 
reason is not just a provisional state of affairs. It presupposes some agreement on values 
so as to live together in a peaceful way. Such an understanding has some practical 
implications. First, the viability of the concept of sovereignty implies that the supremacy 
of a state leaves safe that of other states according to the maxim: “my freedom ends 
where that of others begins.” This can be illustrated by non-intervention in the internal 
affairs of other states and the prohibition to use force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state. Second, mutual interests of states require at least 
partial abandonment of sovereignty, for if all states are absolutely and unconditionally 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
659 Habermas, “Plea for the Constitutionalization of International Law,” 7.  
660 BNR, 320.  
	   279	  
masters of what they are and what they have, international life would be impossible. This 
is seen, for example, when a state ratifies a treaty like the UN Charter. By ratifying a 
treaty, a state freely binds itself and agrees to comply with the requirements of the 
content of the ratified treaty. With regard to the act of freely “self-binding,” Kenneth R. 
Himes observes that “the sovereignty of the state is a real, but relative, value. State 
sovereignty is conditioned from below by human rights and from above by the 
international common good. Thus, when states grievously abuse the human rights of their 
citizens, they cannot use sovereignty to silence the concern of others.”661   
 One of the vibrant expressions of partial abandonment of sovereignty is reflected 
in communal law. States of the community transfer to communal bodies some of their 
hitherto reserved domains; this can be the monetary policy, as in the case of all countries 
in the Euro zone. A similar pattern, although less developed, is found in the Economic 
and Monetary Union of West Africa (UEMOA). Within the Commission, a commissioner 
is responsible for multilateral surveillance to ensure that all countries can follow the 
convergence criteria. The idea of partial abandonment is found in the constitutions of 
many countries. Article 217 of the Constitution of February 18, 2006 of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, for example, states, “the Democratic Republic of Congo may 
conclude treaties or association or community agreements with a partial abandonment of 
sovereignty in order to promote African unity.”  
Opponents of the idea of partial abandonment of sovereignty might object that 
such abandonment can lead to the disenfranchisement of democratic citizens, whose 
sovereignty as people “is expressed in a democratically generalizing from of lawmaking 	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Powers et al., pp. 218-20, cited by J. Milburn Thompsom, Justice and peace: A Christian Primer, 139.  
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which guarantees all citizens equal liberties.” 662  The answer to this objection is: 
“restricting national sovereignty by transferring sovereign rights to supranational 
authorities by no means necessarily comes at the cost of disenfranchising democratic 
citizens. Such a transfer, if it only leaves the democratic procedure intact, carries forward 
precisely the kind of constitutionalization of political authority to which citizens within 
the nation state already owe their liberties,”663 In connection to the transfer of sovereign 
rights, Habermas contends that such a transfer “does not diminish the scope of civic 
autonomy only on the condition that the citizens of the one affected state cooperate with 
the citizens of the other affected states in making supranational law in accordance with a 
democratic procedure.”664 He notes that with this strong condition, he excludes all 
compromise proposals that reduce the legitimatory requirements on supranational 
decision-making processes. For him, democratic legitimation cannot be replaced by one 
of its moments (such as responsibility, deliberative justification, transparency or the rule 
of law).665  
In addition to partial abandonment of states’ sovereignty, the rationalization of 
sovereignty has led citizens of states to understand themselves as both members of their 
nation-states and members of the world society. It has led to what Habermas calls shared 
sovereignty or divided sovereignty, which “provides a standard for the legitimation 
requirements of a political commonwealth beyond the nation state.” 666  As David 
Rasmussen nicely puts it, “this new understanding of divided sovereignty can be 
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663 Ibid., 18-19.  
664 Ibid., 19.  
665 Ibid., footnote 27.  
666 Ibid., 42.  
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conceptualized as an essential stage on the way to building a cosmopolitan order in which 
citizens can conceive of themselves with a double identity as both citizens of a nation 
state and citizens of the world.”667  
Along the same lines as that of rationalization of sovereignty, the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) proposes to move from 
sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility. Three points justify this move. 
First, the notion of sovereignty as responsibility, which is more and more visible in the 
actions of states, means that state authorities are responsible for protecting the safety and 
lives of citizens and promoting their well-being.668 Second, this shift suggests that 
national political authorities are responsible not only internally for their citizens, but also, 
through the United Nations, for the international community. Finally, sovereignty as 
responsibility means that state employees are responsible for their actions, as they are 
accountable for what they do or do not do. Legal armed reprisals reveal that sovereignty 
is not absolute. There are, in the UN Charter, two major exceptions to the prohibition of 
the use of force: self-defense and the prerogatives of the Security Council for “the 
maintenance of peace and collective security” under Chapter VII of the Charter. Article 
51 of the Charter explicitly recognizes “the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations.”  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
667 David Rasmussen, “Legitimacy, Sovereignty, Solidarity and Cosmopolitan: On the Recent Work of 
Jürgen Habermas,” in Philosophy and Social Criticism, vol. 40, no. 1 (January 2014): 14.  
668 Here the Commission is referring to the concept of “human security,” which it defines as follows: 
“Human security means the security of people – their physical safety, their economic and social well-being, 
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The possible action of the Security Council to maintain peace and international 
security is closer to a form of classic intervention rather than to humanitarian assistance. 
Article 42 of the UN Charter provides that the Security Council “may take action by air, 
sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.” This form of action has been taken for humanitarian intervention. Therefore, 
when, for example, under the United Nations mandate, the United States intervened in 
Haiti to restore Aristide’s regime, authors in favor of humanitarian intervention 
welcomed this permission as a precedent that founded the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention.669 Similarly, when the Security Council under chapter VII of the Charter 
insisted in its Resolution 688 of May 5, 1991 that Iraq should allow immediate access by 
international humanitarian organizations to all those who needed assistance in all parts of 
Iraq, and put at their disposal all the means necessary for their action, many people 
interpreted it as a legal recognition of the right of humanitarian intervention.  
From what has been said thus far, it can be argued that by the idea of a right or a 
duty of humanitarian intervention, we imply that the urgency of responding to massive 
violations of human rights is such that the power to restore human rights must engage 
without delay and without due process, since it has the right or even the duty to do so. In 
the same line of thought, Michael Walzer argues that the door must remain open for any 
nation that feels able to intervene, in order to restore the rights violated, for “the law does 
not disappear in such cases otherwise we would not say it has been violated,” or, “if we 	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have rights, then we are entitled to the effectiveness of our rights.” “How,” continues 
Walzer, “can the right to life exist in a world where nobody supports it, where no actor in 
the international community feels the obligation to cross political boundaries so as to stop 
the crimes of masses?”670  
Having discussed the reason for sovereignty and sovereignty of reason, I would 
like, in the following section, to highlight ambitions and ambiguities of the concept of 
“humanitarian intervention” as it is today. Its legitimacy – if it is legitimate – will be 
conditioned by the effort of states, the main actors in the international arena, to objectify 
it and to contain it within the boundaries of positive rules.   
5.2.2.	  Ambitions	  of	  Humanitarian	  Intervention	  	  	  
Given diverse threats to sovereignty, it is important to clarify the rationale behind 
the concept of humanitarian intervention in order to distinguish it from related concepts. 
In its report on “The Responsibility to Protect,” the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty clarifies the nature of the intervention it is referring to 
in order to protect human rights:  
The kind of intervention with which we are concerned in this report is action 
taken against a state or its leaders, without its or their consent, for purposes which 
are claimed to be humanitarian or protective. By far the most controversial form 
of such intervention is military…671  
 
If the question of humanitarian intervention remains highly debated it is because 
of the concern about its legality in the present state of international law and because of its 
frequent recourse to justify, afterward, the violation of the prohibition of the use of force. 	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As Diane Amenéus rightly observes, “A General Assembly resolution is not a legally 
binding instrument in international law.”672 Thus, it is important, in dealing with the issue 
of humanitarian intervention, to distinguish it from humanitarian assistance. In its ruling 
on the military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua, the International 
Court of Justice stated: “assistance must be limited to the purposes embodied in the 
practice of the Red Cross, namely to prevent and alleviate suffering and protect life and 
health and ensure respect for the human person; it must also, and above all, be given 
without discrimination to all persons in need in Nicaragua.”673  
The considerable difference between the two types of intervention has prompted 
humanitarian agencies to express to the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty their indignation against any militarization of the word “humanitarian.” 
For example, organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC), Oxfam, and Médecins Sans Frontières have been arguing in favor of a clear 
separation between military interventions and humanitarian assistance. For them, military 
force is incompatible with the promotion of humanitarian assistance. Thus, in order to 
avoid any ambiguity, the ICISS has opted for the concept of the “The Responsibility to 
Protect.” With this shift of language, the question to be raised is: does the change in 
language make any difference for the function, meaning, and proper use of the principle 
of humanitarian intervention?  
Before I discuss the shift from the language of humanitarian intervention to the 
language of the responsibility to protect, I would like to note that humanitarian 	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assistance, as distinct from humanitarian intervention, has also been the subject of two 
positive resolutions by the UN General Assembly. The first resolution (43/131), adopted 
on December 8, 1988, was on “humanitarian assistance to victims of natural disasters and 
similar emergency situations.” It reaffirms the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and 
national unity of States, and recognizes that it is up to each State, first and foremost, to 
take care of the victims of natural disasters and similar emergency situations occurring on 
its territory. Therefore, the resolution declares that abandoning victims without such 
humanitarian assistance constitutes a threat to human life and an offence to human 
dignity. That is why the General Assembly urges “States in proximity to areas of natural 
disasters and similar emergency situations to participate closely with the affected 
countries in international efforts with a view to facilitating, to the extent possible, the 
transit of humanitarian assistance.” Two years later, the UN General Assembly passed 
Resolution 45/100 of December 14, 1990 concerning emergency humanitarian corridors. 
This resolution reflects the same considerations as Resolution 43/131, and includes the 
establishment of relief corridors.   
It is important at this point to note that a Resolution is not binding, and it is not 
uncommon for a government to refuse aid from another country, or even international 
aid, for political reasons. However, one cannot deny that these resolutions demonstrate 
the access of humanitarian assistance to the body of international law. Compared to the 
content of the above-mentioned resolutions, the NATO intervention in Kosovo is a clear 
example of military force, which is to be separated from humanitarian assistance. On 
March 24, 1999, NATO opened fire on Serbia to stop its forcible expulsion of Muslim 
Kosovars from Kosovo. The military operation known as “Allied Force” continued until 
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June 12, 1999. According to the press release of its General Secretary on March 3, 1999, 
“Allied Force” was to “stop the violence and end the humanitarian catastrophe that hit 
Kosovo.” This military operation did not have the endorsement of all the members of the 
UN Security Council. It was vetoed by Russia and China.  
However, the Allies had their arguments. First, they spoke of non-compliance 
with Resolutions 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998), and 1203 (1998) of the Security Council, 
which described the situation in Kosovo as a threat against international peace. The Allies 
further claimed to have violated neither the territorial integrity nor the political 
independence of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, or any goal pursued by the United 
Nations. The Allies also argued that it was to help the victims of serious violations of 
human rights and of international humanitarian law. The media, politicians, and 
supporters of the doctrine believed to see in this operation a precedent that would 
enshrine military intervention. Yet, among the states of the “Allied forces,” some people 
stressed the fact that the war in Kosovo was an exception, that it should not become a 
precedent, in order not to weaken the monopoly held by the Security Council to authorize 
the use of force. This “exceptional” character of the intervention in Kosovo leads to the 
requirement to consider probable conditions under which humanitarian intervention can 
be authorized.  
One of the conditions on which the consent of the authors seems unanimous is the 
humanitarian goal of a so-called humanitarian military intervention. In this sense, Charles 
Rousseau defines humanitarian intervention as an “action taken by a State against a 
foreign government in order to stop treatments contrary to the laws of humanity that it 
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applies to its own citizens.”674 Following the same line of thought, Arntz argues in favor 
of a possible humanitarian intervention by stigmatizing the “excesses of injustice and 
cruelty that deeply hurt our morals and our civilization.”675 His aim is to highlight the 
minimum standard by which we should judge the necessity of armed intervention. A 
second condition imposed by the doctrine is the quality of the author of the humanitarian 
intervention. While some argue that a collective body may conduct such an operation, 
others justify a right to interfere by any state that has the means to do so. The first 
position is defended by authors like Fernando Téson who argues that individual states can 
act to stop mass killing and massive violations of human rights if the Security Council 
fails to act in such cases.676 Oscar Schachter is in favor of the intervention by any single 
state that has the means to do so. For him, unauthorized unilateral intervention is legal as 
long as it responds to the following five situations: peril of death, self-defense, 
anticipatory self-defense, collective self-defense, and by invitation.677 In essence, the 
issue brought up by the second condition is relatively unimportant because the number of 
states intervening (whether a collective body or one state) does not establish legality.   
A third condition that emerges from some writers is selflessness. To be truly 
humanitarian, they argue, the interference must pursue a humanitarian goal, which is 
strictly disinterested. This condition seems to be unrealistic. In the real world, it is 
practically impossible to separate political motivations and interests from the 	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commitment to intervene. As Peter Maass rightly observes, “You will never get an 
American government, for moral considerations only, to intervene militarily. Moral 
considerations are not enough to move the international community to intervene. There 
should be interests at stake.”678 The truth of this statement is confirmed by the fact that 
there are massive violations of human rights and acts of barbarism committed every day 
in some parts of the world without moving individual states or the international 
community to act because their interests are not at stake.  
A close look at these conditions reveals not only their limits, but also the fragility 
of the consensus that accompanies them. This crisis of conditions is probably the 
reflection of fears about a “right to intervene” being formally acknowledged. Therefore, 
“if intervention for human protection purposes is to be accepted, including the possibility 
of military action, it remains imperative that the international community develop 
consistent, credible, and enforceable standards to guide state and intergovernmental 
practice.”679 In other words, the responsibility to protect human rights must be understood 
as a common and shared responsibility.  
5.3.	  From	  Humanitarian	  Intervention	  to	  the	  Responsibility	  to	  Protect	  	  	  
The language of humanitarian intervention has been replaced with the language of 
responsibility to protect. The real shift is from the right to intervene to the responsibility 
to protect. This semantic shift is the result of the disagreement, by some humanitarian 
agencies, on the pairing of humanitarian ends with the use of force or military 
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interventions. The change of language raises the question of the practical difference 
between the concept of the responsibility to protect and the old language of humanitarian 
intervention. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
pinpoints three key reasons why the traditional language of “right to intervene” is 
unhelpful:  
First, it necessarily focuses attention on the claims, rights, and prerogatives of the 
potentially intervening states much more so than on the urgent needs of the 
potential beneficiaries of the action. Secondly, by focusing narrowly on the act of 
intervention, the traditional language does not adequately take into account the 
need for either prior preventive effort or subsequent follow-up assistance, both of 
which have been too often neglected in practice. And thirdly, the familiar 
language does effectively operate to trump sovereignty with intervention at the 
outset of the debate: it loads the dice in favor of intervention before the argument 
has even begun, by tending to label and delegitimize dissent as anti-
humanitarian.680  
 
With the language of the responsibility to protect, there is a duty on the part of the 
state to act as a moral agent. In virtue of this duty, the state has the primary responsibility 
to protect the human rights of its citizens and of those living in its territory. Such a 
responsibility is both a legal responsibility and a moral responsibility. In cases where the 
state is unable or unwilling to provide the protection that is needed and required, the 
international community has the responsibility to assist a state to fulfill its responsibility 
to protect. Whenever a state manifestly fails both to protect its populations and to accept 
assistance from other countries, the international community has the responsibility to take 
collective action in a timely and decisive manner in order to provide protection and 
assistance to the population at risk.  These three responsibilities constitute the three 
pillars of the doctrine of the responsibility to protect. They are meant to respond to the 	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four major crimes that threaten our common and shared humanity: genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.  
The responsibility to protect human rights consists of three specific 
responsibilities: the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react, and the 
responsibility to rebuild. The first responsibility (responsibility to prevent), which 
consists in “addressing both the root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and 
other man-made crises putting populations at risk,”681 requires three important elements: 
early warning, preventive toolbox, and political will. The early warning refers to the 
knowledge of the fragility of the situation and the risks associated with it. Preventive 
toolbox is the understanding of the policy measures available that are capable of making 
a difference. Political will is the willingness to apply measures that can make a 
difference.682 All these elements are important in order to prevent the tendency to quickly 
move to the second responsibility (the responsibility to react), which more often focuses 
on military actions. As the ICISS expresses it,  
Any new approach to intervention on human protection grounds needs to meet at 
least four basic objectives: (i) to establish clearer rules, procedures and criteria for 
determining whether, when and how to intervene; (ii) to establish the legitimacy 
of military intervention when necessary and after all other approaches have failed; 
(iii) to ensure that military intervention, when it occurs, is carried out only for the 
purposes proposed, is effective, and is undertaken with proper concern to 
minimize the human costs and institutional damage that will result; and (iv) to 
help eliminate, where possible, the causes of conflict while enhancing the 
prospects for durable and sustainable peace.683  
In addition to these basic objectives, the responsibility to protect should include 
political goals; otherwise actions will cause more harm than good. By political goals, I 	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mean the change necessary for peace and development. Such a change encompasses the 
restructuration of the judicial system in order to protect human rights. This political 
necessity is echoed by the just peacemaking theory, which “emphasizes prevention of 
conflict, first of all, by creating a just community and by recognizing and abiding by 
human rights.” 684  Here appears the importance of the third responsibility: the 
responsibility to rebuild. Such a responsibility must focus on durable peace, promotion of 
good governance, and sustainable development. Without these elements, there is a chance 
that the protection and promotion of human rights would remain an unrealistic utopia.  
From the above considerations, it can be argued that the doctrine of the 
responsibility to protect is still in the making. Its legal recognition is still an ongoing and 
unfinished process. It has not yet been fully received in international law. Thus, there is a 
need for developing and promoting a commitment to human rights that encompasses both 
loyalty to a particular nation or state and universal love that transcends the fear that 
constitutes the source of conflicts between states; hence, the importance of solidarity and 
a politics of compassion. In fact, in the complexity that arises from the responsibility to 
protect, there is an opposition between the moral requirement to help people suffering 
violations of their rights and the juridical and emotional concept of sovereignty. The 
apparent simplicity of terms can be misleading, for behind the generosity that claims to 
remove the speck from the eye of a neighbor, can hide a beam of imperialist and 
capitalist goals. Likewise, sovereignty is not an absolute value. It is the responsibility of 
the state to take care of its citizens, but it cannot deny the rights of its citizens to be 
assisted under the pretext of sovereignty. We have to avoid a naïve simplification of the 
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problem of the responsibility to protect either by a hasty nationalist argument or by an 
immature confidence in military solutions. The juridical formalism of sovereignty and the 
ethic of armed intervention on behalf of human rights can both be suicidal. That is why it 
is important to integrate solidarity and politics of compassion in dealing with this 
complexity.  
5.4.	  Solidarity	  and	  Politics	  of	  Compassion	  	  
5.4.1.	  Solidarity	  	  	  
In his paper, “Democracy, Solidarity, and the European Crisis,”685 Habermas 
contends that with the establishment of a common economic government the red line of 
the classical understanding of sovereignty would be crossed. The same assertion is true 
with regard to the establishment of a cosmopolitan human rights regime. State 
sovereignty, in a cosmopolitan human rights regime, is no longer understood as a mere 
protection of one’s borders but also as a commitment to guarantee the same protection for 
other states. This new approach to sovereignty requires that citizens understand 
themselves as both citizens of a nation-state and citizens of the world. Such 
understanding is made possible by means of solidarity, which not only goes beyond 
national borders, but also requires states to assume mutual obligations towards one 
another.  
For Habermas, solidarity becomes an important component of political life once a 
constitutional community reaches beyond the boundaries of a single state. It becomes the 
value that enables citizens to support one another and to share sovereignty with the 	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peoples of other states. Habermas explains the importance of solidarity beyond national 
boundaries by using the example of the European Union citizenry. For him, “the EU 
citizenry as a whole can share sovereignty effectively with the peoples of the member 
states, which continue to enjoy a monopoly on the means for a legitimate use of force, 
only if national civic solidarity also undergoes a transformation.” 686  Such a 
transformation includes, among other things, “the expansion of communication networks 
and horizon of perception, the liberalization of values and attitudes, an increase in the 
willingness to include strangers, the strengthening of civil society initiatives, and a 
corresponding transformation of strong identities.”687 The lack of solidarity is a major 
obstacle on the road to the achievement of a cosmopolitan human rights regime. From the 
example of the European Union, Habermas observes that civic solidarity “cannot develop 
if social inequalities between the member states become permanent structural features, 
and hence reinforce the fault lines separating rich and poor nations.”688  
There is a misconception of the concept of solidarity that tends to limit its 
relevance simply to the realm of morality or religion. This misconception has led to 
exclude solidarity from political discourse. Contrary to any approach that conceives 
solidarity as merely a moral or religious concept, Habermas contends that showing 
solidarity is a political act and by no means a form of moral selflessness that would be 
misplaced in political contexts. Solidarity, he argues, loses the false appearance of being 
apolitical once we learn to distinguish obligations to show solidarity from both moral and 
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legal obligations.689 He expresses the distinction between solidarity and moral and legal 
obligations in the following ways:  
What differentiates […] appeals to solidarity from law and morality is the peculiar 
reference to a joint involvement in a network of social relations. That involvement 
grounds both another person’s demanding expectations that might even go beyond 
what law and morality commands, and one’s own trust in the reciprocal conduct 
of the other if need be in the future. Whereas morality and law refer to the equal 
freedoms of autonomous individuals, ethical expectations and appeals to 
solidarity refer to an interest in the integrity of a shared form of life that includes 
one’s own well-being.690  
 
It is important at this point to note that understanding solidarity as a political act 
does not exclude its moral character. It is precisely because of it moral dimension that 
human beings feel obligated to respond to the suffering of other human beings and to act 
responsibly in order to bring about change. As Habermas expresses it, “we are inherently 
familiar with everyday situations in which we feel obligated to show solidarity with 
strangers, with everything that has a human face, without any hint of self-assertion. Only 
this moral universe of all persons who act responsibly […] is entirely inclusive: no one is 
excluded.”691 It is because of the moral dimension of solidarity that “injustice that is 
perpetuated against any person, the injury suffered by a person whoever they may be, irks 
our moral sensibility and goads us on to moral indignation or to assistance.”692 But, at the 
level of a cosmopolitan human rights regime, one should not simply rely on the moral 
dimension of solidarity. Though important, the moral dimension alone is not sufficient. 
That is why it becomes important to think of solidarity as a political act as well.  	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For Habermas, solidarity as a political act cannot rely on pre-political 
communities such as the family, but on political associations or shared political interests. 
In order to support the argument in favor of the political character of solidarity, he 
presents two ways in which the concept of solidarity marks a change in the semantic of 
ethical life proper. First, conduct based on solidarity presupposes political contexts of 
life, hence contexts that are legally organized and in this sense artificial, not ones that 
have evolved organically. Second, what lends solidarity a special character is the 
offensive character of striving or even struggling to discharge the promise which is 
invested in the legitimacy claim of any political order.693 Habermas acknowledges that in 
his earlier publications (e.g. Justice and Solidarity: On the Discussion Concerning Stage 
6) he connected moral justice too closely with solidarity/ethical life. He no longer 
upholds the assertion that “Justice conceived deontologically requires solidarity as its 
reverse side” because it leads to a moralization and de-politicization of the concept of 
solidarity.694  
Habermas’s evolution in understanding solidarity reflects the evolution in the 
understanding of the concept of solidarity itself. As David Rasmussen puts it,  
Looked at from an evolutionary point of view solidarity combines the classical 
ethical idea (Aristotle) of civic friendship and religious conceptions of the 
relationship of the universal in relationship to the self and transformed politically 
through the notion of fraternité (universal brotherhood) in the French Revolution 
[…] When solidarity finds expressions in fraternité it no longer relies on its 
ethical background but takes a distinctive political form that can be traced through 
its various phases.695  
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Rasmussen describes those various phases in his reading of Habermas’s idea of the 
evolution of the concept of solidarity, which he summarizes as follows:  
Solidarity, the force underlying classical ethical notions of civic friendship and 
religious conceptions of universality in relationship to the self, made political by 
the revolutions of 18th century and the formation of the nation-state in the 19th 
century, is on the threshold of a new transformation through the 
constitutionalization of international law particularly in the European Union and 
[…] on the world stage as well.696  
 
The political character of the concept of solidarity also appears in Catholic Social 
Teaching. As I mentioned in chapter 2, in his encyclical letter, Sollicitudo rei socialis, 
Pope John Paul II speaks of solidarity as not being “a feeling of vague compassion or 
shallow distress at the misfortunes of so many people, both near and far. On the contrary, 
it is a firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good; that is 
to say, to the good of all and of each individual, because we are all really responsible for 
all.” (#38) The requirement to assume mutual obligations towards one another that is 
expected of states and individuals appears here through the acknowledgement of our 
common responsibility to protect and promote the rights of one another. Such an 
acknowledgement can effectively lead to a genuine commitment only if we accept the 
otherness of others. As David Hollenbach notes, “solidarity requires efforts to understand 
those who are different, to learn from them, and to contribute to their understanding of 
the good life as well.” 697  Solidarity brings to light the issue of interdependence 
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understood as “a system determining relationship in the contemporary world, in its 
economic, cultural, political, and religious elements.”698  
From what precedes it can be argued that founding any intervention on behalf of 
human rights on solidarity enables states to stress less the self-interested dimension of the 
intervention. It is not hard to see the many practical implications of the shift from an 
individualistic approach to relationships between states to a serious commitment to 
solidarity. Such a shift implies working to improve socio-political relations. Here, mutual 
interdependence between people should be given more importance than a notion of 
individual freedom or of state sovereignty that excludes openness to others. No one exists 
as an isolated entity (a monad). Humans are, by nature, social beings. They are always 
related to other people. “I” is always understood in connection with “WE.” Therefore, in 
order to build a cosmopolitan human rights regime we have to promote mutual care. 
Failing to do so denies the very ground of our being human beings. Here appears a very 
important question: what does it mean to live intersubjectively and historically within the 
human community? To give an answer to this question is to understand that dignity – 
which is regarded as the starting point of human rights discourse – is realized within each 
particular individual whose rights must be promoted and protected whenever they are 
threatened.  
Thus, solidarity enables us to move from an egocentric “I” to a committed “we.” 
To use the biblical language, solidarity requires us to move from “Am I my brother’s [or 
sister’s] keeper” to “Go and do likewise.” The shift from interpersonal to inter-societal 
relationships brings a new understanding of the concept of neighbor. Therefore, asking 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
698 John Paul II, Sollicitudo rei socialis, # 38.  
	   298	  
the question “Who is my neighbor?” is not merely a spiritual or a religious question. It is 
both an ethical and a political question. It means both what is expected of me as a moral 
individuality open to the light of reason and what should be done to create for others 
conditions that are conducive to a dignified life. As we can see, solidarity goes beyond 
merely honoring the rights of the oppressed. It implies healing the world in order to make 
it a better place for every human being.  
This shift of perception in our living together is clearly expressed by Pope John 
Paul II: “solidarity helps us to see the ‘other’ – whether a person, people or nation – not 
just as some kind of instrument, with a work capacity and physical strength to be 
exploited at low cost and then discarded when no longer useful, but as our ‘neighbor’ 
[…] to be made a sharer on a par with ourselves in the banquet of life.” (Sollicitudo rei 
socialis, # 39) Once we approach the responsibility to protect from the perspective of 
solidarity, we become capable of responding to the social-ethical question of how we 
should live together in a situation where people, groups or countries are involved in a 
serious disagreement or argument about the meaning and content of human rights.  
It is important to be clear on this point. Solidarity does not deny laws and rules 
that regulate the interaction between reasonable beings within a given territory. But it 
goes beyond national borders so as to include service to others, and beyond a mechanical 
application of those laws and rules. As Pope Paul VI observed,  
Legislation is necessary, but not sufficient for setting up true relationships of 
justice and equality […] If, beyond legal rules, there is really no deeper feeling of 
respect for and service to others, then even equality before the law can serve as an 
alibi for flagrant discrimination, continued exploitation and actual contempt. 
Without a renewed education in solidarity, an overemphasis on equality can give 
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rise to an individualism in which each one claims his own rights without wishing 
to be answerable for the common good.699  
From what has been said, it clearly appears that solidarity should be seriously considered 
in seeking international agreements for the implementation of the responsibility to protect 
those whose rights are violated. In other words, solidarity helps us inscribe in deeds and 
structures the determination to promote and protect human rights everywhere. In addition 
to solidarity, compassion is another important element in our effort to bring about a 
cosmopolitan human rights regime.  
5.4.2.	  Compassion	  	  	  
Compassion is often viewed as a spiritual concept, which has nothing to do with 
political life. Thus for many people, compassion cannot be a political value. Such 
reluctance is due to the misunderstanding of the concept itself. As Marcus J. Borg 
observes, “compassion does not mean simply being ‘nice.’ Nor does it mean ‘letting 
people off the hook,’ as if one would say in every situation, ‘I understand,’ and never 
hold anybody accountable.”700 In order to grasp the strength of compassion as a political 
value useful to the establishment of a cosmopolitan human rights regime, we should look 
at it in contrast to its opposites: “hatred, abuse, brutality, injustice; indifference, 
selfishness, self-righteousness (in religious or secular form), hardness of heart; racism, 
sexism, classism, militant nationalism, and so forth.”701 Such a comparison brings to light 
the true meaning of compassion as the capacity to be moved by “the suffering of others 
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and be willing to share that suffering and do something about it.”702 To advocate 
compassion in the effort to protect and promote human rights is to stand against these 
vices. A politics of compassion – to use Borg’s expression – affects our understanding of 
life in common as people sharing the same humanity.  
Thus, it would be wrong to think of compassion as a value that contradicts the 
requirements of judicial justice, to which we often resort in our attempt to address 
conflicts between people or states. The strength or merit of compassion resides in its 
capacity to reduce violence, to avoid duplicating the very vices against which we are 
fighting, and to help victims without creating further victims. Compassion does not 
exclude justice. Otherwise, it would become mere sentiment that opens the door to 
arbitrariness. As a political virtue, compassion promotes a world where human and 
reasonable beings rediscover and assume their common humanity. Therefore, any attempt 
to protect human rights must seriously take into account the “politics of compassion.”  
5.5.	  Conclusion	  	  	  
The responsibility to protect human rights is a common and shared responsibility. 
The increasing awareness of such a responsibility helps us understand that human rights 
are not favors granted to an individual but necessary requirements that not only facilitate 
a harmonious interaction within human community whose members share the same 
humanity, but also transcend the arbitrariness of any human authority. Such a 
responsibility implies creating conditions that lead to durable peace, promotion of good 
governance, and sustainable development. This means that the protection of every 
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individual’s dignity must be the justification of any action on behalf of human rights. 
That is why state sovereignty cannot be an excuse for perpetrating human rights 
violations, to such an extent that it becomes an amoral function of authority and of 
control.  
Fundamental human rights must be considered the principle of reference of state 
sovereignty. When a State no longer plays its role and no longer fulfills its obligations, its 
right to self-determination and sovereignty may become moot. In other words, when a 
state no longer protects human rights and the common good, its very existence has no 
more moral justification. The general will to build a world based on humanizing values, 
capable of rehabilitating the human image altered by the excessiveness of human rights 
violations, should be accompanied by the firm determination to embody statements of 
intent contained in different treaties and declarations. Otherwise, they will remain texts 
that are good for intellectual satisfaction without any impact on peoples’ lives.  
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General	  Conclusion	  
 
The majority of human rights scholars conceive human rights as either moral 
rights or legal rights. Those who take the moral approach refer to human rights as rights 
that people have by virtue of their humanity. For them, human rights as moral rights do 
not presuppose any state system. Those who conceive human rights as legal rights 
understand them as rights that are meant to limit the sovereignty of the state and require a 
system of state. To approach human rights merely as either legal rights or moral rights 
fails to capture their full meaning and scope and weakens the effectiveness of their 
implementation.  
In this dissertation I have advocated an approach that considers human rights as 
both moral and legal rights. The advantage of such an approach is its capacity to 
understand human rights primarily in terms of the kind of world free and reasonable 
beings would like to live in rather than only in terms of what we are legally entitled to. 
This does not imply that the idea of entitlement is completely excluded from human 
rights discourse. There is an entitlement, but of a different kind: every individual has the 
moral entitlement to be granted conditions that lead to a dignified life.  
To conceive human rights as both moral and legal rights is crucial in the world of 
today because the observance and respect of human rights cannot rely simply on the good 
will and moral motivation of individuals. They require an enforcement mechanism that 
helps those who are not morally motivated to refrain from violating the rights of others. 
Without a legal mechanism of enforcement, the understanding of human rights would be 
reduced to framing moral claims against injustices. That is why moral rights need to be 
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protected by legal processes in order for them to be effective human rights. Otherwise, 
they remain declarations without any significant impact on peoples’ lives.  
In the current configuration of the world, legal human rights provide a legal 
framework that compensates for the deficiencies in the implementation of moral human 
rights. The moral-legal approach to human rights not only challenges the exclusively 
negative approach to fundamental liberties but also enables us to understand that human 
rights are not only about individual entitlements, but also about the kind of world we 
would like to live in: a world with legal structures that allow every human being to have 
the opportunity to live a dignified life, and to respect and promote the rights and well-
being of others. 
I began this dissertation by presenting Habermas’s conception of human rights in 
Between Facts and Norms. I argued that the reading of Between Facts and Norms has led 
many readers to identify Habermas with those scholars who approach human rights from 
a legal point of view. The main line of criticism against him has been that he neglected 
the moral dimension of human rights and ended up subordinating morality to law. Many 
of Habermas’s critics did not take into account his purpose in writing Between Facts and 
Norms. In his project of reconstructing law, Habermas intended to address the question of 
the legitimacy of modern law, which he understood as good arguments for a law to be 
recognized as right and just. For him, modern law has two sources of legitimacy: human 
rights and popular sovereignty. He affirms their mutual presupposition in a system of 
rights within a constitutional democracy.  
The affirmation of the interdependence of human rights and popular sovereignty 
is Habermas’s answer to the classical liberal conception of human rights and the civic 
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republican conception of popular sovereignty. Both of these currents of thought view the 
relationship between human rights and popular sovereignty as an antagonistic one. While 
classical liberals hold that human rights are the only source of legitimacy of modern law 
and defend them in order to guarantee individual rights and avoid the tyranny of the 
majority, civic republicans argue that popular sovereignty is the only source of legitimacy 
of modern law. Therefore, nothing can be accepted unless it corresponds to the authentic 
life project of the ethical-political will of a self-actualizing collectivity.  
For Habermas, the justification of the legitimacy of modern law is realized 
through the democratic process that grants every individual the opportunity to participate 
in the democratic opinion- and will-formation. Such participation requires rules that can 
guarantee fair and equal participation for all. The system of rights guarantees such 
fairness and equality. It outlines the basic rights that free and equal citizens should grant 
to one another if they want to regulate their life in common by means of positive law. 
Habermas’s system of rights consists of five categories: equal individual liberties, right to 
membership, right to legal protection, right to political participation, and the provision of 
adequate living conditions (socially, technologically, and ecologically). Because of his 
approach to human rights in Between Facts and Norms, which has been criticized for 
underemphasizing the moral aspect of human rights, some critics regard Habermas as a 
legal positivist.  
In the second chapter of this dissertation I examined the current debate between 
legal positivists and non-positivists in order to show that not only is Habermas’s 
approach different from legal positivism, but that he also discusses the question of law 
from a moral point of view. His moral theory known as discourse ethics is understood as 
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a moral theory based on justice and respect for the other. He conceives law and morality 
in a complementary way: law compensates for the functional weaknesses of morality, 
which relies on the weak sanctions of a guilty conscience, and morality tempers the 
mechanical implementation of positive law.  
For legal positivists, the legal validity of positive law is not determined by 
morality. A law is legally valid, though unjust, as long as the procedure of its enactment 
was respected. For non-positivists, legal norms are valid only if they are consistent with 
morality. Any unjust law is not a valid law. Unlike legal positivism, Habermas argues for 
the integration of law and morality through interaction or rational discourse. For him, if 
law has to fulfill its function of regulating and stabilizing behavioral expectations among 
those who want to intersubjectively share life in common, it must “be at least in harmony 
with moral principles that claim a general validity that extends beyond the limits of any 
concrete legal community” (I.O., 245). The complementarity of law and morality plays 
an important role in securing a world where human dignity is protected and promoted and 
human rights are understood primarily in terms of the kind of world we would like to live 
in, rather than simply in terms of what we are legally entitled to.  
In chapter three, I argued that grasping the relationship between human rights and 
human dignity is the starting point in the realization of such a world. Both notions are 
intrinsically related. Human dignity provides the basis from which human rights are 
interpreted and justified. That is, human dignity justifies the requirement to respect every 
individual’s rights. It is regarded as the standpoint from which individuals can claim 
rights from one another. Its justification as the foundation of human rights was 
approached from religious, philosophical, and experiential perspectives. The religious 
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perspective argued that human beings have dignity because they are created in the image 
of God. From creation they are endowed with the dignity that places them above the 
created world and other created beings. This language is comprehensible in a religious 
context, but makes less sense in a secular context. That is why the secular approach to 
human dignity, based on Kant’s understanding of the concept of dignity, highlighted the 
notion of autonomy (human beings’ freedom and capacity to set goals for themselves) in 
virtue of which human beings can claim to be endowed with dignity and can make rights 
claims upon others. In brief, the secular approach contends that human beings have 
dignity because of their capacity for freedom under the moral law or their capacity for 
moral self-determination.  
The third approach to the relationship between human rights and human dignity 
emphasized the experiential meaning of human dignity, which is trigged by the 
experience of human sufferings, atrocities, and moral outrages. Such experiences lead to 
the commitment to promote and protect the human rights of every individual. The 
experiential meaning of human dignity provides a less controversial justification of 
respect for human rights. Whether a person believes or does not believe in the religiously 
based approach or secular approach to human dignity, he or she will agree that human 
sufferings and atrocities violate people’s human rights. The experience of humiliation and 
human suffering is the door through which the concept of human dignity enters into 
human consciousness and into the legal texts where if finds conceptual articulation and 
elaboration.  
The concept of human dignity enables Habermas to develop the moral dimension 
of his approach to human rights. He describes human dignity as the bridge between the 
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legal and moral aspects of human rights. Because of human dignity, legal systems have 
taken into account moral considerations in the enactment of laws. Simply put, human 
dignity has allowed morality to enter into law. Human dignity helps us maintain the 
balance between different categories of rights. It allows members of a democratic legal 
order to grant themselves rights that are necessary for members of a political community 
to live in mutual respect as free and equal citizens.  
Habermas shows that if we understand human rights both as rights that have the 
legal form of subjective rights and as rights with a universal moral content, then we 
should admit that they could be sufficiently justified by moral arguments alone. 
Reconciling law and morality in human rights discourse enables us to understand human 
rights in terms of the world we would like to live in, rather than simply in terms of legal 
entitlements. In that sense, human rights should not be limited to protecting people from 
the abuses and harms that can be inflicted by their states. They must include promoting 
conditions that enhance every human being’s well-being and flourishing.  
In chapter four I argued for an approach that conceives human rights as both 
moral and legal rights. The complexity for our contemporary world requires that we shift 
from a “morally-oriented” understanding of human rights to a “moral-legally” oriented 
approach. In order to provide protections and resources that are generally needed for a 
minimally good or decent life, there must be institutions that can provide a stable basis 
for social integration. Thus, instead of understanding human rights only as moral rights 
we should equally emphasize their legal aspects. The traditional understanding of human 
rights simply as moral norms or moral claims has become ineffective. It made more sense 
after the atrocities of World Word II, perhaps because it appealed more to human 
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conscience then than it does now. Such understanding has become questionable in a 
globalized world where human rights are used to justify military invasions and 
interference in the internal affairs of other countries.  
The reluctance to give equal weight to both moral and legal aspects of human 
rights results from the failure to distinguish legal rights that are created by the law from 
legal rights that are recognized by the law. When I argued that human rights should also 
be conceived as legal rights, I understood their legality as a legal recognition by the 
legally established authority. That is, they are rights recognized by the law and not rights 
created by the law. In this sense, when the law recognizes human rights, the latter acquire 
a legal status. The acquisition of a legal status does not empty the moral content of 
human rights. Rather, it enhances their effectiveness in providing and ensuring minimal 
decent living conditions conducive to human flourishing.  
The achievement of such a goal requires structures that facilitate social 
integration. That is why I advocated the existence of a strong civil society that can 
stimulate discussion in the public sphere and promote a vigilant citizenry that is 
committed to building a society grounded in the respect and promotion of human rights. 
Using the example of the Democratic Republic of Congo, I held that the existence of an 
active civil society is crucial to the vitality of political democracy. It inculcates in people 
values such as justice, equality, freedom, and political participation that must be 
internalized and practiced in order to build and sustain a stable and legitimate democratic 
system based on respect for human rights.  
In chapter five I contended that respect for human rights and their protection 
require an international effort. There is a moral obligation for the international 
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community to assist states in fulfilling their primary responsibility to secure human rights 
for their citizens. In that sense the protection of human rights becomes a common and 
shared responsibility and requires the establishment of a cosmopolitan human rights 
regime. Such a regime is based on the conviction that all human beings are members of a 
community of fate and they share common human values that transcend the limits of 
nation-states. In a cosmopolitan human rights regime people are protected as persons and 
not as citizens of particular states. The realization of such a regime requires solidarity and 
the politics of compassion.  
The establishment of a cosmopolitan human rights regime raises the issue of 
compatibility between the function of international human rights and state sovereignty. 
This issue leads to the question of whether the common and shared responsibility to 
protect human rights is possible in cases where it conflicts with the principle of 
nonintervention or the principle of state sovereignty. The principle of state sovereignty is 
often justified by the idea of the “reason for sovereignty,” which refers to the 
exclusiveness of the original and supreme power that belongs to the state. Because of the 
“reason for sovereignty,” the political independence of each state is to be respected. But 
the complexity of the nature of international relations challenges the absolute sovereignty 
of the state. Thus, it becomes imperative to move from reason for sovereignty to 
sovereignty of reason, which is understood as responsibility and implies partial 
abandonment of sovereignty for the sake of the international common good.  
With sovereignty of reason, citizens of states understand themselves as both 
members of their nation-states and members of the world society. Such understanding is 
made possible by means of solidarity, which requires states to assume mutual obligations 
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towards one another. This double identity of citizens provides the road to the effective 
building of a cosmopolitan human rights regime. The lack of solidarity beyond national 
borders is the major stumbling block on the road to the realization of effective human 
rights protection. Solidarity brings to light the issue of interdependence among states by 
enabling nations to shift from an individualistic approach to relationships between states 
to a serious commitment to improving socio-political relations. Solidarity promotes 
mutual interdependence and challenges any notion of individual freedom or of state 
sovereignty that excludes openness to others. Solidarity goes beyond merely honoring the 
rights of the oppressed. It implies creating for others conditions that are conducive to a 
dignified life. Simply put, solidarity helps the community of nations to inscribe in deeds 
and structures the determination to promote and protect human rights everywhere.  
In addition to solidarity, the realization of a cosmopolitan human rights regime 
requires the politics of compassion, which affects our understanding of life in common as 
people sharing the same humanity. The politics of compassion allows states to reduce 
violence, to avoid duplicating the very vices against which they fight. It helps victims 
without creating further victims. In short, as a political virtue, compassion promotes a 
world where human and reasonable beings rediscover and assume their common 
humanity. In such a world, the responsibility to protect human rights is understood as a 
common and shared responsibility.  
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